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PREFACE
The Mariner 10 spacecraft passed within approximately
48,000 km (29,830 miles) of the bright side surface of the
planet Mercury during its second encounter which occurred
on September 21, 1974. This encounter was designed primar-
ily for television science. The third Mercury encounter, which
occurred on March 16, 1975, was on the dark side of the planet
at a distance of approximately 327 km (203 miles) from the
planet surface. The third encounter was primarily designed
for nonimaging science. Both encounters were highly successful.
The scientific information, both television and non- imaging
science, contained in this document was derived from status
bulletins published during the mission under the direction of
the Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973 Project. The data in these
bulletins were obtained from the Principal Investigators in
near-real-time in relationship to the events discussed, and as
such are to be interpreted as preliminary. For detailed scien-
tific discussions of the Mariner 10 results, the reader is
referred to the reference and bibliographic sections in this
document.
The work described in this report was .performed by the
Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973 Extended Mission Project of
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory whose membership was com-
posed of personnel from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and
The Boeing Aerospace Company.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Spacecraft Team, composed of both Boeing and JPL people, put forth
great personal efforts and solved perplexing problems with ingenuity. Their
development of a workable solar sailing control technique is a major accomplish-
ment in spaceflight technology. Boeing design engineers are to be commended
for incorporating the flexibility into the spacecraft without which Mariner 10
could not have survived for a third encounter. The Sequence Generation and
Navigation Teams responded to the spacecraft anomalies and emergencies in a
professional and outstandingly innovative manner. All Science Team members
extend their gratitude to W. Eugene Giberson, who directed the Mariner Venus-
Mercury Project from its inception to its second Mercury encounter, to Robert
J. Parks who was Acting Project Manager from the post-Mercury II period
through the end of the mission, to James A. Dunne, who was deputized to pro-
vide project direction on a day-to-day basis, and to the Mariner Mission
Operations Team under the direction of Dallas Beauchamp, Chief of Mission
Operations, and everyone involved in this accomplishment. For several days,
many worked around the clock to make the third Mercury encounter a success.
Those involved in the encounter science made great scientific strides in
proving that Mercury possesses an intrinsic magnetic field and a magnetosphere
that is remarkably similar in structure to that of the Earth, providing the
groundwork for new theoretical work on planetary magnetism and new insights
into the physics of the interaction between the solar wind and magnetic carriers.
The cooperation of the Deep Space Network and the Helios and Pioneer
Projects personnel in yielding their scheduled tracking time during critical
periods is deeply appreciated.
Grateful appreciation is extended to the Mariner 10 Extended Mission
Operations Teams for the preparation of this document. Acknowledgment is
made to the folio-wing Mariner 10 personnel:
M. H. Bantell Maneuvers
D. F. Beauchamp Chief of Mission Operations
R. T. Cowley Propulsion
G. E. Danielson Television Science
E. K. Davis DSN Manager
J. A. Dunne Project Scientist
M. D. Ebben Telecommunications
P. Esposito Celestial Mechanics
R. D. Garcia Temperature Control
M. Gray Assistant Chief of Mission Operations
J. M. Hardman Guidance and Control
L. A. Hughes Data Storage Subsystem
W. N. Jensen Assistant Chief of Mission Operations
J. B. Jones Navigation Team Chief
K. P. Klaasen Television Science
R. E. Koch Tracking and Orbit Determination
L. Koga Central Computer and Sequencer
C. C. La Baw Television Subsystem
J. G. Leisenring Power Subsystem
A. Messner Flight Data Subsystem
W. I. Purdy Spacecraft Team Chief
M. J. Sander MCCC Manager
J. Schmidling Data Records
L. L. Schumacher Attitude Control and Articulation
and Pointing
J. H. Thomas TCM Analysis
J. R. Tupman Data Records
B. H. Walton Facilities Operations Project Engineer
R. F. Wong Central Computer and Sequencer
C. M. Yeates Non-Imaging Science
A. R. Zieger Mission Sequence Working Group
V. S. Zum Brunnen Spacecraft Buss Chief
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
CONTENTS
I. Introduction 1
A. Purpose 1
B. Background 1
C. Scope 2
II. Extended Mission Summary 3
A. Sequence Summary 3
B. Mission Major Events Time Line 3
ILL Science Objectives and Results 9
A. Television Subsystem and Science 9
B. Television Subsystem Performance . . . 14
C. Non-Imaging Science—Mercury II 15
D. Non-Imaging Science—Mercury III 15
IV. Mission Sequence Working Group . . . . 23
A. Organization 23
B. Software Functions 23
C. Scheduling 23
D. Sequence Structure 23
E. Problems and Critical Items 25
F. Functions Performed Correctly 25
V. Mission Operations 26
A. Operation Philosophy and Technique - 26
B. Recommendations 27
C. Command System 27
VI. Spacecraft Extended Mission Performance 31
A. Telecommunications Systems 3j
B. Guidance and Control 43
C. Thermal Control 55
D. Data Control and Processing 59
E. Propulsion Subsystem Performance . " . . . . 62
F. Mariner 10 Power Subsystem 63
VLL Navigation 66
A. Introduction 66
B. Radiometric Tracking 67
C. Orbit Determination 74
D. Maneuver Analysis 92
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
VIII. DSN Mission Support 103
A. . The Period April 15 to Oct. 15, 1974 103
B. Program Control 104
C. Implementation Activities 104
D. The Period Oct. 15, 1974 to Feb. 15, 1975 105
E. The Period Feb. 15 to April 15, 1975 106
IX. Mission Control and Computing Center 109
A. Extended Mission Planning 109
B. MCCC Extended Mission Support 109
C. MCCC Operations 109
D. Mission Support Area 109
E. MSA for Extended Missions Ill
X. Data Records 112
A. Science Data Team Activities 112
B. EDR Activities 112
C. SEDR Activities 112
D. Mercury n and m Predicts 113
E. Real-Time Support of Mission Activities 113
F. Recommendations 113
References 114
Bibliography 115
TABLES
1. Extended Mission summary 3
2. Successful commands by mission phase 28
3. Command anomalies by mission phase 30
4. Extended Mission successful commands by
command system 30
5. Summary of Extended Mission TCM parameters 51
6. Attitude control estimates of TCM pointing errors —
TCM pointing error estimate (bias ±3 <r deg) 51
7. Temperature at Mercury I, II, and III 58
8. Trajectory correction maneuvers 59
9. Mariner 10 TCM summary 63
10. Deep Space Stations used to support Mariner 10 67
11. DSN data types used to support navigation 68
12. Trajectory correction maneuver and flyby summary
for the Extended Mission 94
13. Trajectory correction maneuver parameter
summary for the Extended Mission 96
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
14. Goldstone antenna a r r a y i n g experiment key
15.
FIGURES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
character is t ics and comments
Significant project/DSN Mission achievements
Mariner 10 trajectory showing maneuver and
encounter events
Sequence summary
Major mission events time line
TV discriminabil i ty limits
TV Mercury areal coverage
TV Mercury wide-angle view
TV Mercury south polar region
Magnetic field lines
Spacecraft's path at Mercury 111
Mercury's magnetosheath and plasma sheet
Two views of Mercury I and Mercury III encounters
showing bow shock waves
Charged particle count profile
Spiraling solar magnetic field line
Mariner 10's ground track across Mercury
Representative doppler residuals within Mercury III
Extended Mission organization
Schedule/logic diagram for typical encounter
TCM 4A downlink AGC
Sun-Earth-probe angle
33-1/3 bits/s SNR and AGC, May 22 to
June 11, 1974
33-1/3 bits/s SNR and AGC, June 19-29, 1974
X-band downlink AGC mean and standard variation . . . .
Uplink carrier power mean and standard variation . . . .
105
108
2
7
8
10
11
12
13
16
16
16
16
18
18
18
20
20
20
20
20
22'
22
24
24
29
32
32
33
35
36
37
37
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOE QUALITY
32. DSN antenna array configuration 38
33. 117 kbits/s BER-Mercury II 40
34. LGA performance comparison 40
35. LGA performance, Oct. 15, 1974 41
36. LGA performance, Jan. 8, 1975 41
37. TCM 7 predict LGA pattern 42
38. TCM 7 performance plot 44
39. Mercury 111 22. 05 kbits/s bit error rate 44
40. Mariner 10 articulated members configuration 45
41. Solar pressure forces on solar panel 45
42. Earth track and HGA torque versus clock and
cone angles 47
43. Extended mission gas predicts and actual usage 47
44. Limit cycle torques 49
45. Limit cycle and torque versus gas consumption 49
46. Gas Jet pulse rate 56
47. Roll axis gyro—structural interaction excitation-
celestial (roll inertial) 56
48. Roll axis gyro—structural interaction excitation-
celestial (gyro rate) 57
49. Equivalent Sun hours from launch 57
50. Solar panel degradation 65
51. Block diagram to generate two-way doppler (F2) 69
52. Tracking data flow block diagram 70
53. Data quality analysis edit procedure 73
54. Univac 1557/1558 display device - 73
55. Theory of range calibration at a deep space station . . . . 73
56. DSS range residuals 75
57. F2 data on day of superior conjunction 76
58. Assumed plasma-corrupted F2 residuals 76
59. Plasma-corrupted F2 residuals 77
60. Clean F2 residuals data 73
61. Uncorrected F2 residuals 79
62. Roll-corrected F2 residuals 80
63. Significant navigation events 83
64. Definition of B-plane 84
65. Mercury II B-plane solutions 84
66. TCM 4 in Mercury B-plane 85
67. Doppler noise versus Sun-Earth-probe -angle 88
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
68. TCM 5 in Mercury II B-plane 88
6.9. Pre-TCM 6 Mercury B-plane 89
70. TCM 6 in Mercury III B-plane 90
71. TCM 7 orbit determination in Mercury III B-plane . . . . 90
72. TCM 7 post-maneuver estimates in Mercury III
B-plane 91
73. TCM 6 Mercury III flyby 98
74. TCM 7 Mercury III flyby 100
75. TCM'8 Mercury III flyby 101
76. Goldstone DSSC antenna ar ray block diagram 101
77. Mission support area layout 110
JpL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
ABSTRACT
This report describes the Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973 mission operations
Extended Mission. Prepared by the Mission Operations Team, this report
encapsulates the activities from shortly after Mercury I through the end of
mission. The operational activities are reported by Mission Operations Sys-
tems functions providing a brief summary from each discipline. Based on
these experiences, recommendations for future projects are made.
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DEFINITION OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACE-1
ACMO
ADC
AGC
APS
BER
B/R
CA
CC&S
CMO
COMGEN
COPY
CPT
CMRS
DCMO
DN
DPODP
DPTRAJ
DSN
DSS
DSCC
ECO
EDR
EDRGEN
EM
EPIM
ESH
FE
FDS
FDSC
FIP
FLICONS
GMT
GPCF
HGA
Operational designation for the on-duty ACMO
Assistant Chief of Mission Operations
Analog-to-digital converter
Automatic gain control
Articulation and pointing subsystem
Bit e r ro r rate
Booster regulator
Closest approach
Central computer and sequencer
Chief of Missions Operations
Command generation
Program for copying SEDRs
Charged particle telescope
Celestial Mechanics and Radio Science
Deputy Chief of Mission Operations
Data number
Double Precision Orbit Determination Program
Double Precision Trajectory Program
Deep Space Network
Data Storage System, also Deep Space Station (Table 10)
Deep Space Communications Complex
Engineering change order
Experimental data records
Experimental data record generator
Mercury encounter
Magnetometer EDR Program
Equivalent Sun hours
Far encounter
Flight data subsystem
Flight Data System Count (Program)
Fixed Instrument Pointing (Program)
Flight path software control (1108)
Greenwich Mean Time
General-Purpose Computing Facility
High-gain antenna
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LIBPOG
LGA
LSB
MCCC
MCCF
MDS
MOAT
MOPS
MOS
MSA
MSWG
MTC
MTCF
NCS
NIS
NSP
OD
ODR
OPSCOP
OVT
PAFUVS
PET
PLOP
POGASIS
FOR
PRA
PSE
PS&L
RFMT
SCE
SEDR
SEG
SEP
SES
SIRD
S OF CONS
SPOP
'LIBRARY POGASIS Program
Low-gain antenna
Least significant bit
Mission Control and Computing Center
Mission Control and Computing Facility
Modulation-demodulation subsystem
Mission Operations Analysis Team
Maneuver Operations Program system
Mission Operations System
Mission Support Area
Mission Sequence Working Group
Mission and test computer
Mission and Test Computer Facility
Network Control System
Non-Imaging science
NASA Support Plan
Orbit determination
Original Data Record
Operations Control Program
Operational verification test
Particle and fields ultraviolet spectrometer
Probe ephemeris tape
Planetary operations
Planetary observation geometry and science instrument
sequencer
Power on reset
Planetary ranging assembly
Plasma science experiment
Power switching and logic
Reformat
Spacecraft event
Supplementary experiment data
Sequence of events generator
Sun-Earth-probe
Scanning electron spectrometer
Support Instrumentation Requirements Document
Software control
Scan Platform Operations Program
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SOE
SSA
SSG
STUFF
TCA
TCM
TMU
TPAP
TSOST
TVS
TVCA
UVSAG
Sequence of events
Symbol synchronizer assembly
Science Steering Group
Computer program to complete engineering minor
frames
Time of closest approach
Trajectory correction maneuver
Telemetry modulation unit
Telecommunications prediction and analysis program
TV science operational sequence table
Television subsystem
Thrust Vector Control Assembly
Ultraviolet spectrometer — airglow
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is the final report for the Extended
Mission of the Mariner Venus/Mercury 1973
(MVM '73) Program. Preparation of this report
is in accordance with a request from the MVM '73
Mission Project Office.
A. Purpose
The purpose of this report is to document a
brief summary of the MVM '73 Extended Mission
and describe the unique operational features uti-
lized. Sections of the document list operational
items performed correctly and others which were
considered disadvantageous. All items are inten-
ded to be constructive. In the hope of helping
future mission operations, the special techniques
which resulted in time and cost savings are
specifically emphasized.
B. Background
The MVM '73 Extended Mission began at the
culmination of the primary mission, April 15,
1974. Project decision was made to attempt a
Mercury II and possibly Mercury III encounter
based on having sufficient onboard consumables.
Figure 1 shows maneuver and encounter events
plotted on the mission trajectory curve. At this
time it was readily apparent that the most critical
consumable item was attitude-control gas. Due
to problems encountered during the primary mis-
sion, most of the gas had been depleted. Hence,
it became mandatory that a scheme for efficient
use of attitude-control gas be devised.
Maximum television science at a Mercury
encounter was attainable with a bright-side flyby,
whereas a dark-side flyby was desirable for non-
imaging science (NIS). Another dark-side pass,
similar to the first Mercury encounter would
yield very little additional science for TV. In
order to maximize science return, a decision
was reached to make the Mercury II encounter a
bright-side pass followed by a dark-side encoun-
ter for Mercury III. Also, having the bright-side
encounter first fulfilled propulsion constraints
(discussed later).
During Mercury I, excellent TV coverage
was obtained of the incoming and outgoing visible
portions of the planet; but, due to the nature of
the dark-side flyby, it was not possible to obtain
coverage of the planetary areas directly facing
the Sun. Hence, the TV Team requested a
bright-side pass which would provide coverage
of one of the poles. Since the Mercury II return
trajectory was below the planet, the Navigation
Team recommended altering the trajectory for
a southern hemisphere pass. Thus, the primary
objective for Mercury II became: OBTAIN
IMAGING DATA OF THE SOUTHERN HEMI-
SPHERE PROVIDING PHOTOGRAPHIC COVER-
AGE TO OVERLAP WITH THE DATA ALREADY
OBTAINED.
The Mercury II flyby would be too far from
the planet to achieve NIS data other than ultra-
violet spectrometer — airglow (UVSAG) data.
The Mercury I encounter unexpectedly
revealed a planet-related magnetic field. With a
single dark-side flyby, there remained a question
as to whether the field was intrinsic or induced.
It was quite conceivable that the magnetic field
measurements could be stronger than expected due
to solar interaction in the immediate vicinity of
the planet. To detect an intrinsic magnetic field,
it would be necessary to have a close dark-side
encounter. Hence, the primary objective of the
Mercury III flyby was: OBTAIN NIS DATA
DURING A CLOSE DARK-SIDE FLYBY WITH
PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON THE MAGNETOMETER
MEASUREMENTS.
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Imaging data was of secondary pr ior i ty with
the objectives of obtaining higher resolution pic-
tures of areas previously covered and possibly the
highest resolution pictures of the mission.
C. Scope
This report provides a summary of the opera-
tional aspects of the MVM '73 Extended Mission.
Chronologically it covers mission operations from
April 15, 1974 to the end of mission, which
occurred at 05:21 PDT March 24, 1975. The
report is organized according to MOS disciplines
with each section containing problem areas and
recommendations. A bibliography of relevant
documents pertaining to more detailed analysis of
some of the problems is included for reference.
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Figure 1. Mariner 10 trajectory showing
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II. EXTENDED MISSION SUMMARY
A. Sequence Summary
Figure 2 presents the overall MVM '73 mis-
sion summary showing the period of the Extended
Mission. The Extended Mission comprises about
two thirds of the total mission, since the primary
mission was about six months duration. Table 1
lists the key extended mission items and descrip-
tive comments.
B. Mission Major Events Time Line
Figure 3 presents the major events sequence
and a brief summary of the spacecraft subsystem
activity periods.
Table 1. Extended Mission summary
Item Time Comment
Begin extended mission April 15, 1974
TCM-4 A/B
Superior conjunction
period
TCM-5
Magnetometer and
CPT calibration
UVSAC slit cal and
scan platform
engineering test
PSE/SES status
check
DSS tape failure
Subreflector, antenna
off-point, and dichroic
reflector test
Magnetometer sensi-
tivity check
DSS failed
MCCC OVT
Array test
DSS 14
DSS 1Z
DSS 13
May 9, 10,
1974
May 24 start
June 6 conj.
July 20 end
July 2, 1974
July 5, 1974
July, 22, 1974
Aug. 5, 1974
Aug. 14, 1974
Aug. 12, 1974
Aug. 19, 1974
Aug. 20, 1974
Sept. 9, 1974
Sept. 11, 1974
Began routine use of DSS (tape recorder) to obtain
data during DSN tracking gaps. Some DSS cycling
controlled by CC&S routines. Beginning in May
tape recorder playbacks were suspended due to
poor link performance as a result of increasing
range to the spacecraft
TCM performed on back-to-back days due to pro-
pulsion constraints. CC&S parameters were
reloaded between maneuvers
Performed dual frequency S/X band radio science
experiments
TCM provided precise navigation to Mercury II
aim point. Last successful use of onboard tape
recorder.
First magnetometer calibration and flips and CPT
calibration after superior conjunction. Calibra-
tions performed on weekly basis when possible
Performed to support Mercury II encounter
preparation
Determine the response of the channeltrons
Tape recorder not slewing properly; tape motion
sluggish. Appeared to be stuck past parking
window
Performed in preparation for Mercury II encounter.
Tele communications /DSN preparing for antenna
arraying at Goldstone during this period
Determination magnetometer performance
DSS test performed, tape motion obtained but stuck
again during test, unable to move tape again
Verified readiness of facility
Verified array concept and performance using
117.6 kbits/s data from the spacecraft
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Table 1 (contd)
Item Time Comment
Goldstone DSCC test
DSS 14
DSS43
Array test
DSS 14
DSS 12
DSS 13
CC&S load
U-26.0
EM2 encounter sequence
Goldstone DSCC test
DSS 63
TV and UVSAG on
Array test
DSS 14
DSS 12
DSS 13
Goldstone DSCC test
DSS 14
Optical navigation
Far encounter TV
mosaic and UVSAG
slews
Optical navigation
Real time TV mosaics
Jupiter TV pix and
UVSAG slews
TV mosaic
UVSAG step and drift
UVS collector high-
voltage and CPT
priority inhibit
CC&S control
UVSAG slews
Encounter TV
.Sept. 11, 1974
Sept. 12, 1974
Sept. 13, 1974
Sept. 15, 1974
Sept. 16, 1974
Sept. 16, 1974
Sept. 16, 1974
Sept. 17, 1974
Sept. 17, 1974
Sept. 18, 1974
Sept. 18, 1974
Sept. 19, 1974
Sept. 20, 1974
Sept. 20, 21,
1974
Sept. 21, 1974
Sept. 21, 1974
Sept. 21, 1974
Sept. 21, 1974
Checkout of the DSN stations for encounter
operations
Further verification and performance
measurement
Full load (about 500 words) of the Central Computer
and Sequencer (CC&S) requiring approx. 10 hours
of continuous ground commanding
Checkout of DSS 63 for 22.05 kbits/s sequences
Science instruments turn on
Final array test prior to encounter
Goldstone DSCC supergroup test to validate ability
to receive 117. 6 kbits/s in real time at MCCC
Perform optical navigation sequences via ground
commands every 3 hours
73 km far encounter TV mosaic and UVSAG
slews
Two sets of optical navigation sequences to obtain
planet/star relative geometry pictures
Data mode 4 (117.6 kbits/s) with filter wheel
stepping followed by UVSAG slews
First pictures of Jupiter taken by Mariner space-
craft for TV calibration purposes followed by
UVSAG slews of Mercury
Final far encounter 117.6 kbits/s TV mosaics
prior to encounter
UVSAG step and drift sequence to obtain slow scans
across the planet due to spacecraft planet relative
motion
UVSAG and CPT to proper enc mode at EM2-8 hrs
Begin onboard computer control of the encounter
sequence
Performed from EM2-7 h to EM2-2 h and after
closest approach from EM2+2 h to EM2+7 h
Primary encounter pictures were obtained for
EM2 ±2 h pictures received were of excellent
quality providing new coverage of the south pole
region. The antenna array technique used for the
first time during this encounter made possible the
receipt of full frame pictures at acceptable bit
error rates. Ranging was off during encounter.
The CC&S sequence terminated at EM2+8 h
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Table 1 (contd)
Item Time Comment
UVSAG step and
drift
TV mosaic
Optical navigation
CC&S load
U-Z8.0
Acquisition lost
Acquisition lost
CC&S load
U-28.2
TCM-6
1 year in flight
NIS-2 using LGA
magnetometer roll
calibration maneuver
NIS checkout
Aim point selection
CC&S load
U-28.6
TCM-7 aborted
TCM-7
EM3 sequence
preparation
CC&S load
U-28.8
TCM-8 sunline
Sept. 22, 1974
Sept. 22, 1974
Sept. 22, 1974
Sept. 23, 1974
Oct. 5, 1974
Oct. 6, 1974
Oct. 28, 1974
Oct. 30, 1974
Nov. 3, 1974
December and
January
Feb. 10, 1975
Feb. 12, 1975
Feb. 13, 1975
December
through
February
Mar. 6, 1975
Mar. 7, 1975
UVSAG data obtained during outgoing encounter
similar to the incoming sequence
Final outgoing far encounter TV mosaic to comple-
ment the corresponding incoming mosaic
Final three optical navigation sequences followed
by TV and UVSAG off
Onboard computer programmed for cruise func-
tions such as HGA pointing, solar panel tilts,
Canopus cone steps
Loss of Canopus due to particle
Loss of Canopus due to particle. Difficulty
reacquiring without using major portion of
remaining attitude-control gas. Decision to
stay in roll dr if t mode to conserve attitude-
control gas.
TCM-6 maneuver sequence and FDS
reprogramming
First TCM performed with rolling spacecraft
maneuver consisted of stopping at proper roll
angle and performing pitch-burn-pitch CC&S con-
trolled sequence, then return to roll drift mode
Mariner 10 was launched Nov. 3, 1973 at
05:45 GMT
During spacecraft closest distance to Earth data
mode 13 was used to obtain low rate NIS data over
the LGA with the spacecraft in the roll drift mode
Meetings were held to determine best aim point for
science. SSG selected high north latitude darkside
pass as close as possible with primary emphasis on
magnetic field measurements
TCM-7 maneuver sequence loaded for another
pitch-burn-pitch maneuver strategy similar to
TCM-6
Uncertainties in Canopus identification made
aborting mandatory
Executed as planned. Entire maneuver sequence
was retargeted and implemented by working
around the clock. Spacecraft remained roll drift
mode before and after CC&S controlled maneuver
Varying aim point selection created the need.for
developing several Mercury III encounter
sequences. The sequence was very sensitive to
pointing due to the close approach
Small CC&S load to perform TCM-8 sunline
maneuver
Executed as planned. Performed to provide
assurance of not impacting. Created need for
another complete iteration through sequence
software
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Table 1 (contd)
Item Time Comment
EM3 encounter
load, part 1
EM3 encounter
load, part 2
EM3 encounter
load, part 3
Canopus acquisition
TV sequence and
NIS checkout
CC&S load to tweak
encounter sequence
Mercury III encounter
Mar. 8, 1975
Mar. 9, 1975
Mar. 10, 1975
Mar. 13 to
Mar. 15
Mar. 15, 1975
Mar. 15, 1975
Mar. 16, 1975
22:39:24 GMT
TV color mosaic and
TV off
UVSAG slit calibra-
tion and astronomy
Engineering tests
End of mission
Mar. 17, 1975
Mar. 17 to
Mar. 20, 1975
Mar. 21, 1975
Mar. 24, 1975
12:21:00 GMT
Due to multiple project demands of DSN stations
MVM was forced to use one pass per day conse-
quently it was elected to uplink the encounter load
in 3 parts using DSS 63
Tremendous difficulties in acquisition are
attributable to a series of problems. See
Sect. VI-B for details
Far encounter TV in edit mode was obtained.
Magnetometer and PSE checkout sequences were
performed
Redefinition of the aim point from orbit determina-
tion after performing TCM 8 created the need for a
final restructuring of certain parts of the encounter
sequence
Closest approach was about 327 km above the surface.
Primary objectives of obtaining critical NIS data
were achieved. High resolution pictures of Mercury
were obtained, although optimum TV data was not
achieved because the TV edit mode was used due to
station not being able to receive imaging 1 data
(117.6 kbits /s) at the required bit error rate
Outgoing far encounter TV mosaic was performed
with filter wheel stepping. This obtained the data
required for preparing a color mosaic. Following
the mosaic the TV was turned off
The UVSAG slit was calibrated and several UVS
astronomy sequences were performed with good
results
See engineering test results in Sect. VI
Spacecraft attitude control gas was depleted.
Radio subsystem was turned off using DC-55
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Figure 2. Sequence summary
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III. SCIENCE OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS
A. Television Subsystem and Science
1. Mercury II. The first-encounter of
Mercury was targeted for a dark-side flyby in
order to maximize the science return from all the
experiments onboard the spacecraft. The second
encounter provided a unique opportunity to greatly
enhance the return from the television science
experiment by selecting a bright-side aim point.
Synchronisms between the spacecraft orbit.
Mercury's orbit, and Mercury's rotation rate
caused the identical portion of Mercury to be sun-
lit for both encounters. Although no new terrain
was lit, much valuable imaging data could still be
added to that obtained during the first encounter.
Severe foreshortening and high solar illumination
angles precluded accurate interpretation of the
surface structure near the limb regions of
Mercury as viewed on the first encounter (Fig. 4).
The bright-side pass allowed continuous television
coverage of these regions and provided for a
geologic and cartographic tie between the two
sides.
In order to obtain continuous coverage of the
regions of interest with the long focal length
(1500 mm) cameras, the periapsis point was
cho-sen with a range of about 50, 000 km. Although
this large miss distance meant a sacrifice in sur-
face resolution, the greater areal coverage
allowed was deemed more desirable. An aim
point about 35 deg South of the equator minimized
the velocity change needed for a possible third
encounter of Mercury. Television science pre-
ferred an aim point farther South to allow unfore-
shortened photography of the Southern terminator
region. The final aim point was chosen to be
about 40 deg South of the equator.
With this aim point selection, the following
objectives were adopted for the television science
experiment:
(1) Obtain a geologic and cartographic tie in
the Southern hemisphere between the two
sides of Mercury photographed during
the first encounter.
(2) Search for new types of terrain not seen
during the first encounter and determine
the extent of previously recognized types.
(3) Search for basins in the size range 450
to 1300 km, none of which were recog-
nized on the first encounter pictures.
(4) Obtain stereographic coverage of a large
portion of the Southern hemisphere for
quantitative topographic information.
(5) Improve knowledge of the Mercurian
photometric function through observa-
tions at different phase angles.
In order to achieve these objectives, an
imaging sequence was designed that consisted of
a far-encounter sequence for instrument checkout
and calibration, and a real-time imaging sequence
at 117.6 kbits/s in the six-hour period around
encounter. To meet the photometry objective, the
far-encounter sequence included photography of
Mercury at up to seven exposure levels through
the various color filters to characterize the
camera sensitivity at cold temperatures (the
optics heaters had failed just after the first
Mercury encounter) and photography of Jupiter to
give an independent check of absolute system sen-
sitivity. The planned encounter sequence con-
sisted of coverage of the entire sunlit Southern
hemisphere at surface resolutions between 1 and
3 km in an attempt to meet the other objectives.
One picture through the wide-angle optics
(50-mm focal length) was planned near periapsis
to obtain photometric data at the minimum possi-
ble phase angle.
The entire television science sequence was
accomplished as planned. Pointing was excellent;
scan platform backlash was compensated for very
well. The telemetry bit error rate was about
1/35, as expected. Figure 5 shows the approxi-
mate area covered during the second encounter
at between 1 and 1. 5 km resolution (shaded) over-
laid on a map of the coverage obtained during the
first encounter. Areal coverage at good discrim-
inability was increased by about 50%. Figure 6
shows the wide-angle view of Mercury obtained
near encounter and compares this view to those
from the first encounter. Figure 6(a) is the
Mercury I outgoing view, 6(b) is the Mercury I
incoming view, and (c) is the Mercury II view.
The pictures obtained of the Southern hemi-
sphere have provided the coverage necessary to
make a reliable geologic and cartographic tie
between the two sides of Mercury seen on the
first encounter. In general, the South polar
regions consist of a heavily cratered surface
very similar in appearance to the inbound side
seen on the first encounter (Fig. 7). The surface
is crossed by numerous bright rays. Several
large basins, often multiringed, were observed
in the size range of 200 to 600 km. Lobate
scarps are abundant in the South polar regions,
which supports the concept of an early episode of
global compression. With appropriate image
processing, excellent stereoscopic viewing can
be achieved over the majority of the lit Southern
hemisphere that will be extremely valuable in
deciphering Mercurian topographic, stratigraphic,
and structural relationships.
2. Mercury III. The aim point for the third
encounter of Mercury was again on the dark side
to maximize the return from the particles and
fields experiments. Periapsis was chosen to be
about 200 km above the surface at about 70 deg
North latitude. Again, the identical portion of
Mercury's surface was illuminated.
Although the trajectory passed far to the
North at periapsis, the view of the planet outside
of approximately 20 min on either side of encoun-
ter was changed only slightly from that of the
first encounter because of the close flyby point.
Therefore, essentially no new area could be
photographed on the third encounter. The objec-
tives of the television science experiment for the
third Mercury encounter were thus chosen to be:
(1) Increase the resolution of the photog-
raphy of selected targets of interest.
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(2) Fill in gaps in the high-resolution cover-
age obtained on the first encounter.
(3) Improve the color ratio data in the
terminator regions.
The planned imaging sequence consisted of a
far-encounter sequence for instrument checkout
and calibration, mosaics in orange and ultra-
violet wavelengths covering the terminator
regions about six hours out on either side of
encounter, and high-resolution photography at
117.6 kbits/s of selected points and areas in the
four-hour period around encounter.
The actual television sequence only partially
fulfilled the objectives. Difficulties in acquiring
Canopus caused deletion of the early portions of
the far-encounter sequence, although enough data
were obtained after acquisition to calibrate the
system. Difficulties in resetting the roll posi-
tion gyro prior to encounter forced delay of the
color ratio mosaic scheduled for 6 h before
encounter. When the mosaic was actually begun,
the command system at DSS 14 failed and the
mosaic was canceled. The real-time encounter
sequence then had to be performed at 22 .05
kbits/s in the center-strip edit mode because
DSS 43 had hardware problems and could not cool
their maser sufficiently to achieve an acceptable
bit-error rate at 117.6 kbits/s . Scan platform
pointing control appeared good. However, only a
few of the high-resolution targets were actually
photographed, partly because of the quarter-
frame coverage and partly because periapsis was
higher than predicted, and the outgoing trajectory
asymptote was somewhat changed. High-
resolution pictures were received of Discovery
Scarp, the "weird terrain, " and the floor and
mountains of the Caloris Basin. The color ratio
mosaic on the outbound leg was obtained. Pic-
ture processing and scientific analysis of the data
is underway.
Figure 8 is a mosaic of four frames taken
during the Mercury III encounter. Although only
the center quarter of each frame was received,
fortuitous spacecraft limit cycling caused these
four frames to fall close enough together to be
mosaicked. The highest resolution pictures
(600 m) of Discovery Scarp, the target of interest
for this planned mosaic, are shown here. This
scarp, located near 38 °W longitude and 55°S
latitude, is over 500 km long and 2 to 3 km high
and presents some evidence for an early episode
of crustal shortening on Mercury. The distance
from top to bottom of this mosaic is about
300 km.
B. Television Subsystem Performance
1. Mercury II. Television power was
turned on by ground command at 15:40 GMT,
September 16, 1974. The beams and light flood-
ing were enabled at 07:13 GMT, September 17,
1974. The resulting beam currents were:
A = 73 DN read, 122 DN erase
B = 96 DN read, 175 DN erase
Normal operation was observed during the
entire encounter period.
Statistics for the encounter was as follows:
Power ON
Beams ON
Filter steps
Shutters
277.3 h
63.6 h
A = 48
B = 64
1436 each
The television subsystem was turned OFF at
04:39 GMT, September 23, 1974.
2. Mercury III. TV power was turned on
by ground command at 10:47 GMT, March 12,
1975. Power on was confirmed by a change in
the +X solar panel current . Temperatures rose
through the next three days, finally s tab i l iz ing at
-5°C for the A vidicon and -14°and -15°C for the
B optics ( rear) and the Auxil iary Electronics
Subassembly, respectively. Data Mode 1 on
March 15, 1975 provided housekeeping data indi-
cating that all TVS operat ing parameters were
correct . The beams and l ight flood were enabled
at 1008 GMT, and the resulting beam cur ren t s
(A = 77 DN read, 130 DN erase; B = 94 DN
read, 170 DN erase) were virtually the same as
at turn-off after Mercury II.
Near-encounter proceeded without d i f f i c u l t y ,
although the inability to receive 117. 6 kb i t s / s
imaging resulted in the loss of picture side lap
due to the use of the center str ip edit mode to
recover some high-resolut ion imagery. This
also caused some data loss in the very early
outgoing pictures, as the short exposures to pre-
vent smear resulted in data that was active in the
LSBs; the two least of which are truncated in
22.05 kbits/s data.
The outgoing mosaics were conducted
properly with the exception of one filter wheel
step command being overridden by another
entered by command form. A few A camera
orange filter pictures of the final mosaics were
lost until this was corrected.
At 10:30 GMT on March 17, 1975, the TVS
power was turned off. The beam currents at that
time were: A = 71, 116 and B = 91,163. The
measurement of concern, the A vidicon read
beam current, at that time was 9 DN above the
beam starvation level. Cumulative statistics for
TVS operations are as follows:
Mercury III Total mission
Power on 119.7 h 3077. 5 h
Beam on 36.7 h 866.3 h
Filter steps A, 32; B, 24 A, 363; B, 409
Shutters 700 each 6157 each
The television experiment was conducted by
a team of fourteen investigators under the leader-
ship of Dr. B. C. Murray, California Institute of
Technology, Principal Investigator. Coinvesti-
gators included Dr. M. J. S. Belton of the Kitt
Peak Observatory, M. E. Davies of Rand Corpo-
ration, G. E. Danielson of the Jet Propulsion
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Laboratory, D. E. Gault of Ames Research Cen-
ter, Dr. B. C. Hapke of the University of Pitts-
burg, Dr. B. T. O'Leary of Hampshire College,
R. G. Strom of the University of Arizona, Dr. V.
E. Suomi of the University of Wisconsin and Dr.
N. J. Trask of the United States Geological
Survey. Associates include J. L. Anderson of
the California Institute of Technology, Dr. A.
Dollfus of the Paris Observatory, Dr. J. E. Guest
of the University of London Observatory, and
Dr. G. P. Kuiper (deceased) of the University
of Arizona.
C. Non-Imaging Science — Mercury II
This imaging encounter enabled the collec-
tion of data from the other instruments. The
data system was configured so that the p r io r i ty
for real-time data was given to imaging. As of
this writing the Charged Particle Telescope and
Magnetometer experimenters have not completed
analysis of data. The Plasma Science investiga-
tors saw some interesting changes. Details must
await the correlation with the magnetic field
experimenters as to whether they are planet-
related phenomena.
1 . Magnetometer. The instrument was on
and operating normally. However, due to the
large, flyby distance, very little data of value was
obtained.
2. Charged Particle Telescope. The
'Mercury II t rajectory passed too far from the
planet to allow any field and particle measure-
ments of the Mercury interaction with the solar
wind. Since it was a bright-side pass, the infra-
red radiometer did not see Mercury.
3. Ultraviolet Spectrometer. Ultraviolet
spectrometer measurements were taken from a
distance of about 50,000 km on both the bright
and dark side of Mercury, with a predominance
of dark-side measurements. The data has not
yet been analyzed in detail.
D. Non-Imaging Science — Mercury III
1. Magnetometer Experiment. The mag-
netic field experiment on Mariner 10 during the
third encounter dramatically confirmed and
extended the results obtained a year earlier at the
Mercury I encounter. The magnetic field, which
is responsible for deflecting the flow of solar
wind, is unquestionably intrinsic to the planet and
is not associated with any complex or exotic
induction process associated with the solar wind
interaction with the planet.
Based upon the Mercury I encounter results
and a mathematical analysis, a modest planetary
magnetic field with a strength of 350 gamma at
the equator and 700 gamma in the polar region
was identified (Fig. 9). The magnetic dipole axis
was tilted 7 deg from the axis of rotation of the
planet. The Mercury III encounter trajectory
(Fig. 10) was very carefully selected to enhance
the ability of the data to illuminate more fully
the characteristics of the planetary magnetic field
and its deformation by the solar wind. A model-
magnetosphere was constructed which permitted
predictions of the expected bow shock and mag-
netopause crossings as well as the maximum mag-
netic field to be measured.
The actual observations of the characteristic
bow shock and magnetopause show a perfect cor-
respondence with predictions (Fig. 11). The
maximum field measured was 400 gamma, only
slightly less than the 500 gamma value predicted
pre-encounter. The difference is understood,
since the actual flyby occurred at an altitude
approximately 127 km higher than predicted pre-
encounter and used in the model.
The composite results of the magnetic field
measurements establish unequivocally that the
planet Mercury is one of the few magnetized ter-
restrial planets in our solar system. Neither
Venus nor the Moon has even a modest magnetic
field. The results on Mars, due to investigations
by the USSR, are somewhat equivocal, partially
associated with the less than ideal trajectory of
the spacecraft Mars II, III and V.
The origin of the magnetic field is definitely
associated with the planetary interior. Whether
it is due to permanently magnetized rocks or an
active dynamo mechanism in a fluid core is at
present unclear. However, the permanent mag-
netization theory requires a very special
sequence of events occurring during the forma-
tion and evolution of the planet. The active
dynamo mechanism faces some difficulties
because of the uncertainty about the exact struc-
ture of the planetary interior. It is expected that
careful analyses of the magnetic field measure-
ments at Mercury III and comparison with those
of Mercury I shall contribute to a resolution of
this issue. The existence of the planetary mag-
netic field places specific constaints on the
planetary interior in either model, which can
be tested with other complementary data includ-
ing other measurements by Mariner 10. For
example, the distribution of mass within the
interior may be estimated by a careful analysis
of the tracking data following the deflection of the
spacecraft 's trajectory by Mercury.
The magnetic field experiment was conducted
by a team of investigators from the Goddard
Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland.
Dr. Norman F. Ness is the principal investiga-
tor, and coinvestigators are Mr. K. W. Behannon
and Dr. R. P. Lepping of GSFC and Prof. Y. C.
Whang of the Catholic University in Washington,
D. C.
2. Plasma Science Experiment. Data
obtained with the plasma science instruments on
Mariner 10 provided definite indications that the
interaction between the solar wind and Mercury's
magnetic field, to a remarkable degree of detail,
appears to be a scaled-down version of the inter-
action of the solar wind and Earth's magnetic
field. Magnetosphere boundary locations and the
bow shock (Fig. 10) observed during Mercury III
are consistent with the locations that were pre-
viously scaled from Earth's magnetosphere on
the basis of the Mercury I field and particle
observations. In addition, the cool and hot
regions of the plasma sheet and also a polar low-
flux region (similar to that at Earth's polar cap or
the high-latitude magnetotail) are all consistent
with a similar scaling on the basis of the mag-
netic field model deduced from Mercury I data.
This new evidence strongly supports the idea
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that Mercury's magnetic field is largely of
intrinsic planetary origin. The polar low-
flux region was observed for the first time
during Mercury III. Distinctions between the
cool and hot plasma sheets became apparent
from a comparison of the Mercury I and III
data.
Figure 12 shows the trajectories of both the
Mercury I and III encounters by Mariner 10
together with the orientation of Mercury's mag-
netospheric equator, given by the model of Ness
et al. Predicted locations of the magnetopause
and of the bow shock are shown for Mercury III
as well as the observed boundaries and plasma
regions on both encounters. The inbound cross-
ings of the magnetopause and the bow shock
occur at almost precisely the predicted locations;
the outboard crossings were only slightly farther
out than predicted. After crossing the inbound
magnetopause. Mercury III encountered a region
of fairly intense but relatively low energy electron
population (spectral peak at -150 eV, e-folding
energy -50 eV), very similar to the cool plasma
sheet seen in Earth's magnetic tail at appreciable
distances from the magnetospheric equator. A
similar region was seen on the inbound pass of
Mercury I. In Fig. 12, it should be noted that
Mercury I is well below the magnetospheric equa-
tor, and Mercury III is well above. The intensi-
ties and energy spectra seen in Mercury I and III
are similar when allowances are made for the
fact that during Mercury III the instrument (or
spacecraft) appears to be at a positive potential
of about 40 V relative to the plasma. This differ-
ence is tentatively attributed to aging effects.
Near the center of the Mercury III encounter
trajectory, where the projection of the spacecraft
on the magnetospheric equator is behind (or
within) the planet (Fig. 13), a region of very low
electron flux was observed, having a very soft
energy spectrum (e-folding energy <1 0 V). How-
ever, this region was not encountered during
Mercury I because at this point the spacecraft was
close to the magnetospheric equator; whereas in
Mercury III, it was nearly at its maximum height
of about one planetary radius above the magneto-
spheric equator. If the magnetosphere is scaled
relative to Earth, this region corresponds to
about 7 Earth radii. At such a location in Earth's
magnetosphere, very low particle intensities are
also observed, this region corresponding to mag-
netic field lines that emanate from Earth's polar
cap. The origin of these few observed low-
energy particles is still an unsettled and contro-
versial question in the case of Earth and is
equally uncertain for Mercury; they could origi-
nate from Mercury's magnetosheath or from its
tenuous atmosphere. Further study of the
observed spectra should help clarify this ques-
tion. During Mercury III, significant time varia-
tions are seen in this low-intensity population.
The outbound traversal of the magnetosphere
on Mercury III is similar to the inbound, as
expected because the spacecraft is at nearly the
same height above the magnetospheric equator.
By contrast, on Mercury I the electron population
seen on the outbound traversal was quite hot
(spectral peak above the instrument range,
e-folding energy at hundreds of electron volts),
much hotter than the corresponding portion of the
inbound traversal. As can be seen from Fig. 12,
the spacecraft while outbound was nearly at the
magnetospheric equatorial plane, indicating that
the plasma behavior is the same as in the case of
Earth, where the plasma near the equator is
hotter than at the outer regions of the plasma
sheet in the magnetotail.
The plasma science experiment was con-
ducted by a team of nine investigators from five
organizations under the leadership of Dr. H. S.
Bridge, MIT Center for Space Research, Princi-
pal Investigator. Coinvestigators included
Dr. C. M. Yeates of JPL, Dr. H. A. Lazarus
of MIT, Dr. K. W. Ogilvie of GSFC, Dr. J. D.
Scudder of GSFC, Dr. R. E. Hartle of GSFC,
Dr. G. L. Siscoe of UCLA, Dr. J. R. Asbridge
of Los Alamos, and Dr. S. J. Bame of Los
Alamos.
3; Charged Particle Experiment. In the
discussion of magnetic fields and plasma observa-
tions, the emphasis was the major magnetic field
that exists around the planet Mercury and the
interaction of that field with the solar wind plasma
(Fig. 13) which has relatively low energy; i.'e. ,
10 to 150 eV. The charged particle experiment
measures the intensities of protons and electrons
that range from a few percent to very close to the
velocity of light; i. e. , 0. 5 to 2 MeV. Although
these high-energy particles do not carry enough
energy to distort a planet's magnetic field, they
are at the core of energy conversion from mag-
netic fields into high-energy particles by an
acceleration process.
The high-energy particles come from distant
reaches of a planet's magnetic field which cannot
be reached by the spacecraft itself. Therefore
these particles can be used as probes of a much
larger region of a planet's environment than by
the actual probing of a magnetometer. Interest-
ing features about the scale properties of a mag-
netic field can be deduced.
A preliminary examination of the charged
particle data revealed two interesting phenomena.
The first was that intense bursts of radiation were
observed by the Charged Particle Experiment as
Mariner 10 approached and passed by Mercury
during the first encounter. The magnitude or
intensity of this event was very great and the dura-
tion very brief. Such events are apparently
related to solar electromagnetic storms that have
been observed on Earth. The second phenomenon
was a fortuitous first actual test of the idea that
the Sun is emitting a steady stream of nuclear
particles along its magnetic field lines that
extend outward from the Sun and are in corotation
with it.
During the first Mercury Encounter bursts
of high-energy radiation were observed that
extended several orders of magnitude in intensity,
dying away very rapidly as the spacecraft passed
into the occultation region. As the particle inten-
sities died down, they appeared to ring or oscil-
late at 6-sec intervals. This phenomenon may be
due to a resonant flapping of the magnetic tail like
a flag waving in a breeze. Both low-energy pro-
tons and electrons appear to be accelerated and
taking part in this mechanism. This phenomenon
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occurs so rapidly that there is not enough time
to accelerate them by a process as in a bevatron
or cyclotron. There is hardly enough time to
execute even one gyro radius in a typical magnetic
field. It must be an unstable and explosive event
that promptly dies away. It is related to the
generation of a momentary strong electric field.
During Mercury I, the pass was on the dark side,
close to the planet's magnetic equator, which is
a relatively weak region near the neutral sheet or
the merging region for the magnetic field. This
merging can be considered as an energy source
for particle acceleration.
In Fig. 14, the results of the charged particle
experiments during Mercury I are compared with
those of Mercury III. During the cross-polar
flight of Mercury III, no unusual data were
expected. The particles would have to fan out and
reach the higher latitudes where the field was
expected to be stronger. However, a giant burst
of 300 keV electron radiation was experienced.
The Mercury III data are shown in Fig. 15.
About 2 days before Mariner 10 encountered
Mercury, the interplanetary radiation of protons
was observed to be rising gradually to a factor of
10 above the normal background level in inter-
planetary space. Then, as Mariner 10 passed
behind Mercury, the particle energy level dropped
to the quiet level. In Fig. 16, the spacecraft are
looking down on the Sun, and the magnetic field
lines are seen to spiral outward, where they are
frozen into the plasma. One curved line passes
Earth where it is being observed by the IMP-8
satellite orbiting around Earth. About 4 days
later, a particle burst of the identical energy
range was detected by the Charged Particle
Experiment on board Mariner 10. The Sun's
13.3 deg/day rotation rate is seen to shift the
plasma radiation line, which has a broad sector
structure, about 55 deg in 4 days, and this same
line then passes Mercury with protons having
10 times the normal background energy.
In addition to the Sun being a source of occa-
sional impulsive events like solar flares, the
Sun also has many active centers that emit an
almost continuous particle population distribution.
For almost 9 years, this problem has been studied
at the University of Chicago at a distance of 1 AU
from the Sun. Now, Mariner 10 has provided a
test situation that demonstrated the dropout of the
burst particles as the spacecraft passed behind
Mercury. As the particles flow outward along the
Sun's field lines, they spiral or loop around these
frozen-in magnetic fields. The radius of this
spiraling action does not appear to differ greatly
from the radius of Mercury. Nature provided us
with a giant shutter of the right size to give evi-
dence of the continual emission of nuclear matter
from the Sun. The energy spectrum of the helium
component emitted appears to be 0. 1 of the proton
level and has the same spectral pattern. Fig-
ure 14 is an equatorial plane view of the Mari-
ner 10 flight path showing the region in which the
burst event occurred. The collapse of the mag-
netic fields occurred in about 100 sec. This col-
lapse may serve as an energy conversion source
to accelerate nuclear particles. This informa-
tion may help increase our knowledge of the
effects of magnetic storms on Earth.
The charged particle experiment was con-
ducted by Dr. J. A. Simpson, principal investiga-
tor and Mr. James E. Lamport, co-investigator,
both of the Enrico Fermi Institute at the Univer-
sity of Chicago.
4. Ultraviolet Spectrometer. Extensive
UVS observations were taken on the limbs,
across the terminator, and on the night side,
with particular coverage on the north polar cap
region. Preliminary curves of Lyman Alpha
1Z16 A and Hel 584 A are shown in the Fig. 17.
These are the results of a slow drift of the UVS
slit across the bright limb of Mercury, near the
equatorial region. Considerable Hel is again
observed as before during Mercury I encounter.
The source of the helium is still an open question.
Three very slow high rresolution scans were
obtained on approach and three on the outbound
portion of the trajectory.
5. Celestial Mechanics Experiment. The
determination of the mass and low-order coeffi-
cients in the gravitational potential of Mercury is
one of the major objectives of the celestial
mechanics experiment. During Mariner 10's
second flyby of Mercury, the encounter altitude
was approximately 47,000 km and consequently
radio metric data received from the spacecraft
was of little or no value for celestial mechanics
purposes. However, the encounter trajectory at
Mercury III was favorable for deducing celestial
mechanics information.
Figures 18 and 19 reveal geometric charac-
teristics of the third encounter. In particular,
the altitude of the spacecraft was 327 km, the
spacecraft 's hyperbolic trajectory was inclined
76 deg to Mercury's equator and a geocentric
occultation did not occur.
Radiometric data received from Mariner 10
consisted of high quality coherent two-way dop-
pler and round-trip time delay measurements.
The variation of the doppler within 20 hours of
encounter is shown in Fig. 20. Several features
are immediately apparent: (1) the overall trend
represents the geocentric motion of the space-
craft, (2) the individual curves represent the
characteristic signature caused by the diurnal
motion of the tracking station due to the Earth's
rotation and (3) the distinct signature at encoun-
ter is due to Mercury's dominant gravitational
influence on the flyby trajectory.
Preliminary results for the mass and gravity
field were obtained as follows. The basic data
arc consisted of radiometric data from 3 days
before to 3 days after encounter. Precise track-
ing station coordinates and ephemerides of the
Earth, Mercury and other planets were used in
the analysis and are the result of extensive and
accumulative research conducted at JPL and MIT.
Basic forces acting on the spacecraft (solar radia-
tion pressure, etc.) were modeled, the influence
of the troposphere on the radio signal was
accounted for, and ground and spacecraft calibra-
tions were applied to the time-delay data. Typi-
cally the analysis involved estimating the six
orbital parameters of the Mariner 10 trajectory,
the mass of Mercury, and various subsets of the
low-order gravity coefficients. The results of
1
 Reference numbers refer to Bibliography entries.
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the preliminary analysis thus far concluded are
(1) the ratio of the mass of the Sun to that of the
mass of Mercury is 6 023 700 ± 300 (correspond-
ing to a planetary gravitational constant of
GM = 22031.8 ± 1 . 0 km3 sec-2) and (2) there are
strong indications that the oblateness of Mercury
(J2> is approximately one half of the value of the
lunar oblateness. The mass solution is in excel-
lent agreement with the mass deduced from the
first Mercury flyby (Ref. 23 1 ) - Furthermore,
the uncertainty associated with the mass may be
reduced by about a factor of five, once data
received from both encounters have been analyzed
in detail. Analysis of the third encounter data
for Mercury 's oblateness is complicated by the
influence of other gravity effects and the correla-
tion of J2 with other parameters. Thus, at this
preliminary stage of the analysis and in view of
the above difficulties, it is advisable to place a
conservative uncertainty on j£ of 100%. How-
ever, in order to indicate the sensitivity of the
oblateness parameter to the data, we find a stan-
dard deviation of 6% or less when one assumes
that the influence of all other gravity coefficients
is negligible. Clearly more work is necessary
before the proper value and uncertainty of J2 can
be determined with definitiveness.
A representative set of doppler residuals is
shown in Fig. 21. The rms residual for doppler
average over 60 sec is about 5 mHz. Doppler
within encounter ±20 min was averaged over 10
sec and this fact, in part, accounts for the
increased noise noted in this region. In addition,
within encounter ±3 min, the residuals exhibit a
systematic trend with an amplitude of roughly
80 mHz. Presently, this trend is being attributed
to the influence of other gravity terms in the
potential expansion. However, other possible
causes are also under investigation.
This brief report represents the status of
the analysis af ter a very preliminary examination
of the Mercury III data. A good deal of additional
work needs to be accomplished. Finally, although
the analysis has concentrated on the doppler data,
high-quality time-delay data were measured
throughout the encounter period. These data will
improve the Mariner 10 encounter trajectory and
will determine the distance between Mercury and
the Earth at the time of the encounter. This dis-
tance will be used to improve the ephemeris of
Mercury, and it will contribute to tests of general
relativity which rely on precision orbits for the
inner planets.
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IV. MISSION SEQUENCE WORKING GROUP
The MVM '73 Mission Sequence Working
Group (MSWG) prepared all MOS sequences begin-
ning with simulation exercises- p-rior to launch.
The same concept was continued during the
extended mission. The extended mission MSWG,
composed of key individuals from each functional
sequence area, developed and implemented
sequences similar to the primary mission. A
significant difference in operating procedure was
the structuring of a single major sequence during
any one period. As a result of "scoping down"
sequence development to a series -concept, the
necessary team membership was reduced to nine
key personnel. Sequence reviews afforded cri-
tique opportunities for the entire MOS team,
generally consisting of about thirty personnel.
A. Organization
Figure 22 presents the MOS organization
depicting the relationship of the MSWG with other
MOS teams. MSWG team members played dual
roles in the operations organization, since many
members were also members of another team.
The primary function performed in MSWG activi-
ties was nonreal-time planning and preparation
of executable sequences. Generally, the final
product being the CC&S load and associated
ground commands to perform the sequence.
Non-MSWG functions were centered around per-
forming the planned sequences and reacting to
any problems occurring during sequence execu-
tion. This proved to be a very valuable working
arrangement since MSWG members were aware
of spacecraft idiosyncracies and any difficulties
that might be encountered during implementation.
B. Software Functions
The most significant aspect of sequence
development is the proper use of all the software
progra'ms. Each program performs a specific
task and links one or more individuals to getting
each job accomplished. The MSWG software set
and functions performed are as follows:
1. TSOST (Div. 82). General-purpose
science input program providing basic sequence
structure. Interfaces with SEG, POGASIS,
SPOP, and COMGEN. Used primarily for gen-
erating first cut at encounter sequences. Also,
provided critical interface from POGASIS to
SPOP. Performs rudimentary constraint check-
ing. Used SCOUT conic trajectory program for
trajectory information.
2. SEG (Div. 29). Merges the spacecraft
command files with other sequence inputs to pro-
vide the integrated sequence output. Used to
prepare planning sequences for review/critique
by using TSOST card interface for the bulk of
spacecraft sequence inputs. This technique pro-
vided planning sequences in the same format as
flight sequences.
3. POGASIS (Div. 39). Precision naviga-
tional pointing supplied with plot outputs to pro-
vide accurate pointing analysis. Employed after
initial sequence development and for final trajec-
tory tweaks to obtain initial pointing parameters.
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4. SPOP (Div. 34). Generates proper scan
platform pointing values considering offsets,
biases, and backlash compensation. Final point-
ing parameters input to COMGEN. In the pro-
cessing mode, SPOP uses the COMGEN space-
craft command files to provide an as-programmed
spacecraft command pointing profile for LIBPOG.
5. COMGEN (Div. 36). Provides final
spacecraft command files. Integrates all space-
craft commands for both CC&S and ground com-
mands. Performs the bulk of sequence genera-
tion activities by simulating CC&S, APS, FDS,
and DSS spacecraft subsystems. Provides the
command deck for ground commanded sequences
and interface files for SEG and SPOP.
6. LIBPOG (Div. 39). Produces the final
pointing values with a plot capability to show point-
ing results from those actually obtained from
COMGEN files. Performs extremely important
function of checking programmed values, in partic-
ular, initial positions and backlash compensation.
C. Scheduling
The very nature of sequence development
being tied with software programs used by cogni-
zant team members lends itself to milestone
scheduling. Each software program performs
one or more functions in the sequence develop-
ment process. Figure 23 combines the schedule
with a logic diagram approach. This technique
was utilized often to maintain visibility. Extreme
difficulty is usually encountered in trying to keep
the sequence development process on schedule.
Operating the software identifies many items
which are not foreseeable in the early planning
phase. This often requires modification and
reiteration through some of the software
processes.
D. Sequence Structure
The. major spacecraft constraint to sequence
design was the limitation due to CC&S program-
mable storage (512 words). Tradeoffs were con-
tinually performed between the desired sequence
and the implementable sequence. Two ways to
partially overcome this problem are to reload
the CC&S and to augment the CC&S using ground
commanded sequences. For Mercury encounters,
augmentation with ground commands proved to be
the more desirable choice. Both extended mis-
sion encounters were executed with hybrid
sequences composed of ground commanded far
encounters and CC&S-controlled near encounters.
Mercury III near encounter utilized ground com-
mands for UVSAG slew sequences to enhance
science return during predetermined pauses in
CC&S-controlled slew sequences.
Trajectory Correction Maneuver sequences
and specialty items, such as UVS astronomy con-
tained ground commands in order to provide real-
time sequence flexibility. TCM's 6, 7, and 8
were initiated by ground commands which, in
turn, started CC&S-controlled maneuvers. In
the case of UVS astronomy, the desire was to be
able to control the initial pointing by ground
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command, and let the CC&S execute the lengthy
incremental slew sequences. Utilization of these
types of sequence structure made possible the
implementation of complex sequences within
extended mission MOS limitations.
E. Problems and Critical Items
Mercury II encounter preparation was
hampered by SPOP backlash compensation cor-
rections. Results from the first Mercury
encounter revealed that the backlash was a major
item which must be properly taken into account.
Performing a scan platform engineering pointing
test provided new backlash parameters and identi-
fied nonlinearity in the backlash values. For
example, near cone angles of 90 deg, a value of
4 incremental steps was adequate; whereas at
higher cone angles 7 or 10 steps might be
required. This posed problems in programming
the CC&S mosaic routines and in the post pro-
cessing to obtain L.IBPOG plots. Extra iterations
with COMGEN were required late in the prepara-
tion process to overcome this problem. How-
ever, as a result of under standing this operational
idiosyncrasy, the most accurately pointed pic-
tures of the mission were obtained during the
Mercury II encounter.
Mercury III problems consisted mostly of
uncertainties in the aim point. Although this was
a tradeoff that science was willing to make for a
close approach, it made encounter sequence
preparation difficult, due to the many sequence
iterations required. This problem occurred since
TCM 8 was necessary to decrease the probability
of impact. To overcome this problem, the MSWG
prepared two sequences and then selected the
proper sequence after determination of the aim-
point parameters. This approach created an addi-
tional hardship on personnel, since most mem-
bers performed the dual work role of sequence
development and sequence execution.
F. Functions Performed Correctly
In retrospect, there are several key items
which contributed to the success of the MVM
extended mission:
(1) MSWG staffing was at the minimum
level. Most areas were represented by
a single cognizant engineer. Interfaces
were well defined.
(2) Personnel comprising the MSWG were
selected from the primary mission. In
some cases, these individuals had been
involved in sequence design since two
years before launch.
(3) Although very informal in many areas,
the MSWG maintained signature approval
requirements for flight sequences. This
type of approval meant each area had
reviewed the sequence and added their
comments where appropriate.
(4) The MVM software was inherited from
MM '71 and modified to fill the require-
ments of MVM. Many operational
problems were fixed, and the users
understood their software extremely
well. The program interfaces worked
smoothly. In planning stages card
interfaces allowed easy access for
changes between programs. During
final sequence development phase tapes
and files with additional input by cards
were exclusively used. Good software
is available only after many hours
of testing and operational use; hence,
MVM was blessed with second-
generation software. In addition,
MSWG personnel were well aware
of software idiosyncrasies and
limitations.
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V. MISSION OPERATIONS
The Mission Operations Organization for the
extended MVM Mission did not differ from the
MOS Organization except for its-relative size. It
consisted of five teams, as follows:
(1) Mission Control Team
(2) Spacecraft Team
(3) Navigation Team
(4) Sequence Development Team
(5) Science Team
This section of the final report will deal pri-
marily with the Mission Control Team.
The Mission Control Team consisted of two
elements: the flight control element and the data
processing element. The flight control element
provided overall control and execution of flight
operations including all commanding of the space-
craft. The data processing element provided the
necessary interface between the MCCC data-
processing facilities ( i .e . , the MTC, MTCF, and
MCCF) and the Project.
For the extended mission of MVM '73, it was
necessary to drastically reduce the manpower
levels from the prime mission. For example, the
Mission Control Team was reduced as follows:
ACMOs (ACE-ls)
Command operators
Deputy CMOs
Secretarial support
Data chiefs
SOFCONs
FLICONs
From 5 to 2
From 3 to 0
From 1 to 0
From 1 to 0
From 5 to 2
From 5 to 1
From 3 to 1
In order to provide the same prime mission func-
tions at an acceptable level of support, the
extended Mission Control Team staff was exten-
sively cross-trained to perform other functions.
For example, both ACMOs were cross-trained to
be Command Operators.
The Data Chiefs, SOFCONs and FLICONs
became familiar with one another's functions and
performed the other functions as required.
A. Operation Philosophy and Technique .
The reduced manpower along with limitations
on the number of tracking passes that could be
provided by the DSN (DSN had commitment to
Pioneer, Helios, Radio Astronomy, and Viking)
forced the extended mission operational philoso-
phies and techniques to change from those of the
prime mission. Basically, 24 h/per day around-
the-clock tracking and spacecraft monitoring was
no longer possible. Another constraint was that
the MTC would support cruise phases on a
40-hour 5-day week basis. This constraint was
somewhat flexible in that during high activity
periods such as TCMs and encounters the MTC
supported as required. The constraint was
primarily leveled to allow MTC to r econ f igu re
for the Viking Project and to complete their
prime mission sequence data records generat ion.
The operational technique used from
Mercury I to Mercury II was to place the space-
craft in a rather quiescent cruise mode and t rack
it at least once a day. The operations teams
would monitor the spacecraft in real t ime from
Monday through Friday during normal working
hours. During off hours and on weekends key
personnel were on emergency-call basis with a
reaction time, portal to portal, of no more than
60 min. This was accomplished by assignment
of Page Boy II beepers (ef fec t ive range radius of
80 miles) to on-call personnel. Operat ions
requir ing extended coverage such as TCMs,
CC&S loading, and science cal ibrat ions requi red
that many personnel work extended-shifts such as
12 h on, 12 h off.
For the Mercury II Encounter some person-
nel from the prime mission were recrui ted to
staff their old operational position dur ing the
periods of lower activity, thus allowing the main
crew to concentrate their efforts on the high
activity periods. Specifically, two ACMOs and
one command operator were brought back tempo-
rarily to fill in as required.
The extended mission operations between the
Mercury II encounter and Mercury III encounter
were reduced even further. Again DSN commit-
ment to other projects forced fur ther reductions
in tracking coverage of the Mariner spacecraft .
DSN coverage was reduced to about 7 passes per
week. This level of coverage is barely suff ic ient
to collect minimum required radiometric data in
order to determine an accurate orbit of a nominal
spacecraft. It is also the minimum confidence
level coverage to maintain the spacecraft in a
healthy state. Shortly after Mercury II encounter ,
the spacecraft had problems remaining Canopus-
acquired. The navigation problem and the space-
craft housekeeping problem then became critical.
The spacecraft had lost its reference on the star
Canopus several times due to dust particle inter-
ference in the Canopus t racker 's field of view.
This caused the spacecraft to use up a large
amount of its attitude-control gas, making it
nearly impossible to attain a third encounter if
the spacecraft were to be allowed to maintain a
three-axis reference.
A gas-saving technique was devised and
implemented. The technique was to disable the
roll attitude-control jets and allow the spacecraft
to roll, maintaining two-axis pitch and yaw con-
trol only. This caused several operational prob-
lems, as follows.
(1) The roll rate had to be maintained within
certain limits. If it rolled too fast,
cross coupling in the pitch and yaw axis
caused high gas usage. If it rolled too
slow, low-gain antenna nulls would
cause long periods of no data (telemetry
or radiometric) and the collection of
radiometric data was essential. Opera-
tional personnel were required to support
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on a nonregular shift basis. Days,
nights, weekends, whenever a track by
the DSN was available and when com-
manding was necessary.
(2) The seven passes a week by the DSN had
to be scheduled to allow two to three
long passes per week on the order of
16 to 24 hours long. This required sta-
tion coverage that was overlapping.
These long tracks were required by navi-
gation as their problem now was to con-
verge an orbit on a rolling spacecraft.
The net effect was that it was necessary
to accept tracking gaps as long as
48 hours.
(3) Prior to TCMs it was necessary to
establish a very accurate roll rate as
the technique used for the maneuver was
to allow the spacecraft to roll to the
desired TCM attitude without the use of
gyros or the roll gas jets. This meant
that two to three days prior to the TCM,
continuous or near-continuous tracking
and spacecraft monitoring was required.
Adjustments to the spacecraft roll rate
were made using the solar wind to pro-
vide roll torques, and the CC&tS was
loaded for the TCM when a good com-
mand uplink was available (i. e. , when
the roll position on the LGA was
favorable).
These operational problems were handled quite
effectively by the very small operations crew
primarily because:
(1) The personnel by this time had acquired
a broad knowledge of all aspects of the
mission; e. g. , the ACMOs knew the
Ground Data System, the Command
System, the Data Processing System,
and a great deal about the spacecraft.
The spacecraft team members likewise
had a very good understanding of the
same systems.
(2) Delegation of authority by the Project
Manager, the CMO, and the Team Chiefs
was more extensive.
(3) Total and complete dedication by all
team members was a very significant
factor.
B. Recommendations
Recommendations for future projects that
can be drawn from the MVM extended operation
in the area of the Mission Control Team are as
follows:
(1) The Mission Control Team was under-
staffed. At least three ACE-Is trained
in command system operation are
needed. There always seem to be
periods of more than 24 hours of rela-
tively high activity that require both an
ACE and a Command Operator to be on
for at least 10 to 12 hours of the period.
Also, vacations became a problem with
too few staff members.
(2) ACMOs can handle the Data Chief
function but not the SOFCON and FLICON
functions. The Data Chiefs could have
been reduced to one assuming the
SOFCONs and FLICONs could be called
in to perform part of the Data Chief
function, if required.
(3) MSAs should be designed for extended
mission operations. A small densely
packed MSA is desirable as long as
there is only a small staff. For exam-
ple, the command console should be in
very close proximity to the ACE-1 con-
sole. (In the MVM extended mission,
the command console often served as
the ACE console, as there was often
only one man performing both funct ions . )
C. Command System
1. Command Operations. During the first
ten weeks of the Extended Mission, a designated
command operator was utilized for day shift
command operations. During the off shift
periods, the on-duty ACE-1 was also the com-
mand operator (as well as being the data chief).
After that initial period, all command operations
were performed by ACE-1; during the occasional
high activity periods both ACMOs were on-duty,
one primarily to operate the command system.
If needed, a command operator from the prime
mission (assigned to other tasks during the
extended mission) was available, but was utilized
infrequently.
This arrangement worked quite well. Both
ACMOs had been ACMOs during the prime mis-
sion. Further, one was also the Command Sys-
tem cognizant engineer and the other was ade-
quately trained in command system use and
operations. There was no need to have a full-
time command operator assigned.
Recommendation. Future missions which
have extended cruise periods (or otherwise low-
activity profiles) should utilize the on-duty
ACE-1 as the command operator. At the very
least, all ACE-Is should be qualified command
operators.
2. Replacement of Command System. The
ground command system utilized during the
Prime Mission was also used during the Extended
Mission until January 16, 1975. On that date,
the entire ground command system software was
replaced with what is known as the Redesigned
Command System. During the three-month
period preceding the switchover, training in the
use of the new system was performed on an off-
line basis.
There was an initial scare when the new sys-
tem was used in flight operations for the first
time: the first nine commands transmitted were
not received by the spacecraft. However, the
problem was resolved to be a ground hardware
failure, which could have occurred under the old
system just as easily. Thereafter, commanding
via the new system was generally smooth and
somewhat easier.
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One feature of the new command system was
the isolation of the Deep Space Station command
initialization function into the NCS. Two signifi-
cant problems arose with the advent of the NCS.
One problem had to do with the partial develop-
ment of the NCS: the project normally had to test
whether the command system portion at a DSS
and the portion in the MCCC were in agreement
as to the GMT day. If a difference existed, a
special one-time (per DSS per day) work around
had to be exercised by the Project to resolve the
conflict. The other problem was that the Project
had absolutely no visibility into the state of DSS
initialization or what operational parameter
values had been set by the NCS. A blind faith
acceptance of NCS actions was required.
Recommendation. Provide the Project com-
mand operator the capability to access (and
modify, as necessary) in real time the opera-
tional parameter values set by the NCS; the
Project should have complete control of the com-
mand system at a DSS.
Another problem area was encountered dur-
ing the period when the new command system was
in use, but was essentially independent of the new
system. Hardware modifications (ECOs), were
implemented at the DSSs in preparation for the
Viking Project. Some of these ECOs caused
MVM command anomalies (confirmed.transmis-
sions not received by the spacecraft), although
the changes were not expected to affect Mariner
10. Occasionally, single commands were trans-
mitted to the spacecraft to confirm proper DSS
operation before a series of commands were
transmitted, thus providing the spacecraft team
with a higher level of confidence in the new com-
mand system.
Recommendation. Appropriate equipment
should be installed at each DSS which may be
used to verify command throughput — intercept
the DSS uplink signal as it leaves the antenna to
verify that supposedly transmitted commands
are actually radiated. The equipment need only
be used pretrack during command system
checkout.
3. Reliability and Statistics. Reliability
of the command function during the Extended
Mission was very high as measured by the num-
ber of attempted command transmissions which
were actually received by the spacecraft: 99. 49%
(8942 of 8987). The comparable reliability for
the Prime Mission was 99.82% (15307 of 15334).
The apparently reduced reliability is due pri-
marily to two major factors: (1) the spacecraft
ability to receive ground commands was reduced
by the existence of the low-gain antenna pat tern
nulls, and (2) the implementation of Viking
Project ECOs. If the anomalies resulting from
these two factors are discounted, the rel iabi l i ty
during the Extended Mission was 99.87% (8942
of 8954).
The distribution of successful transmissions
of the six types of ground commands during the
two Extended Mission phases is given in Table 2,
while the distribution of the command anomalies
is given in Table 3. The corresponding distribu-
tion of successful commands allocated to the old
and new command systems is given in Table 4.
The anomaly distribution allocated to old and
new system periods is identical with that given
in Table 3.
4. Manpower/Month Expenditures. Fig-
ure 24 presents the actual manpower expended
per month during the primary and extended
missions.
Table 2. Successful commands by mission phase
Type of command
CC-1/2 pairs (CC&S loads)
CC-3 (CC&S readout)
CC-4 (fixed sequencer)
CC-5 (FDS commands)
CC-6 (APS commands)
DC (direct commands)
Total individual commands
Extension I
1167
0
377
1327
927
292
5257
Extension II2
1032
39
354
430
631
167
3685
Total
2199
39
731
1757
1558
459
8942
Extension I is the period from April 15, 1974 to October 15, 1974.
Extension II is the period from October 15, 1974 to end of mission.
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Table 3. Command anomalies by mission phase
Type of anomaly
Hardware aborts
Exciter / transmitter
failures
CMA/confirm loop
Unreceived commands
Hardware anomalies
Procedure errors
Low-gain antenna null
Unresolved
Totals
Extension I
0
0
0
8
0
0
8
Extension II
1
2
26
0
7
1
37
Total
1
2
26
8
7
1
45
Table 4. Extended mission successful commands by command system
Type of command
CC-1/2 pairs (CC&S loads)
CC-3 (CC&S readout)
CC-4 (fixed sequencer)
CC-5 (FDS commands)
CC-6 (APS commands)
DC (direct commands)
Total individual commands
Old system
1281
12
418
1428
996
310
5726
New system
918
27
313
329
562
149
3216
Total
2199
39
731
1757
1558
459
8942
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VI. SPACECRAFT EXTENDED MISSION PERFORMANCE
A. Telecommunications Systems
During the Extended Mission, telecommunica-
tions systems, performance was monitored in a
wide variety of operational modes. These ranged
from 117.6 kbits/s imaging data being transmitted
over the high-gain antenna to 8-1/3 bits/s engi-
neering data being transmitted over the low-gain
antenna. Performance objectives were met or
exceeded in all phases of operations. No anom-
alies or failures were recorded in this period.
The following sections will summarize the char-
acteristics and performance of the individual
mission phases.
1. Mercury I to Mercury II Cruise
a. Trajectory Correction Maneuvers (TCMs).
Two TCM' s were performed during the cruise.
TCM 4 took place in two parts on May 9 and 10,
1974. TCM 5 occurred on July 2, 1974. The
same basic sequence was used on each. The
spacecraft was commanded to Data Mode 21
(33-1/3 bits/s uncoded engineering data) and
switched from the high-gain antenna to transmit-
ting over the low-gain antenna. The roll and
pitch turns were then performed. During the
burns the data rate was 2450 bits/s block-coded
engineering data. It was recorded by the Data
Storage subsystem for playback at a later time.
Real-time data reception was not possible at this
data rate as the turns required for the TCMs
placed the spacecraft in a minimum gain area on
the low-gain antenna pattern, hereafter referred
to as a LGA null. Figure 25 shows typical link
performance during the maneuver periods. As
can be seen performance was varied depending on
the data mode. The period of no data is when
2450 bits/s data was being transmitted over the
LGA during the burn. Although this plot of down-
link AGC is of TCM 4A it is very representative
of TCM 4B and TCM 5 performance.
b. Solar superior conjunction. Superior
conjunction took place during May and June 1974.
The Earth, Sun, and the spacecraft were most
nearly aligned in a straight line, with the space-
craft on the opposite side of the Sun from the
Earth, on June 6, 1974. Telecommunications
performance was influenced primarily by: (a) the
separation angle between the Sun and where the
antenna is pointed, i. e. , Sun-Earth-Probe (SEP)
angle, (b) the level of solar activity, and (c) the
communications mode. The SEP angle is mea-
sured with respect to the center of the Sun. A
plot of the SEP angle during this period is shown
in Fig. 26. Communications modes determine
the relative amounts of power placed in the phase-
modulated carrier, its sidebands, and also the
bandwidths of the data channels.
This section will deal primarily with the
effects of solar activity on the 33-1/3 bits/s
uncoded rate. There is also some information
provided on the X-band downlink AGC. However,
due to the X-band failure during the prime mis-
sion the data is somewhat clouded.
Solar activity was predicted to be low for
MVM1 73 superior conjunction. The average
predicted solar activity is only an average, and
.it is the solar flares that are truly disruptive of
S-band communications. Large flares occurred
about one month after the MVM'73 conjunction
(time relative to minimum SEP angle).
The characteristics of the solar conjunction
period are:
(a) Bit error rate increased as SEP
decreased with no total loss of data
during the entire period.
(b) Usable two-way S-band doppler and
S-band ranging was received though
the noise level increased.
(c) X-band downlink, X-band ranging, and
X-band two-way doppler was too noisy
for any use due to the multiplication
of the S-band noise by the 11/3 X/S-band
transmission ratio on the X-band
downlink.
Because of manpower limitations and the
pressure of other tasks, proper monitoring was
not possible. In addition, because of severe
computer processing limitations in terms of
recording and display associated with the data
taking itself, it was necessary to manually record
most data in real time. The data observed was
on a digital television monitor, and it consisted of
the receiver AGC from the two Block III receivers
at the station (and in the case of DSS 14, one of
the Block IV receivers used for X-band). Also,
there was SNR from one or two strings or chains
of telemetry receiving equipment (subcarrier
demodulator assembly, symbol synchronizer
assembly, TCP, etc. )
As already indicated, most of the data con-
sisted of cruise telemetry at 33-1/3 bit/s. Be-
cause of the need for real-time manual monitor-
ing, observation periods were limited to between
20 min and 2 or 3 h per day, and this would be
divided into one to three periods over the working
day. The AGC and SNR readings were recorded
once every 30 s with mean and standard deviation
being calculated for each period.
Figure 27 represents all the data available
from the time observation was begun (May 25,
1974) until five days after minimum SEP angle
(June 10, 1974). Figure 28 continues the data
through July 19, 1974 in a somewhat simplified
manner.
Starting with the AGC in Fig. 27, the circled
dots represent the mean of the AGC over i5-min
periods each day, with the receiver in the wide
loop bandwidth. If there were more than one such
15-min period on a given day, .the AGC's were
averaged. The dots surrounded by triangles are
similar AGCs when the receiver was in narrow-
loop bandwidth. Several days of questionable
data was not included when the configuration was
uncertain. The rest of the data shows that the
narrow-loop bandwidth produced an indicated AGC
about half a decibel higher than that wide-loop
bandwidth. The data is generally, but not
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entirely, from DSS 14.
from DSS 63-»
The early data is
The bottom half of Fig. 27 shows the 33-1/3
bits/s cruise mode SNR. Again, some of the data
occurred with the loop bandwidth in the wide posi-
tion (circled dots) and some in the narrow position
(triangled dots). (In general, the wide bandwidth
resulted in an indicated SNR that was 2 to 3 dB
higher than when the narrow bandwidth was used.^
Minimum SEP angle occurred on June 5,
1974 (GMT Day 156). Maximum AGC degradation
occurred two days later, on June 7, 1974. Maxi-
mum SNR degradation occurred three days later
on June 10. However, AGC variation during the
week, centered on June 5, was less than 0. 5 dB .
and SNR variation was less than 1 dB. SEP angle
was changing very slowly.
The standard deviation is indicated by the
vertical line centered on the dot for each day. The
reason for the extreme change in AGC variation on
June 6, relative to the other days nearby, is not
known unless the station Digital Instrumentation
Subsystem AGC smoothing factor was set different-
ly on that one day. This factor results in the cur-
rent AGC output being affected by from 0 to 19 of
the previous AGC outputs. The SNR standard de-
viation on June 6 is only slightly larger than on
nearby days.
Figure 28 provides data only for the wide loop
bandwidth. Once SEP angle had increased to
' 3 deg, there was a single DSS 14 pass weekly in
which the 33-1/3 bits/s cruise mode was avail-
able. The data on Days 182 and 189 (July 1 and
July 8, 1974) is interesting. "Importance 1"
solar flares occurred on July 4 and 5, and high
to very high solar activity occurred during the
entire week. A large scatter, but small degrada-
tion, occurred on the indicated S-band AGC. The
degradation of the SNR was larger on July 1 than
on July 8, but the scatter was more than twice as
much as July 8 than on July 1. After the July 8
observation, the Sun entered a quiet period of
activity. By the time the SEP angle was 6 deg,
the scatter in the data seemed to show that condi-
tions were back to the way they were before the
Sun had a perceptible effect on the downlink.
Because of various spacecraft problems dur-
ing the mission, the X-band transmitter was not
operating normally at all times. However, the
degradations discussed in this paragraph are
believed to be due mainly to the solar effects and
not the X-band transmitter anomalies.
Figure 29 is a summary of the Block IV
receiver AGC from the X-band downlink. Imme-
diately apparent is the great difference between
the one-way and the two-way signature. Com-
pared to two-way, the one-way AGC has a much
higher mean and a much lower standard deviation.
The degradation in two-way AGC is.caused by the
effects on the S-band uplink caused by its passage
close to the Sun. Phase jitter in the spacecraft
S-band receiver is multiplied by the factor 11/3
before being applied to the X-band downlink
carrier. The spacecraft S-band receiver can
follow (to some degree) the phase transients.
However, the ground receiver has much less
success in following the phase transients which
have been multiplied by 11/3.
One significant accomplishment was achieved
when spacecraft telemetry was received through-
out the superior conjunction period. MM'69 and
MM1 71 each had 20-day blackouts of telemetry.
•Therefore, for the first time the effects on the
S-band uplink could be deduced directly by means
of telemetry. Figure 30 shows that solar effects
on the uplink were significant. There were some
bit errors induced in the downlink telemetry;
however, most of the data points shown in the
computer-generated plot lie within the range of
-128 to -136 dBm and are considered therefore to
be valid. On the day shown, May 29, the SEP
was 2. 2 deg, and the amplitude fluctuations on the
uplink AGC were about 8 dB peak-to-peak. Fig-
ure 31 is a summary plot of DSS 14 100 kW uplink
AGC mean and standard deviation for the entire
period. The use of DSS 14 100 kW transmitter
was ended prior to loss of all solar effects.
When comparing the uplink and downlink AGC,
plots for this period it should be noted that the
respective measurement quantizations are quite
different. The uplink AGC measurement is taken
from the spacecraft telemetry stream and each
DN (data number) equals a quantization of approxi-
mately 1 dB. The downlink AGC measurement is
received in the DSN monitor block data and each
DN equals a quantization of -0. 016 dB. There-
fore, a greater scatter is seen in the uplink AGC
data.
2. Mercury II Encounter. The second
Mercury encounter was designed primarily as a
TV pass. Therefore it was important to provide
117 kbits/s imaging data with the lowest possible
BER. At Mercury I encounter the actual per-
formance was a BER ranging from 2.35 per 100
to 2.63 per 100. However, Mercury II encounter
was to take place at a greater range (i.e., higher
BER) and with the tape recorder failure was
restricted to either 117 kbits/s real-time coverage
or 22 kbits/s quarter-strip pictures.
With DSS 14 in a listen-only configuration
using the super-cooled maser a BER of 4. 4 per
100 to 4.9 per 100 was expected. In order to
improve the performance capabilities it was
determined that by arraying the antennas (Fig. 32)
of DSS 14, DSS 12, and DSS 13, each in a low-
noise configuration, and by using a special signal
combiner the BER could be lowered to 3. 0 per 100
to 3.3 per 100. Additional antenna arraying
details are discussed in Sections VIII-A-7 and
VIII-C. In addition a further option was used, in
that by using the Mercury I occultation analog
recorders at DSSs 14 and 43 the BER could pos-
sibly be lowered to even 1.6 per 100. This would
be accomplished by recording the SSA soft deci-
sion integral bit values. The analog tapes would
be returned to JPL for processing in the Tele-
communications Development Laboratory.
Figure 32 shows the DSN configuration used
during the 117 kbits/s portion of the encounter.
Figure 33 shows the predicted and actual BER
achieved. -The actual BER at 117 kbits/s during
the prime encounter TV sequences ranged from
3. 1 per 100 to 3. 6 per 100.. The predict for nor-
mal operation and the predict for combined oper-
ation reflect the improvement expected. An
extrapolation for normal operation was taken
from the actual combined data. This was verified
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to be accurate by the operation mode change
shown as 1. in Fig. 33.
3. M e r c u r y II to Mercury III Cruise
a. Link performance with.a rolling space-
craft. In order to have a successful Mercury III
encounter an extreme attitude-control gas con-
servation mode was required. On Oct. 5, 1974 the
spacecraft went off Canopus and was allowed to
roll using solar panel tilt angle and HGA position
to control the rate and direction. Communications
with the spacecraft was maintained by both trans-
mitting and receiving via the LGA.
Up to this point the spacecraft has been Can-
opus acquired. With the use of a trajectory tape
from the Navigation Team, TPAP (Telecommuni-
cations Prediction and Analysis Program) has
been used to generate telecommunications per-
formance predicts. This could no longer be done.
First, among other things, TPAP depended
on a predictable Earth clock and cone angle for
use in determining LGA gain. The Earth clock
angle, however, was rapidly changing with unpre -
dictable rate and acceleration changes in the roll
drift . When the spacecraft was Canopus acquired
the Earth clock angle changed from a fraction of
a degree per day to as much as 1-1/2 deg per
day. With a now possible rate as great as two
or more degrees per minute, telecommuni-
cations performance predictions had to be done
by hand.
Second, the shape of LGA pattern reduced the
link capabilities. Being in the general shape of
a doughnut the relative gain of the antenna changed
with increments in clock and cone. Coupled with
the increased range of the mid-cruise the LGA
nulls created losses in downlink communications.
Figure 34 is a comparison of: (1) the TPAP
prediction with Canopus acquired, (2) the theo-
retical LGA pattern through 360 deg of roll and,
(3) actual spacecraft downlink AGC recorded over
DSS 43 on Oct. 15, 1974. As can be seen, the
TPAP predict is totally unusable, while the
theoretical pattern is usable only in a general
sense as a trend indication. The theoretical pat-
tern had a resolution of 5 deg in clock which for
a slow roll rate was inadequate. Discussion of
TCM 7, TCM 8, and the Canopus acquisition
sequence prior to Mercury III will bear this out
further.
Figures 35 and 36 yield a comparison of
spacecraft downlink AGC data under similar condi-
tions but with different roll rates. The primary
difference is in the data scatter. When the space-
craft is rolling at a more rapid rate much of the
fine grain structure is smoothed over by the roll
rate and AGC sampling time. The downlink AGC
is recorded once per minute. This sample is an
average of 12 5-s data samples from the station.
If the roll rate is high then as much as two or more
degrees could be represented by one sample. Also,
if the roll rate is low then a higher resolution
antenna pattern is obtained.
Through the unique nature of MVM' 73 opera-
tions it was discovered that the antenna patterns
included in TPAP were inadequate for the above
situation. The solution would be to have a larger,
more accurate pattern. To accomplish this,
TPAP should be expanded to accommodate a
larger pattern matrix, or a series of grids, each
covering a small area, developed for use when
needed.
b. Trajectory correction maneuvers. In
this portion of the Extended Mission three TCMs
were performed to bring the spacecraft to its aim
point. They were unique in that they were initiated
while the spacecraft was rolling. The idea was
to stop rolling at the end of the roll turn then
pitch tu rn and burn.
TCM 6 and TCM 7 were standard maneuvers.
TCM 8 was a sunline maneuver. TCM 6 telecom
performance was as expected. The associated
turns caused changes within ±1 dB of steady state.
TCM 7 presented a more interesting set of con-
ditions. Due to a timing error the first attempt
had to be aborted. However, the maneuver was
successfully accomplished the next day, Feb. 13,
1975. The LGA pattern for the maneuver is
shown in Fig. 37. Note the difference in the
TPAP turn predict and the pattern predict. This
is due to the difference in the resolution. TPAP
uses a 10 deg clock X 10 deg cone increment,
whereas the LGA pattern uses a 5 deg clock angle
X 0 . 5 deg cone increment.
An expanded view of the area from Canopus
through the pitch turn with the actual data added
is shown in Fig. 38. The data scatter is quite
large. To extract a shape overlapping 5 min
means -were plotted. The difference between the
actual data and the predict is shown. The X' s on
the predict line are the 5 deg clock points. Com-
pared to actual data points they exhibit the poor
resolution of the predict pattern. TCM 8 being a
sunline maneuver with, therefore, no pitch turn
was uneventful for telecommunications. It was
performed when the link signal strengths were
at peak.
4. Mercury III Encounter. Prior to the
initiation of the encounter sequences it was neces-
sary to stop the roll drift and acquire Canopus •
with minimum gas usage. Standard acquisition
procedures were no longer adequate due to pos-
sible roll gyro oscillations and the entrance into
the particle area. The particle area was espe-
cially serious in that whenever the HGA position
was changed there followed a short time later
a large number of particles.
The acquisition sequence called for an
extremely slow roll rate with position information
coming from LGA pattern observations. At this
time the LGA nulls coupled with increasing range
covered 120 deg of the pattern. A new plan had to
be devised. The spacecraft was commanded to
transmit via the HGA after the roll was stopped.
By slewing the antenna along the Earth line a
signal was finally located. Spacecraft position
was determined by comparing HGA position at
peak signal strength to where the HGA should be
pointed when Canopus acquired. Using this as a
map, the HGA was repositioned and the space-
craft was rolled to a peak signal and stopped.
Data rates for the encounter were single
channel 2450 bits/s block coded non-imaging
science (NIS) data and 22 kbits/s block coded
imaging data interplexed with the above 2450bits/s
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NIS data. Real-time 117 kbits/s imaging data
had been planned. However, due to some last
minute difficulties it was cancelled. This is dis-
cussed further in Section VIII-D. The Z2-kbits/s
data bit-error-rate is shown in. Fig. 39 for the
prime encounter TV sequences. As can be seen
it was somewhat higher than predicted. The aver-
age delta shown corresponds to an actual SNR
degradation of 0.4 dB. The receiver AGC for
this period averaged within ±0. 1 dB of predicts.
5. End-of-Mission Testing. No tests were
performed that were strictly for telecommunica-
tions systems. The HGA feed test was canceled
when it was determined that the att i tude-control
gas was close to being depleted. The TMU (Telem-
etry Modulation Unit) was switched, to its
redundant element, TMU II, as part of the FDS
(Flight Data Subsystem) testing. TMU II had not
been powered since before launch, as it has an
unfused power supply. For twenty minutes it
operated flawlessly before power was returned to
TMU I. Also, the Radio Frequency Subsystem
(RFS) TWT was cycled OFF/ON three times in
the final three days before the final DC 55 TWT
OFF command was transmitted. No anomalies
were recorded.
6. Systems Operation Summary. During
the 343 days of the Extended Mission no new
anomalies were recorded which affected the RFS,
MDS," X-band transmitter, or S/X-band antennas.
The RFS was maintained in a TWTA 1, high-power
mode throughout. All engineering channels and
.performance checks were normal and as expected.
The Auxiliary Oscillator frequency was found to
decrease more with temperature than original
predicts indicated. The cause is unknown at this
time.
The MDS remained steady state with the Flight
Command Unit processing close to 9000 commands
during the extended mission with over 24200 com-
mands over the entire mission. The DC 42, DC 43
(TWT to high power, TWT to low power) interface
problem of the prime mission was never investi-
gated fur ther . The TMU performed within speci-
fications and was exercised repeatedly in all modes.
The X-band transmitter continued to toggle
within its predicted anomalous modes from the
prime mission. In July of 1974 the Block IV
receiver system was removed from DSS 14 for
modification. From that time on no estimate of
X-band downlink AGC or S/X-band ranging per-
formance can be given. Performance prior to
then can be found in Section VI-A-l-b.
The S/X-band antennas performed within
their acceptable margins. The HGA anomaly
from the prime mission did not reappear. As
was noted before, however, when the spacecraft
entered the particle region a number of particles
were observed after each HGA repositioning.
B. Guidance and Control
Attitude-Control Extended Mission
a. Introduction. During the MVM '73 sys-
tem design phase, the possibility of multiple
Mercury encounters was recognized, provided an
adequate supply of attitude-control gas remained, to
maintain spacecraft Sun orientation for power
and temperature control purposes.
During the Ear th to Mercury I transit period,
conservation of attitude, gas for potential multiple
Mercury encounters was a secondary considera-
tion; the first priority was achieving a f i r s t
Mercu ry encounter. MVM'73 was launched with
3. 63 kg (8 Ibm) of attitude control gas and ended
the Mercu ry I encounter sequence with 1. 36 kg
(3 Ibm). However, the many performance anom-
alies and operating characteristics identified
during the primary mission provided the constraints
and insights required in developing the attitude
control operational modes which minimized
Extended Mission gas usage.
This section will discuss the unique attitude-
control modes, analysis techniques and insights
used to achieve a remarkable one-year two-
encounter extended mission.
b. Extended mission attitude-control modes.
Using torque produced by solar pressure on space-
craft surfaces to reduce attitude-control gas
usage is not a new concept. Mariner IV had
movable solar vanes on the ends of its four solar
panels which attempted to create a favorable gas
usage torque in the pitch and yaw axes. How-
ever, there were some control problems with
these devices, and active attitude control using
solar pressure as a spacecraft control mechanism
was abandoned on subsequent Mariners.
Mariner 10, illustrated in Fig. 40, was con-
figured with four movable appendages: two
tiltable solar panels, a two-degree-of-freedom
HGA, and a scan platform. The two solar panels
and the HGA had surfaces exposed to solar radia-
tion and the forces produced on these surfaces
produced torques on the spacecraft. As a. result
of observations made during the primary mission,
it was determined that differentially tilting the
solar panels produced torques in the control axes.
The solar panels absorbed approximately
78% of the incident energy. Figure 41 illustrates
an end view of one solar panel and the forces
which produced roll and yaw torques. Roll
axis torque was approximately related to solar
panel angles as follows:
Roll torque = Kj(SI)[sin(2 6 ) - sin(2 6 ) ]
where
6 = the tilt angle of the +x solar panel
9 = the tilt angle of the -x solar panel
K.(SI) = a proportionality factor which is a
function of solar intensity and
absorptivity
Yaw axis torque was approximately related
to solar panel angles as follows:
Yaw torque = K2(SI)[cos(6 ) - cos(6n)]
K,(SI) = a proportionality factor which is a
function of solar intensity and
reflectivity
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The net torque observed about the three
spacecraft axes was also largely influenced by the
HGA torque contributions. No simplified expres-
sion for HGA torques was ever developed; how-
ever, torque evaluations made during the primary
mission demonstrated that when.the HGA boresight
axis cone angle was about 45 deg, the pitch and
yaw torques were very small. This was dis-
covered by correlating HGA boresight clock and
cone angles during the primary mission to the
spacecraft observed torques. Figure 42 illus-
trates the Earth track (HGA boresight angles) in
a clock cone polar plot.
Gas usage predicts and actual usage for the
Mercury I to Mercury III period are plotted in
Fig. 43. Two predicts were made. The first pre-
dict assumed three-axis celestial control with
successful torque control in all three axes and a
limit cycle gas usage of about 2. 7 g/day (0. 006
Ibm/day).
The second predict assumed an unsuccessful
torque control usage of 5.9 g/day (0.013 Ibm/day)
until Mercury II, and then a roll drift mode (to
be discussed later) usage of about 1. 6 g/day
(0. 0036 Ibm/day) until Mercury III.
c. Mercury I to Mercury II attitude control
modes. From Mercury I to Mercury II, the
spacecraft maintained 3-axis orientation and con-
trol. During this period the mean solar panel
angles were selected to provide adequate power
within temperature constraints and the HGA was
positioned to maintain telecommunications link
performance. Roll torques were brought to
desired levels by differentially tilting the solar
panels.
During this period, the evaluated average gas
usage from limit cycle data was:
Axis
Total
Gas/day, g(lbm)
1.2 (0.0027)
0.7 (0.0015)
0.8 (0.0018)
2.7 (0.0060)
Gas usage from tank temperature and pres-
sures was evaluated as follows:
GMT day
107 (L + 165)
242 (L + 300)
Gas weight,
g(lbm)
1360
820
(3.0)
(1.8)
Total
Gas usage
val was:
135 540 (1.2)
other than limit cycle in this inter-
Event
TCM 4A/4B
Gyro test
TCM 5
Gyro test
Science
Gas used,
g(lbm)
73 (0. 16)
9 (0.02)
36 (0.08)
9 (0.02)
9 (0.02)
136 (0. 30)
The average daily limit cycle gas usage
evaluated from tank temperatures and pressures
is as follows:
Average gas
Day
1. 2 - 0.30
135
540 - 136
135
0.0067 Ibm
Day
The excellent correlation between predicted
gas usage and actual usage up to launch plus 305
is illustrated in Fig. 43.
On Sept. 4, 1974 (L + 305) a particle induced
a roll axis star loss. During the reacquisition
the gyros structural interaction occurred and
resulted in the loss of 272 g(0. 6 Ibm) of gas.
Another star loss and reacquisition occurred on
Sept. 9, 1974 (L, + 310) and resulted in the loss
of another 113.4 g (0.25 Ibm) of gas. Fortunately,
no further star losses occurred until after the
Mercury II encounter.
d. Mercury II to Mercury III attitude con-
trol modes. After Mercury II encounter, the
hazard of a roll axis star loss and the large
amount of gas required for reacquisition was being
pondered versus going into the untried roll drift
mode. In the roll drift mode, roll axis torque
must be reduced to very small values to minimize
roll spin-up and large gas usage ( through the^-'
product of inertia terms) in the pitch and yaw
axes. Additionally, pitch and yaw torques must
be kept small to keep their usage small.
On Oct. 6, 1974 (L + 336) another roll axis
Canopus loss occurred and initial acquisition
attempts failed after the use of about 118 g
(0. 26 Ib) of gas. At this point it was decided that
Mercury III was only possible in the roll drift
mode. After about two days of very high usage,
searching for an acceptable spacecraft torque
configuration, it was determined that positioning
the HGA boresight at 45 deg cone and about 30 deg
clock should produce a very low torque in all
axes. For small changes around this point, the
pitch, yaw and roll torques were nearly decoupled.
Clock angle changes in HGA boresight controlled
roll torque, cone angle changes controlled pitch
torque and yaw torques could be controlled by
differentially tilting the solar panels. The polar-
ities of these control torque changes are illus-
trated in Fig. 42.
On the outgoing leg of the Mercury II to
Mercury III transient phase, the average gas
usage was about 1.4 g (0. 003 Ibm) per day and the
average usage on the incoming leg was about
1. 8 g (0. 004 Ibm) per day.
For short periods, limit cycle evaluation
indicated gas usage as low as 0.23 g/day (0.0005
Ibm/day) and some as high as 4. 5 g (0. 010
Ibm/day). During this period spacecraft tracking
was only four to six hours per day, three to four
days per week. Had there been continuous track-
ing and a larger support team, the limit cycle
usage could easily have been reduced to 0. 45 to
0. 90 g/day (0. 001 to 0. 002 Ibm/day).
e. Analysis methods used during the
extended mission. Analysis during the Mercury I
to Mercury III period was principally confined to
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evaluating attitude control gas usage from limit
cycle data, and revealed some startling facts
about the effect of external spacecraft torques on
gas usage.
(1) Daily gas usage evaluation-from limit
cycle data. Each axis controlled with reference
to a specified celestial or inertial position pro-
duces a position versus time history (limit cycle)
which will have a signature similar to one of the
three signatures illustrated in Fig. 44.
Figure 45a illustrates a torque-free limit
cycle; Fig. 44b illustrates a one-sided limit cycle
due to a large torque; and Fig. 44c illustrates a
limit cycle with a torque too small for a consistent
one-sided limit cycle.
The gas used in the torque-free limit cycle
case can be evaluated with the aid of Fig. 44a with
the following expression:
Gas (Ibm) =
WD • 6dB V"* 1
At.
Gas = gas used in time interval At, Ibm
6dk = width of position deadband (rad)
WD = gas value flow rate to produce angular
acceleration a in Ibm/s
a
 = gas system angular acceleration at
gas flow rate WD, in rad/sec2
At. = time to cross deadband, s
The gas used in the one-sided limit cycle
case can be evaluated once the disturbance torque
is known. The disturbance torque is determined
with reasonable accuracy by averaging a series
of single-point torque evaluations as follows:
Tor = average torque, in ft-lbf
J = inertia in slug-ft2
M = number of samples
A9. = height of position excursion,
in rad
At. = time between gas jet firings as
1
 illustrated in Fig. 44(b)
The gas used in one-sided limit cycle is
evaluated with the following expression:
Gas (Ib) =
T
°
r (tST - WD
(t__ - t ) = time interval of gas (2)
evaluation, s
J • a = gas jet torque in ft-lb (3)
The gas used in the small torque limit cycle
case illustrated in Fig. 44(c) uses the Eqs. (1),
(2), and (3) developed above as follows:
Gas (Ibm) =
N
'DB
At.
P
E
Jo WD
E = total one-sided limitcycle time, s
(1)
The above expressions enabled rapid, accur-
ate evaluation of each axes' gas usage without
the tedious evaluation of individual rate increments.
(2) Gas usage versus disturbance torque.
During the extended mission, the disturbance
torque in each axis was adjusted using the solar
panels and HGA. In the initial torque adjustment
period, critical torque levels were sought. Crit-
ical torque and a torque-free limit cycle are
illustrated in the phase plane in Fig. 45(a). Gas
usage for a critical torque limit cycle is ideally
1/4 that of torque-free limit cycle.
Gas usage versus the ratio of observed torque
to critical torque is plotted in Fig. 45(b). Also
plotted in Fig. 45(b) is the actual Mariner 10
observed gas usage relative to the ratio of
observed to critical torques. It was observed
that a critical torque limit cycle could not exist
under actual conditions, and guaranteed one-
sided limit cycle did not exist until the disturb-
ance torque was about three times critical torque
levels. However, minimum gas usage was
recorded at a disturbance torque slightly less than
twice critical torque values. In addition, using
derived rate and apparently subject to a small
amount of noise, the torque-free limit cycle con-
sumption was about 1. 5 times the ideal value,
and this state was observed only during periods
when no electrical coupling could be detected.
f. Insights into roll gyro—structural inter-
action. During the primary mission the roll axis
gyro structural interaction resulted in the con-
sumption of about 680 g (1. 5 Ibm) of gas and about
390 g (0. 85 Ibm) just prior to Mercury II encoun-
ter. Analysis and simulation determined the f re-
quency of the disturbance to be 3.6 Hz, but little
was determined about the mechanism of exciting
this roll gyro-structural resonant frequency.
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It was discovered that while operating with
the gyros on, a variable frequency of gas jet
pulsing resulted as the spacecraft state moved up
and down the combined rate plus position switch-
ing line. The time between gas jet pulsing can
be calculated subject to the following, assumptions
illustrated in the phase plane in Fig. 46:
(1) The gas jet rate increment A8 is about
constant.
(2) The rate plus position switching line
is a straight line in the phase plane
expressed as:
,pb
= C
6 , = position deadbandpb
6 ,, = fate deadbanddb
Figure 47 illustrates the time between gas jet
pulses versus spacecraft rate in the roll inertial
mode, and Fig. 48 illustrates the time between
gas jet pulses in the celestial plus gyro rate mode.
It was concluded that this model explained all
occurrences of gyro structural interaction and
that if spacecraft roll rate has kept below 150
u.rad/s, there was little danger of exciting the roll
axis gyro structural interaction.
This policy was enforced during the Mercury
II to Mercury III period -and no incidents of the
interaction were observed.
2. Roll Drift. The period of roll drift mode
for attitude-control gas conservation extended
from 04:30 GMT on Oct. 6, 1974 until 05:00 GMT
on March 15, 1975. This was a total of 160 days
using solar pressure for spacecraft attitude-roll
control which was interrupted for small periods
of all axis inertial control during TCMs 6, 7, and"
8. The average attitude-gas consumption during
this period was 1.6 g/day (3.5 mlbm per day).
The attitude-gas conservation problem became
more complex in the roll drift mode. Because
of large inertia cross-products, especially in the
roll axis to pitch axis, a low value for the roll
rate had to be maintained. The solar panels
directly controlled yaw solar torque; so for best
performance in yaw only two solutions were avail-
able around a mean position, dictated by power
considerations. These two positions were as
follows-
(1) +X panel at the greatest pitch angle and
the -X panel at a position for producing
between 50 and 100 dyne-cm negative
yaw torque, positive roll torque for
panel angles less than 45 deg and nega-
tive roll torque for panel angles greater
than 45 deg.
(2) -X panel at the greatest pitch angle
with a similar opposite torque affect.
The HGA was found to control pitch ade-
quately at a cone angle of 45 to 50 deg with
the variance due to.solar intensity changes. With
these constraints for attitude-gas conservation,
the roll drift torque had to be controlled primarily
with the HGA clock angle torque component.
Another factor concerning the roll driff modes
was the navigation team request for knowledge of
the roll position of the spacecraft for doppler data
modification for orbit determination. This con-
straint required a negative roll direction above a
certain rate dictated by DSN tracking, because the
star tracker must have a negative sweep to track
a star across its field of view. Even with these
many constraints, the roll drift mode of attitude-
control operation was successful and made a third
encounter with Mercury a reality.
During the roll drift mode the longest time
period between two articulation and pointing sub-
system configurations was 23 days with an average
rate of-340 jirad/s and an average negative rate
increase of .8 firad/s each day. The average period
was more than 3 days between configuration changes.
The minimum gas consumption for a 10-day
period was less than 6. 8 g (0. 015 Ibm).
The major problem with the operational
aspects of this control mode is the DSN tracking
required. After a configuration change a mini-
mum period of 20 hours of continuous spacecraft
tracking was necessary to see the new torque
level in the roll direction. Probably an optimum
spacecraft tracking schedule for this mode should
have been two 24-hour continuous coverage periods
per week which may have reduced the configura-
tion change frequency to one change every 8 to
12 days.
3. Trajectory Correction. Maneuvers
(TCM's). Five TCM's were completed during
the MVM Extended Mission. These maneuvers
varied considerably in procedure and scope
especially during the later mission phases.
Desired parametric values for these TCM1 s are
shown in Table 5. For each TCM, a priori
3-sigma uncertainty pointing errors were calcu-
lated, based upon an analysis of spacecraft
hardware error sources. Similarly, a posteriori
estimates of the pointing errors associated with
each TCM were determined, using spacecraft
engineering telemetry data. Table 6 consists of
a summary of the results of these analyses.
A description of the operational procedure
used in each TCM is given in the remainder
of this section. TCM 4 was divided into two
parts, 4A and 4B, because of thermal con-
straints on the jet vane actuator potentiom-
eters. The engine burn duration of 195:014 sec
for TCM 4A preceded by a negative roll turn of
181.431 deg and a positive pitch turn of 25. 607 deg
was initiated at 20:05 GMT on May 9, 1974. The
burn stop was followed by a normal celestial
acquisition with a gyro power inhibit to prevent
attitude gas loss due to gyro oscillation. TCM 4B
was accomplished in a similar manner using an
engine burn duration of 139.014 s initiated at
20:06 GMT on May 10, 1974. This engine burn
was preceded by a negative roll turn of 178.481
deg and a positive pitch turn of 36. 028 deg with a
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Table 5. Summary of Extended Mission TCM parameters
TCM No.
4A
4B
5
6
7
8
Date
May 9, 1974
May 10, 1974
July 2, 1974
Oct. 30, 1974
Feb. 13, 1975
Mar. 7, 1975
Commanded AV, s
49.998
27.554
3.321
14.543
2.021
0.483
Commanded
Roll turn, deg
-181.431
-178.481
56. 100
-100.800
-21.364
a
Pitch turn, deg
25.607
36.028
57.828
86.344
114.494
a
Not applicable; sunline (no turn) maneuver.
normal acquisition after the engine burn
completion.
TCM 5 was accomplished using the normal
procedure with a burn duration of 18.8 sec init-
iated at 19:55 GMT on July 2, 1974. The space-
craft turns for thrust vector pointing were a
positive roll turn of 56. 100 deg and a positive
pitch turn of 57. 828 deg. This was the final TCM
used before the second Mercury encounter.
Because of gyro oscillations during reacquisi-
tion sequences before the second Mercury
encounter, the attitude-control gas was approach-
ing a negative margin for a third encounter using
a normal cruise attitude-gas conservation mode.
A roll drift gas conservation mode was adopted
upon the loss of Canopus acquisition on Oct. 6,
1974, with only 272 g (0. 60 Ibm) of attitude gas
remaining in the tanks. This mode of operation
changed the strategy for the remaining TCM' s
significantly.
TCM 6 was completed on Oct. 30, 1974, using
the new operation strategy required by the roll
drift mode. The negative roll turn of 100.8 deg
was accomplished by timing a minimum duration
(0. 156 s) positive roll turn from the null center
of the last tracker Canopus crossing. The inter-
val between the Canopus null crossing and the
spacecraft inertial stop was calculated based upon
the roll rate and roll acceleration determined by
previous Canopus crossings. Four consecutive
spacecraft revolutions were tracked before the
last Canopus crossing which determined an
average rate of -197. 56 firad/s for the roll turn.
This rate determined a roll turn interval of 8905
sec followed by a conventional positive pitch turn
of 86. 344 deg. The engine burn duration of
83. 15 s was initiated at 21:53 GMT and was fol-
lowed by a pitch unwind plus a return to the roll
drift mode. Some roll turn error may have been
introduced because of moving the solar panels
during the roll drift turn.
TCM 7 used the same procedure as the pre-
vious maneuver. Limited spacecraft tracking due
to the DSN reconfiguration for Viking created a
situation where the roll rate had to be calculated
based on one Canopus tracker star crossing. The
roll .turn magnitude of 21.47 deg dictated a reac-
tion time of less than 10 min after the Canopus
crossing to the first critical command. The TCM
was originally planned for Feb. 12, 1975, but an
unexpected early arrival of the Canopus crossing
made a cancellation necessary. The TCM was
Table 6. Attitude control estimates of TCM pointing errors-TCM
pointing error estimate (bias ±3<r deg)
TCM No.
4A
4B
5
6
7
8
A Priori
Pitch
O i l . 2 0 7
0 ± 1.482
0 ± 1.373
O i l . 597
0 ± 1.375
0 ± 0.892
Yaw
0 ± 1.313
0 ± 1.285
0 * 1.330
0 ± 2.206
0 ± 1.855
0 ± 0.891
Resultant
0 ± 1.985
0 ±1 .962
0 ± 1.789
0 ± 2.723
0 ± 2.310
0 ± 1.261
A Posteriori
Pitch
0. 164 ± 1.303
0.426 ± 1.296
0 .074± 1.272
-0. 127 ± 1. 593
-0. 198 ± 1.300
-0.086 ± 0.580
Yaw
0. 176 ± 1. 122
0. 081 ± 1. 147
0. 155 ± 1.220
0. 194 ± 1.566
-0. 106 ± 1.413
0. 293 ± 0. 579
Resultant
0.241 ±1.720
0.434 ±1.731
0. 172 ± 1.762
0. 232 ± 2.234
0. 199 ±1.920
0.305 ±0.820
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completed the next day, Feb. 13, using a negative
roll drift turn of 21.364 deg at a roll rate of
-161.0 jirad/s and a positive pitch turn of 114. 494
deg. The engine burn duration of 12.5 sec was
initiated at 10:00 GMT followed by the return to
the roll drift mode. The inaccuracy of the space-
craft thrust vector pointing during this maneuver
caused an overcorrection in the orbit. The error
was mainly created by the error in the roll turn
which was caused by inadequate spacecraft track-
ing for roll rate determination.
TCM 8 was a sunline maneuver completed on
March 7, 1975. Since this maneuver was initiated
without any pitch turn, TCM 8 was not constrained
by the roll drift attitude control mode. An engine
burn duration of 3.2 sec preceded by all-axis
inertial attitude mode targeted the spacecraft very
close to the nominal aim point for TCM 7. During
the last two TCMs, a slight instability in the auto-
pilot control was noticed; but since these were
short duration engine burns, no major effects
were noticed.
With the exception of a general tendency
shown by tracking-data-based orbit determination
for roll turn error to be somewhat larger than
expected from a priori statistical predictions
(giving indication of an unidentified bias effect),
no performance anomalies occurred in TCM
attitude-control operations. Overall pointing
accuracies achieved were considered to be
adequate for attainment of all extended mission
objectives.
4. Acquisitions. Although the normal cruise
configuration of the spacecraft is Sun and Canopus
acquired, it was necessary to cruise for an
extended period (from Mercury II to Mercury III)
in a non-Canopus acquired state (the modified roll
drift/solar sailing mode) in order to achieve a
level of attitude-control gas consumption that
would ensure a Mercury in encounter. This sec-
tion deals with the reacquisitions of Canopus
during the extended mission.
On April 16, 1974, after the first tracking gap
in the Mariner 10 mission, it was discovered that
the FDS had suffered an analog-to-digital con-
verter failure that resulted in the loss of nearly
half of the engineering analog telemetry. Some of
the measurements had been redundantly input to
the other ADC, but the primary measurement used
for star acquisitions was not; the function of
Canopus intensity had been lost. In addition, the
tracker cone angle position and adaptive gate
telemetry was also lost. Recognition of the star
acquired now depended upon a priori knowledge
of the approximate roll position of the spacecraft,
keeping track of the last commanded cone angle
and adaptive gate settings, and, as a final con-
firmation, the received signal strength from the
high-gain or low-gain antenna. Telemetry on
the pointing direction of the high-gain antenna had
also been irretrievably lost, but the high-gain
antenna calibrations performed during the pri-
mary mission coupled with the position command
capability of the Articulation and Pointing Sub-
system were sufficient to point the high-gain
antenna to any desired position.
The first loss of Canopus acquisition was
deliberate: on April 26, 1974 a gyro test was
performed to evaluate the possibility of the roll
axis structural interaction occurring in the space-
craft configuration proposed for TCM 4. The
gyros were enabled with DC-19, turned on with
7M1, and two DC 18 commands were sent to roll
the spacecraft +4 deg. DC 19 then allowed the
spacecraft to roll search back to Canopus. Can-
opus was acquired normally, and the gyros auto-
matically turned off after acquisition. Command
DC 40 was then sent to prevent a roll search in
the event of accidental loss of Canopus acquisition.
TCM 4 was split into two parts due to tem-
perature constraints on the TVCA. TCM 4A was
performed on May 9, 1974 and TCM 4B on May 10.
Both maneuvers involved loss of Canopus acquisi-
tion; TCM 4A was a -181. 19 deg roll turn,
TCM 4B a -178. 14 deg roll turn. In each case,
the roll unwind turn was 4. 98 deg longer than the
roll turn, to allow acquisition of Canopus without
a roll search. The reacquisitions af ter the unwind
turns were normal.
It was necessary to periodically update the
tracker cone angle position, as the cone angle of
Canopus varied with spacecraft position in the
heliocentric orbit. Updating was invariably done
by programming the CC&S to issue the required
number of 7D commands at the proper time.
Throughout both the primary and extended mis-
sions, the cone angle updating was completely
routine; no anomalies associated with an update
were ever observed.
The next reacquisition of Canopus occurred
on June 24, 1974 when a gyro test similar to that
performed on April 26 indicated that no roll axis
oscillation would be expected to occur in the
TCM 5 spacecraft configuration. Canopus
acquisition after the +4 deg roll turn produced by
the two DC 18 commands.
TCM 5 was performed on July 2, 1974. The
roll turn was +56. 1 deg; the roll unwind resulted
in normal reacquisition of Canopus.
From time to time during this Mercury I to
Mercury II cruise, flyback and sweep sequences
had been observed in the tracker roll error signal.
Since the intensity telemetry was no longer avail-
able, there -was no method of deducing the
severity of the disturbances other than by the
number of flyback and sweep sequences observed
at each disturbance. The bright particles that
were apparently causing the temporary loss of
acquisition, followed by the flyback and sweep
sequences, were expected to increase in intensity
and frequency as the spacecraft heliocentric range
decreased. The standard cruise mode was mod-
ified by utilizing DC 40, the unconditional gyros
off command, to prevent a roll search in the event
loss of Canopus acquisition did occur, thus pre-
venting the roll axis structural oscillation that
could possibly occur during the roll search. How-
ever, on Sept. 4, 1974, a stream of bright par-
ticles caused loss of Canopus acquisition, and
reacquisition did not occur on the flyback and
sweep.
The attitude-control subsystem is mechanized
such that when a negative roll gas jet valve has
commanded ON for 30 seconds, roll axis con-
trol is removed. When the flyback and sweep
sequence failed to reacquire Canopus, the Canopus
tracker field-of-view moved to the roll search
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position, causing the negative roll gas jet valve to
fire, accelerating the spacecraft in the (negative)
roll search direction. With the gyros inhibited
from coming on upon loss of acquisition, only the
30-'second roll search inhibit prevented the space-
craft from spinning uncontrollably.
With Canopus not acquired, with the roll
axis uncontrolled, and with the spacecraft spinning
in roll, the ground station acquired the signal
every time the high-gain pattern swept across the
Earth. About one to two minutes of data were
available before the station lost lock. Transmis-
sion over the low gain antenna at 33-1/3 bits/s was
attempted, but the signal strength was too low for
good data reception, so the spacecraft transmitter
was switched back to the high-gain antenna, at
2450 bits/s engineering. This "lighthouse" data
mode was sufficient to obtain all the data needed
to assess the state of the spacecraft. The space-
craft roll rate was measured by timing the Can-
opus crossings (i.e., the times between zero roll
error readings on the roll error signal as the
tracker acquired Canopus each time the spacecraft
rolled through zero clock angle; with roll axis
control removed, the roll error signal was not
enabled to the attitude control, so that spacecraft
acquisition of Canopus could not occur). The
spacecraft roll rate was -0.47 deg/s (-8.2 mrad/s).
Since 30 s of acceleration would result in a rate
o f -0 .75 deg/s (-13 mrad/s), the bright par-
ticles had most likely caused the tracker to lose
acquisition at a spacecraft rate of +0.28 deg/s
(+4.8 mrad/s) after tracking the particle(s). After
about six hours of observing the spacecraft, a
DC 19 ground command was sent to enable the
gyros.to- come on and reduce the roll rate to dead-
band values, followed by a DC 21 to reset the roll
search inhibit and start a roll search to Canopus.
The commands were timed to occur such that the
roll axis control would be enabled 6 deg before
Canopus entered the field of view of the tracker,
so that acquisition would be immediate and the
gyros would be on for a minimum amount of time;
thus, if the roll axis oscillation occurred during
the search, the amount of attitude-control gas
expended would be minimized. The commands
were received properly by the spacecraft at the
correct time, but acquisition of Canopus did not
occur, and the spacecraft executed a 360-deg roll
search, acquiring Canopus approximately 24 min
later. The roll axis oscillation was present
during the search, and approximately 250 g
(0. 55 Ibm) of the remaining attitude-control gas
supply was used.
The reason for the failure to acquire Can-
opus on the initial opportunity may be one of two
reasons: (1) the gyros did not come up to speed
as quickly as expected (the gyro scale factor is
directly proportional to gyro wheel speed) so that
when the DC 21 command was received, the
resultant spacecraft rate was too high to allow
acquisition; (2) the spacing between the DC 19 and
DC 21 commands was too small, such that the
same effect was achieved —the gyro scale factor
resulted in a spacecraft rate high enough to pre-
vent acquisition. The corrective action for future
incidents of this type is to turn on the gyros earlier
in relative time, separate the DC 19 and DC 21
commands by 90 to 120 s, and take the risk of
using more than the minimum amount of attitude-
control gas required to acquire the star with the
roll axis oscillation present.
The reason for the occurrence of the roll
axis oscillation during the search was also not
clear; it was felt that the spacecraft configuration
had a bearing on the presence or absence of the
oscillation, but the configuration at the time the
gyros were enabled was very close to the TCM 4A
configuration (the high-gain antenna was different
by a few degrees in boom and dish).
Two days later, on September 6, an identical
incident occurred. A bright particle, or a stream
of bright particles, caused loss of acquisition,
with a resultant spacecraft roll rate of -0. 19 deg/s
(-3.3 mrad/s). This time, the spacecraft was
placed in the exact configuration used for TCM 4A,
and the DC 19/DC 21 command pair separated
by 90 s. Canopus was acquired immediately, but
the roll axis oscillation was present, resulting in
attitude-control gas usage of approximately 77 g
(0. 17 Ibm).
Not all of the attitude-control gas used
was used by the roll axis oscillation. During
the Sept. 4th incident, the spacecraft roll rate,
coupling through the products of inertia into
the pitch and yaw axes, caused attitude-control
operation at the edge of the deadband, resulting in
gas usage rate of 10 g/h (0. 022 Ibm/h) for a total
gas usage of 50 g (0. 110 Ibm); the roll axis oscil-
lation used 193 g (0.425 Ibm), and the rate reduc-
tion process used 2. 6 g (0. 0057 Ibm). For the
Sept. 6 incident, the scan platform was positioned
to minimize the products of inertia; with the much
smaller roll rate resulting after the loss of
acquisition, the gas usage rate was 2. 7 g
(0. 006 Ibm/h) for a total of 0. 120 Ib; the roll axis
oscillation used 18 g (0.040 Ib), the rate reduc-
tion 2. 6 g (0. 0057 Ibm).
Although bright particles continued to be
observed in the roll limit cycle, no further losses
of Canopus acquisition occurred through the time
of the Mercury II encounter, on Sept. 21, 1974.
The encounter attitude-control mode was the
cruise mode: Canopus acquired, gyros off and
inhibited from coming on with command DC 40.
After the encounter, the cruise plan was to
forego cruise science data and use the high-gain
antenna to generate torques from solar radiation
pressure to minimize gas consumption in the
pitch, yaw, and roll axes. The solar panels had
been used during the Mercury I to Mercury II
cruise to generate torques in the roll axis, but
torques in the other two axes could not be con-
trolled by the panels alone. It was felt that only
this cruise mode would allow the attitude-control
gas usage to be minimized enough to have enough
gas left for the last encounter. Therefore, imme-
diately after the encounter, the spacecraft was
placed in the 33-1/3 bits/s engineering only data
mode, and a series of empirical determinations
of the pos'i'tion of the high-gain antenna positions
that would produce the desired torques in the
pitch and yaw axes was begun. After this calibra-
tion had been completed, roll axis control would
be removed, and the spacecraft allowed to drift
in roll, with the proper torques maintained in the
pitch and yaw axes. This would reduce roll axis
gas usage to zero and minimize gas usage in
pitch and yaw.
Since tracking was not continuous, and since
torque analysis of limit cycle behavior took an
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appreciable amount of data, the calibration period
was estimated to be a few weeks. However, on
Oct. 5, 1974, another bright particle incident
caused loss of Canopus acquisition, with a result-
ing roll rate of +0.32 deg/s (+5.6 mrad/s). The
fact that the roll rate was positive indicated that
this was the most severe particle incident to date.
After attempting to evaluate the data at 8-1/3
and 33-1/3 bits/s over the low-gain antenna, it
was decided to move the high-gain antenna from
its solar sailing torque generating position to the
Earth-pointing direction, in order to go to the
lighthouse data mode to assess the state of the
spacecraft, confirm the positive roll direction,
and measure the rate. After this was accom-
plished, an attempt was made to acquire Canopus
without turning on the gyros by resetting the roll
search inhibit when Canopus was in the field of
view of the tracker. The command was timed
such that the spacecraft rate would be reduced to
zero when the spacecraft clock angle was very
near zero; this should result in acquisition. Data
was available when the command was received,
but there was no indication of acquisition. The
failure to acquire meant that the negative roll gas
jets would be on for thirty seconds, resulting in
a spacecraft rate of -0.45 deg/s ( -7 .9 mrad/s).
At this time, it was decided not to attempt
further to acquire Canopus, but to reduce the roll
rate to deadband values by turning on the gyros
for 3. 5 min. This action would place the space-
craft in the backup gas conservation mode-
uncontrolled in roll, with torques generated as a
function of high-gain antenna position and solar
panel position in all three axes. This mode had
been studied, but enough empirical data on the
positions of the high-gain antenna had not been
obtained to be able to predict what torques would
be generated. However, for long-term cruise,
there appeared to be no alternative; if bright par-
ticle incidents were going to occur periodically,
some method of negating them was required.
Accordingly, the gyros were turned on for the
minimum amount of time possible (3. 5 min) and
then turned off. The high-gain antenna was
returned to the only known torque configuration
established, and the data rate returned to
8-1/3 bits/s.
During the next few weeks, it became clear
that the best use for the torque generating capa-
bility of the high-gain antenna was to control pitch
torques. The criticality of the pitch torque was
that the pitch axis control was now the largest
user of gas. Yaw and roll torques were affected
by the high gain, and the solar panels were used
to trim these torques.
TCM 6 was performed on Oct. 30, 1974; a
-100.80 deg roll turn was required. The roll
turn was accomplished by turning on the gyros
and placing the spacecraft in the all-axis inertial
state after the spacecraft had rolled the required
amount past Canopus, as determined by the time
and rate observed when the Canopus crossing
occurred. After the maneuver, the spacecraft
was returned to the roll drift mode.
During the cruise period, the roll rate was
determined by observing the acquisitions of
Canopus (and whatever other stars were acquir-
able by the tracker) as the spacecraft rolled
through the clock angle of the star. With roll
axis control removed, the t racker was able to
electronically acquire and track the star without
effect on the spacecraft . The high-gain antenna
and solar panels were then adjusted to produce
the required amount and polarity of roll torque, -
while mainta ining the required amount and polarity
of pitch and yaw torques.
TCM 7 was per formed on Feb. 13, 1975. It
had originally been scheduled for Feb. 12, but
was aborted when the Canopus crossing occurred
approximately 20 min earlier than expected. The
roll rate had been reduced to about a nine-hour
period, so that the spacecraft rate when the gyros
were turned on would not be high enough to
excite the roll axis structural interact ion. As a
consequence, Canopus cross ings did not fit the
tracking schedule, and enough information was
not available to accurately predict position, rate,
and acceleration in the roll axis. The maneuver
implementation sequence was modified so that the
maneuver could proceed immediately upon
detecting a Canopus c ross ing , and the maneuver
then rescheduled for the next day. The roll turn
required was -21.47 deg; the t u r n was accom-
plished in the same manner as the TCM 6 turn,
with the exception being that the Canopus t racker
had to be turned off pr ior to t u rn ing on the gyros
(because the roll search inhibit had been set
prior to TCM 6, but the loss of Sun gate during
the TCM 6 pitch tu rn had reset it). Again, a f te r
the maneuver, the spacecraft was re turned to the
roll dr i f t state.
The final maneuver prior to Mercury III,
TCM 8, was performed on March 7, 1975. This
maneuver was a sunline maneuver ; no roll or
pitch turns were required. Accordingly, the
spacecraft was simply stopped in roll by turn ing
on the gyros and placing the spacecraft in the
all-axis inertial state, and executing the engine
burn. Again the spacecraft was returned to the
roll drift mode.
One more Canopus acquisition was required
for Mariner 10. The Mercury III encounter
sequence required the spacecraft to be Sun- and
Canopus-acquired in order to return high-rate
science data over the high-gain antenna. The
method of acquisition proposed was to slow the
spacecraft rate to a value that would permit the
acquisition commands to reach the spacecraft
while Canopus was still in the field of view, when
the acquisition commands were sent when Canopus
entered the field of view. A sequence was devised
that would place the spacecraft in a safe state even
if the acquisition commands were late, and Canopus
had passed through the field of view. The direc-
tion of roll could then be reversed, the spacecraft
"backed up" beyond Canopus, and the process
repeated until acquisition had occurred.
The first opportunity for acquisition was pre-
dicted to occur during a tracking gap on March 12,
1975. Although the spacecraft roll period was
approximately 24 h, an attempt was made to slow
the rate even further, so that the Canopus crossing
would occur after the tracking gap (which was
about three house in length). However, the station
had trouble in acquiring the spacecraft after the
gap, and no Canopus crossing was evident. Deter-
mination of the roll rate and position was com-
plicated by the fact that no other stars were
acquirable by the tracker in the encounter cone
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angle setting, and by the fact that there were two
sizable low-gain antenna nulls, causing loss of
data for nearly 180 deg of the 360 deg of roll.
Real-time plotting of the low-gain antenna trans-
mitted received signal strength gave an approxi-
mation of spacecraft position, as. well as
knowledge of the position of the nulls.
The first attempt at acquisition was made on
March 13, 1975. However, the command arrived
at the spacecraft after the spacecraft had passed
through Canopus, and the tracker had lost acquisi-
tion. The Flight Data Subsystem was repro-
grammed to increase the number of tracker roll
position samplings, and the polarity of the roll
torque reversed. The spacecraft was then placed
in the roll drift mode, and backed up across the
star. After about an hour and a half, several
flyback and sweep sequences were noted in the roll
position measurement. This was taken to mean
that Canopus had been passed through (rolling in
the positive direction will not produce an acquisi-
tion until the star is at the edge of the field of
view; the acquisition will be immediately followed
by a loss of acquisition, producing a flyback and
sweep). The spacecraft was then stopped, the
direction of the roll torque again reversed to pro-
duce a negative roll, and returned to the roll
drift mode.
Astoundingly, Canopus was not acquired, and
the spacecraft continued rolling into a low-gain
antenna null, resulting in the loss of telemetry
data. The only possible reason for not crossing
Canopus was that the spacecraft had not been
rolled far enough in the positive direction to cross
the star; which meant that the flyback and sweep
sequences observed were not Canopus, but a
bright particle incident. The occurrence of this
incident at this particular time was disastrous;
had it not occurred, Canopus would have almost
surely been acquired.
Although the telemetry was lost in the low-
gain antenna null, it was still possible to com-
mand the spacecraft. Therefore, the spacecraft
was stopped once again, the polarity of the roll
torque changed to produce a positive roll, and
the spacecraft returned to the roll drift mode to
back out of the null. After several hours of back-
ing up, it appeared the spacecraft had reached
the other low-gain antenna null, about 140 deg
from Canopus. The spacecraft was stopped, and
the Earth-pointing direction of the high-gain
antenna calculated. The high-gain antenna was
then pointed toward the Earth, and spacecraft
transmission over the high gain commanded. Re-
ceipt of the signal then gave a positive confirma-
tion of spacecraft position. The solar panels
were then differentially tilted to give the maximum
amount of negative torque (since leaving the high-
gain antenna in the near-Earth pointing direction
produced a positive roll torque) and the space-
craft allowed to roll drift to Canopus. The high-
gain antenna was positioned such that it would
point toward Earth 40 deg prior to Canopus and
the spacecraft was allowed to drift to a position
7. 5 deg from Canopus where it was stopped, then
allowed to roll toward Canopus. With the high-
gain antenna pattern being tracked in real time
and the spacecraft rate deduced from the pattern,
a time was determined to send the acquisition
commands. Canopus was acquired at a net roll
error of -1.5 deg. The spacecraft was placed in
the roll axis inertial mode after the roll error
had been updated to about +0. 20 deg to provide
an inertial reference. The use of the roll axis
inertial mode guaranteed that no bright particle
incidents would cause loss of acquisition for the
encounter.
The acquisition of Canopus occurred on
March 15, 1975 about 30 h before closest
approach at Mercury III. One far-encounter
mosaic sequence was lost, due to not acquiring
Canopus earlier, but the significant encounter
sequences were now enabled. A routine was
devised to update the inertial roll reference when
needed (roll gyro drift was about -0.54 deg/h,
requiring an update about once per day).
Attitude-control gas usage during the Mer-
cury II to Mercury III cruise in the non-Canopus
acquired state averaged about 0. 59 g/day (0. 0013
Ibm/day) for attitude control, and about 0.45 g/day
(0.001 Ibm/day) of system leakage. Usage in the
Mercury III encounter mode, roll axis inertial con-
trol, averaged about 0. 45 g/h (0. 001 Ibm/h).
6. Post Mercu ry III. During the M e r c u r y II
to Mercu ry III transient phase, it was demon-
strated that at certain spacecraft configurations
very low torques existed in all axes. This implied
that the spacecraft center of mass and center of
pressure were linear. If the distance between
the center of mass and center of pressure was
sufficient and the center of pressure was behind
the center of mass, a stable spacecraft Sun-
oriented configuration should result without any
active attitude control. Unfortunately, this prin-
ciple could not be verified since an attempted
derived rate acquisition from a cone angle of
less than 1 deg resulted in consuming all the re-
maining attitude-control gas and imparted a large
spacecraft pitch axis rate, causing the spacecraft
to tumble.
C. Thermal control.
During the extended mission, the spacecraft
was predominantly in a cruise mode. The major
events of thermal significance were: (1) the two
Mercury encounters and (2) the five trajectory
midcourse maneuvers. Thermal control of the
spacecraft was maintained by turning on the sup-
plemental heaters as required. Also the solar
panels were tilted as required for temperature and
power considerations. During this period, the solar
flux has cycled between 211.5 W/ft^ (1. 68 Suns) and
602. 2 W/ft2 (4. 78 Suns). The total accumulated
solar exposure through L + 500 days was approxi-
mately 30,000 equivalent Sun hours (ESH). 'A plot of
ESH versus time from launch is shown in Fig. 49
1. Mercury Encounters. The thermal per-
formance of the spacecraft at the first, second,
and third Mercury encounters can be compared,
since the solar intensity is the same (4. 61 Suns).
Table 7 shows the data for Mercury I, II, and
III. The data shows a significant increase in
temperature with the exception of the TV optics.
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Table 7. Temperatures at Mercury I, II, and III
Mission and
test computer
channel No.
065
066
067
068
069
070
106
107
301
408
409
454
455
456
457
500
602
603
604
605
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
750
751
752
753
754
.755
756
757
758
800
801
802
803
Temperature measurement description
Canopus tracker
Gyro control assembly
Sun sensor
+X/- Y N2
-X/+Y N2
Thrust vector control assembly
PSE electronics
PSE plat.
CPT charged particle telescope
Ultraviolet spectrometer airglow
Ultraviolet occultation
Propellant N.,
Propellant
Valve
Thrustplate
IRR
Magnetometer A
Magnetometer B
Magnetometer electronics
Magnetometer processor
Auxiliary oscillator
TWT 1
TWT 2
VCO
Dish 1
Dish 2
Dish 3
S/X Feed
X-band transmitter
Bay 1
Bay 2
Bay 3
Lower blanket
Bay 5
Bay 6
Bay 7
Sunshade
HGA boom
TVA optics F
TVA optics R
TVA video
TVB optics F
I II III
Temperature, °F
40
78
105
69
74
168
86
85
38
51
76
86
88
138
140
85
-4
10
95
97
88
112
95
84
177
22
61
222
74
69
69
72
17
77
74
72
411
203
42
49
66
42
58
84
116
88
a
180
a
89
45
a
92
a
106
a
151
96
5
a
101
a.
98
a
107
a
14
a
178
a
a
115
a
85
44
83
a
77
a
a
0
a
24
a
65
127
119
95
a
186
a
129
51
a
88
a
112 '
a
155
102
8
a
106
a
106
a
113
a
91
a
227
a
a
122
a
92
44
87
a
84
a
a
a
23
a
Telemetry channels lost due to FDS-ADC 2 failures.
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Table 7. (contd)
Mission and
test computer
channel No.
804
805
806
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
Temperature measurement descript ion
TVB optics R
TVB vidicon
Auxiliary electronics
Battery
+X solar panel 1
+X solar panel 2
+X solar panel 3
+X solar panel 4
-X solar panel 1
-X solar panel 2
-X solar panel 3
-X solar panel 4
I II III
Temperature, °F
51
66
46
68
126
145
194
149
128
180
155
198
9
a
5
a
129
176
214
169
a
a
a
a
9
a
6
a
115
166
210
160
a
a
a
a
aTelemetry channels lost due to FDS-ADC No. 2 failures.
The higher temperatures are the result of the
thermal surface degradation of the Alzak and
silvered Teflon surfaces. Of particular interest
is the PSE platform temperature. It exceeded the
upper temperature allowable limit at the third
Mercury encounter. The TV optics temperatures
were lower at the second and third encounters
since the optics heaters were on at Mercury I and
off at Mercury II and III. The power anomaly
caused an increase in Bay 1 and 3 temperatures.
It was necessary to tilt the solar panels to 71 deg
at Mercury III. This was done so as not to exceed
the upper allowable temperature limit.
2. Trajectory Correction Maneuvers. There
were five trajectory correction maneuvers per-
formed during the extended mission. The fourth
TCM of the mission (first of the extended mission)
was divided into two maneuvers, TCM 4a and
TCM 4b. This -was necessary for the long burn
duration required for the maneuver. All of the
thermal predictions made for the TCM's were
based on previous MVM data and Edwards Test
Station data. The soakback temperatures were
generally lower than the predictions and no tem-
peratures exceeded the upper allowables. Table 8
lists the TCMs with the solar intensity and burn
duration. Plots of soakback temperatures for
TCMs 4-8 are included in Ref. 4.
3. Thermal Control Staffing Requirements..
Thermal control responsibilities during the
extended mission included: (1) monitoring and
recording spacecraft temperatures on an almost
daily basis, (2) providing temperature predicts
for maneuvers and encounters, and (3) recom-
mending changes to the supplemental heater
power state as required to maintain adequate
temperatures.
Plots of each telemetered temperature were
generated and maintained throughout the mission.
These plots are included in Refs. 3 and 4.
Table 8. Trajectory correction
maneuvers
TCM
4a
4b
5
6
7
8
Solar intensity,
Suns
2.85
2.80
1.70
2.97
2.60
4.08
Burn duration,
sec
195.014
139.014
18.813
83.17
12.52
3. 12
A constant staffing level of men was required
throughout the extended mission to fulfill the
responsibilities listed above. Additional support
(~<1 man) was occasionally required for very
brief periods of time to support the maneuver
and encounter periods.
This level of effort was considered adequate
for the successful completion of the extended
mission.
D. Data Control and Processing
1. Flight Data Subsystem. The FDS which
collects all science and engineering data, encodes
it for radio transmission and controls the science
instruments processed all commands it received
properly. It also issued all commands to the
science instruments properly.
Unfortunately, howeyer, at approximately
18:00 GMT on April 16, 1974, the FDS lost half of
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its analog data collecting capacity due to a failure
of analog-to-digital converter number two. This
failure had no effect on the ability to transmit
the data that could be collected. The failure
caused the loss of all analog engineering measure-
ments processed by that ADC. No digital mea-
surements were affected. Eighty-nine active
telemetry channels were lost. Of those 89, 17
were redundant to both ADC 1 and 2. For a more
thorough discussion of this failure and its con-
sequences, refer to Refs. 1 and 2.
To circumvent this failure as much as pos-
sible, the FDS was extensively reprogrammed to
eliminate sampling of the lost measurements and
to optimize information returned by the remain-
ing measurements. After the DSS failure (refer
to Sect. VI, D, b) reprogramming of the FDS
became quite common, as it was often necessary
to improve spacecraft team visibility of specific
measurements during critical periods such as
trajectory correction maneuvers.
The ability of the FDS to substitute one pre-
determined block of measurements for another
block (block substitution) was also used to advan-
tage several times during the mission. The
possibility of an FDS power on reset (POR) in
which the FDS reinitialized itself in response to
transients in its power source was accounted for
by backup data mode commands whenever gyro
activity was planned; so the POR presented no
problems during the extended mission.
a. End-of-Mission tests. This test con-
sisted of exercising the major blocks of redundant
hardware in the FDS. TMU number 2 was turned
on in order to obtain more information relative
to the failure of FDS-ADC number 2. Five sep-
arate tests were conducted, including switching
power converters. Data analysis consisted of
real-time verification of proper FDS responses.
A detailed test sequence is presented in Ref. 12.
b. End-of-Mission test results. Proper
FDS operation for each step was verified. The
four internal voltages measured during operation
of the redundant power converter (B) were the
same levels as those for power converter A.
The FDS clock error was measured over the
37-min interval of operation on oscillator B.
This clock error, +5.5 Hz at 307°K (93°F), fell
in line with prelaunch subsystem test data. The
switch to TMU number 2 did not cure the failed
ADC number 2. These test results can be sum-
marized as "perfectly normal response."
2. Data Storage Subsystem (DSS). The DSS
failed completely on Aug. 14, 1974. After much
testing and investigation, it was determined that
the failure was most likely due to a mechanical
problem with the tape itself. Possibilities are
that the tape is stuck to the head or that it came
off its guides. For a thorough analysis of this
failure, refer to Refs. 9 and 13. The net result
of the failure was a serious reduction in the data-
gathering ability of the spacecraft and a consider-
able simplification of sequence design exercises.
Unfortunately, the most serious data losses
occurred at the times of greatest need. For
example, during a TCM, the high-gain antenna is
usually not Earth pointed and therefore engineering
data was normally recorded by the DSS. Without
the DSS, maneuvers were done essentially in the
blind.
The simplification of sequence design was
quite dramatic because the DSS is a difficult
device to work with. It is flexible enough to
create many options to its use in a sequence, but
not flexible enough to permit easy use. As an
example, note that none of the control sources
(CC&S, FDS, and radio receiver) has complete
control over the DSS. Also the inability to
reliably determine tape position at any given time
during a tape pass is a severe restriction on
sequence design.
a. DSS End-of-Mission test. A DSS end-
of-mission test was conducted to attempt to
reactivate the tape recorder . The test comprised
of two parts. The first was an attempt to move
the tape by means of maximum torque tape direc-
tion charges. This was unsuccessful. The
second was an experiment to discover the con-
sequences of leaving the tape in a maximum motor
torque state with the motor stalled for a long
period of time. Three results were possible:
(1) nothing would happen, (2) the motor driver
transistors would burn out, and (3) the heat gen-
erated by the motor and transistors would unstick
the tape and the tape would move to its end and
stop. Unfortunately, the mission ended before
any results were obtained from this portion of the
test.
3. Central Computer and Sequencer. For
the extended mission, various changes were made
in programming the Central Computer and
Sequencer (CC&S). The changes were due to
changes in requirements and philosophy, and
failures or malfunction in spacecraft equipment.
The first candidate for change was the tra-
jectory correction maneuver routine. The
routine was rewritten to be quite general in appli-
cation. Although this approach uses more words
than a specifically tailored routine, it was very
useful for the five TCMs that followed. With
no modifications, the routine performed maneu-
vers that went from a full-scale maneuver all the
way down to a motor-burn only maneuver. By
a two-word addition to the routine, it was also
possible to initiate a minute counting chain with
DC 32 which started the maneuver sequence.
The minute counting chain was used to issue
events on minute centers.
Since the maneuvers were computer-only
maneuvers, a scheme had to be devised to guar-
antee the maneuver durations. A tandem maneu-
ver using both the sequencer and the computer
would automatically abort a maneuver if there
were timing differences between the two. How-
ever, this mode was not used due to attitude-
control gas conservation activities. To protect
against the possibility of infinite turns should a
noise glitch reset the program counter in the
CC&S, the routine was written so that once a
turn starts, it was guaranteed to stop as
programmed.
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Another feature used in the extended mission
was the clock calibration routine. This made it
possible to obtain clock calibration points inde-
pendent of the down-link data bit rate.
For the two extended mission encounters,
most of the routines remained essentially the
same. Except for the TV mosaic routines, all
changes made were to effect simplification and,
therefore, word savings. The encounter loads
were the most troublesome because the sequences
required more memory words than were available
in the spacecraft computer. In the extended
mission, no restrictions were placed on the types
of mosaics, i.e., the mosaics were not restricted
to be rectangular, single strip, step strip, or
parallelogram in form. The mosaic parameters
such as pictures per row and scan platform step
sizes were not constrained, although imposing
restrictions would have saved considerable
memory words. For example, if the step size
in the main slew axis had been fixed for several
mosaics, a single table entry could have been
used repeatedly.
A feature that was desired for Mercury I but
could not be incorporated due to lack of time and
memory space was included in the extended mis-
sion. This was the corrections to the APS data
word to account for backlash in the scan platform.
To do this, the tailored mosaic routines were
rewritten into a fairly general mosaic routine.
To operate in conjunction with this routine, back-
lash correction routines were also written. At
Mercury III, for example, out of the thirty-one
mosaics, ten different types of backlash correc-
tions were required. This consumed twenty-five
words of memory. The determination as to where
backlash corrections were required was a time-
consuming task. The direction of movement of
each scan platform position had to be reviewed.
Then the clock and cone steps for the first move-
ments in each mosaic were determined. If the
movement was in the opposite direction, backlash
correction had to be applied. The second row of
each mosaic had to be studied in relation to the
flyback position and corrections applied where
necessary.
During the period when the acquisition of
Canopus was being attempted prior to the final
encounter of Mercury, extensive use was made of
the coded command-direct command (CCDC)
capability of the CC&S. This function causes
the CC&S to issue a command upon receipt of the
execute command by ground transmission. The
CCDC was used to issue 7B and 7B/R (Canopus
tracker ON and OFF). Since the encounter
sequence was already loaded in memory, and since
it was desirable not to disturb the sequence, the
one spare word in memory was used to load the
data word. This eliminated the necessity.of having
to reload any memory words connected with the
encounter sequence. This guaranteed a CC&S
controlled automatic sequence if a problem had
occurred in command transmission.
For the first time in the MVM '73 mission,
an update to the CC&S was made before the begin-
ning of the automatic encounter. This, too, was
done to maintain the philosophy that once the auto-
matic sequence had started, no intervention by
ground command was necessary to ensure a
successful encounter. The update consisted of
one word that changed the programmed FDS data
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mode command. Without this change, highly
degraded video signals would have been received.
The successful programming of the sequences
was to a large measure due to the small, but
close, knit working group where the communica-
tion line was always open. Solutions were quickly
achieved by free discussion and interchange of
ideas. The CC&S functioned without fault through-
out the extended mission. Fifty-three program-
ming loads were made using over 2, 000 load
commands. The CC&S issued almost 4, 500 com-
mands to other spacecraft subsystems during the
extended mission.
4. Support Software. Very extensive use
was made of four ground support software pro-
grams; COMGEN, OPSCOP, MOVTIM, and
FDSMEM. Some use was made of a fifth program,
RAMAP.
a. Command Generation (COMGEN). In all
the programs and routines written, validation is
required. A software package called COMGEN
is used to do this. COMGEN produces a simula-
tion of the program and provides a detailed listing
of all events and their timing. It also checks
the coded words to the APS and FDS. In the case
of the APS word, COMGEN will check for valid
addresses and magnitudes. It will also indicate
conditions where one slew command overlaps
another.
The program COMGEN, which contains a
CC&S assembler; a merge capability, a command
generation capability; and an extensive simulation
ability of the CC&S, the FDS, the APS, and the
DSS, was the most used program. It was run
through over 50 operational cycles. In general,
a new cycle was started after each period of high
CC&S execution or loading activity in order to
eliminate having to continually resimulate what
was, by then, history. As each cycle was com-
pleted, the complete status of COMGEN was
recorded on magnetic tape as a backup against
any possible data file losses on the computer.
COMGEN was always run in a sequence with the
file packing routine AMPACK and several utility
routines designed to ease data file maintenance
problems. This was all done in one operating
card deck by using the capabilities of the utility
program OPSCOP.
During the sequence preparation work for the
two encounter sequences, COMGEN was used in
an additional mode. The purpose of this mode
was to allow inputs from three sources; namely,
TSOST, SPOP, and the Data Systems Engineer
to be merged without having to physically mix the
three decks. This mode also permitted delaying
FDS timing decisions until nearer encounter when
frame starts could be better predicted.
This special mode of COMGEN was also run
in conjunction with the program OPSCOP and in
fact made use of all of OPSCOP1 s capabilities.
Had it not been for this method of COMGEN use,
situations such as correcting for unexpected FDS
frame start drift several days before encounter
would have required changing hundreds of COM-
GEN inputs instead of just six.
COMGEN1 s time ordered merge of inputs
from several sources plus the ability to work in
a relative time base made it possible to keep up
with the rapidly changing command periods that
resulted from sporadic station coverage and the
roll drift mode of spacecraft operation. It was
especially useful during TCMs which were timed
based on star sightings instead of wall clock
time.
COMGEN did have several shortcomings, some
of which cost many manhours of effort in solving.
Among the more serious of these were the infinite
loop problem and the merge-assembly incompat-
ibility problem. The infinite loop problem
occurred when COMGEN was asked to simulate a
CC&S execution that crossed over one of the CC&S's
hours marks. The result was that the COMGEN
run went into an infinite loop and had to be can-
celled. Cancelling the run, of course, lost the
output and helped obscure the problem. The
merge assembly problem was worse. Its causes
and cures are not yet completely understood.
Another problem was one of output delivery.
There were many occasions where the time be -
tween the conclusion of a COMGEN run and the
receipt of the printed output from that run was
an hour and a half. Such a delay makes response
to dynamic situations very difficult.
b. OPSCOP. The utility program, OPSCOP,
was almost always used to run COMGEN because
it enabled the automating of several file main-
tenance functions associated with the operation of
COMGEN and thereby saved much time and pre-
sented many errors. Occasionally, OPSCOPS' s
file update capability was used to correct minor
errors in COMGEN-generated output files.
The only serious OPSCOP problem that was
encountered was with the file update capability.
Under certain conditions, update lines ended up in
surprising places. Another serious problem which
was a procedural problem involved OPSCOP writ-
ing on a magnetic tape that belonged to another
group. The only real solution to a problem such
as this is for the computer' s operating system to
be set up to use standard system labels on all
tapes.
c. MOVTIM. The program MOVTIM was a
latecomer on the scene. Its purpose was to allow
a user to move a specified block of COMGEN inputs
by some specified amount of time. The concept is
very useful, but it was quickly implemented (less
than one day), with such severe limitations as
fixed column format inputs. The program did,
however, assist greatly in the complete reorgan-
ization of the Mercury III sequence in less than
two days beginning just three days before encoun-
ter. This was done in order to adjust for the
star acquisition difficulties and uncertainties in the
aimpoint due to the late execution of TCM 8.
A program such as MOVTIM should be
developed to a high level and made available to
mission sequence implementation groups.
d. FDSMEM. All of the extended mission
FDS reprogramming was done using a FDS mem-
ory maintenance and command generation program
called FDSMEM. This program saved many
manhours and eliminated many mistakes by pro-
ducing all of the spacecraft commands, all of the
Mission Test Computer (the telemetry decom-
mutating computer) inputs, and most of the docu-
mentation for the changes. FDSMEM was also
capable of supporting block substitutions with
commands and MTC inputs. The MTC inputs
were necessary for block substitutions because
of a serious deficiency in the MTC programming
that prevented the automatic handling of block
substitutions.
e. RAMAP. The DSS simulation program,
RAMAP, was occasionally used as sequence prep-
aration work, but the program had several
restrictions that discouraged its use. Among
these was a fixed column field input that made
hand preparation of inputs difficult. An inability
to reject DSS commands was very inconvenient.
The fact that RAMAP was not on the same com-
puter as its prime source of inputs, COMGEN,
seriously discouraged its use. Data identification
after a RAMAP run was not easy as there was no
provision for titling the stored data. RAMAP
had no continuous mission run capability such as
COMGEN1 s cycling ability. Certain control
functions were not changeable during the course
of the RAMAP run thus producing too little infor-
mation or way too much.
With respect to errors, though, RAMAP was
very good. Only one was found, and it was
minor.
E. Propulsion Subsystem Performance
Table 9 summarizes the performance of the
Propulsion Subsystem during the eight TCMs.
TCMs 4a through 8 were performed during the
extended mission. Initial tank pressure was not
known for the maneuvers subsequent to TCM 4a
due to the FDS failure of April 16, 1974. How-
ever, it proved to be possible to compute the
initial tank pressure with sufficient accuracy that
the burn errors did not significantly increase.
TCMs 4a and b were so-called because they
were considered to be two parts of one maneuver.
They were performed approximately 24 h apart
to prevent possible damage to spacecraft com-
ponents from the temperature increases due to a
single long burn. The burn time for TCM 4b was
computed before TCM 4a. It was not readjusted
based on observed TCM 4a performance.
Table 9 shows that the AV errors attained
were well within the basic subsystem 3cr accuracy
requirement of 8%. At the time of preparation
of the table, AV error estimates were not avail-
able from navigation for TCMs 7 and 8. A pro-
pulsion TCM 8 AV error estimate is not possible
due to the lack of telemetry.
A more detailed discussion of the extended
mission maneuvers, including plots of the telem-
etry data, is given in Refs. 5-8.
In general, the propulsion subsystem per-
formed satisfactorily during the Mariner 10
Mission. No malfunctions occurred, and the
burn errors were less than la- after TCM 1. The
subsystem gradually increased in thrust a few
percent during the mission due to decreasing
catalyst bed pressure drop and higher than pre-
dicted thrust coefficient, but even these
phenomena were not unexpected.
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Table 9. Mariner 10 TCM summary
TCM
• 1
2
3
4A
4B
5
6
7
8
Burn time,
s
19.90
3.70
51.153
195.014
139.014
18.813
83. 17
IE. 52
3. 12
Predicted AV,
••' " m/s
7.778
1.359
17.831
49.998
27.554
3.321
14.543
Z.022
0.486
Percent of
3o A priori AV error
4.3
5.2
4.6
6.2
6. 1
7. 1
7.2
7.9
10.2
Percent of 3u A posteriori
AV errorsa
Propulsion
+0.9 ± 2.32
+ 1. 55 ± 1.2
-0.9 ± 0 . 7
-0.82 ± 0.75
+0.32 ± 0. 90
+0. 96 ± 1.07
+0.72 ± 1.21
+0. 5 ± 1.77
Navigation
+ 1.81 ± 0.39
+ 1.25 ± 0. 04
-0.72 ± 0. 10
-0.27 ± 1.03
+0.67 ± 2.80
+1.46 ± 0. 20
+1.86± 0.21
Includes errors due to propulsion performance prediction, temperature prediction and burn time.
F. Mariner 10 Power Subsystem
The Mercury I encounter on March 29, 1974
•was very successful in spite of the deteriorated
condition of the spacecraft. The power subsystem
had sustained anomalies causing transfer to the
standby chain (redundant boost regulator and 2.4
kHz inverter) and partial reduction in one solar
panel power string output. Because of excessive
control gas usage, the solar panel tilt capability
was used for attitude control of the spacecraft by
varying the effective solar pressure resulting
from the differential tilt angles.
Immediately after the successful Mercury I
encounter on March 31, 1974, the power subsys-
tem experienced an electrical failure in Bay 1
which manifested itself as a 90-W load at the
input to the boost regulator and a measurable bay
temperature increase. After many attempts to
adjust and reduce the spacecraft electrical loads,
it was determined that the power system had
sufficient power margin to support normal opera-
tions plus the parasitic anomalous load. Oper-
ating modes were adopted so that the Bay 1 temper-
ature would not become excessive. The far
encounter science sequence was not compromised.
The following week contained several more
anomalies in other subsystems, i.e., the tape
recorder power {2.4 kHz) turning on and off with-
out commands and the loss of direct command
capability to change the TWT from low to high
mode. No correlation could be established between
the boost regulator "parasitic load" and these
other subsystem events.
On April 16, 1974, the Flight Data Subsystem
(FDS) experienced a failure which eliminated
many of the engineering data channels. The
power subsystem was left with only the following
data after FDS was reprogrammed to maximize
the data return from the operating channels:
E-750 Bay 1 temperature
E-853 30 V regulator voltage
E-854 30 V regulator current
E-861 +X solar panel 1 current
E-862 +X solar panel 2 current
E-866 Irradiated cell current (Iscr)
E-867 Standard cell voltage (Voc)
E-868 Standard cell current (Isc)
E-870 +X solar panel 1 temperature
E-871 +X solar panel 2 temperature
E-872 +X solar panel 3 temperature
E-873 +X solar panel 4 temperature
E-660 X-band transmitter current
(power switching and logic
voltage indicator)
All of the information about the -X solar panel
power performance was lost. The VOC-I8C trans-
ducer data from the -X panel provided the only
indication of tilt angle change and temperature.
The power output of the -X panel was assumed to
be proportional to the +X panel performance.
The four +X panel temperature transducers pro-
vided data to permit -X panel temperature
assumptions. It was fortunate that the Bay 1
temperature data remained available so that the
boost regulator parasitic load could be monitored.
The 30-V regulator current and voltage channels
were not useful because the regulator was never
turned on.after the power chain transfer to standby.
The X-band transmitter load is constant power
on the raw dc bus. Therefore, its input current
varies inversely proportional to the bus voltage.
Channel E-660 thus provided an excellent indi-
cation of the raw bus (PS&L) voltage. Because
all battery telemetry channels were lost, the
X-band transmitter current measurement pro-
vided the only data on battery performance when
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the solar panels were off Sun or during the solar
panel/battery share mode. The performance of
the battery charger was monitored by noting the
change in +X solar panel currents when the
charger was commanded ON/OFF. This limited
power system telemetry data provided a sufficient
information base from which the power system
performance could be implied.
After the anomalies were analyzed and under-
stood, work-around .procedures were developed
so that the remainder of the mission was conducted
in a near normal manner. TCMs 4A, 4B, and 5
were performed without incident allowing the
spacecraft to again encounter Mercury on Sept 21,
1974 and provide excellent return of science
data.
The six-months cruise period between Mer-
cury II and Mercury III was filled with solar panel
differential tilts so that maximum conservation
of control gas could be realized. Without control
gas, a third Mercury encounter would be useless.
TCMs 6, 7, and 8 were performed successfully,
making Mercury III encounter a significant science
and engineering accomplishment.
After Mercury III encounter, the spacecraft
was dedicated to engineering tests. One of the
tests involved tilting the + and - solar panels
from 71 to 78 deg and return in 1 deg or less
increments. (The largest tilt angle used during
the mission was the design limit of 76 deg.) The
results of this exercise were twofold. First, the
steady-state data plotted in Fig. 50 permits
assessment of the solar panel performance after
500 days in space.at Sun intensities never before
experienced (0.4 AU). The solar panel perfor-
mance data includes calibration at large tilt angles
and the evaluation of degradation due to ultra-
violet and hard particle irradiation. Second, the
MVM ' 73 solar panel design and near Sun per-
formance could be evaluated for use in the MVM
Encke Comet study. Preliminary analyses indi-
cates a significant ultraviolet degradation of the
thermal properties and solar cell coverglass
transmission. Comparable data at equal Sun
intensities and tilt angles indicate a 11°C increase
in solar panel temperatures. The resulting solar
panel power loss due to thermal degradation and
coverglass transmission loss was approximately
12 to 14%. Hard-particle damage does not appear
to be significant, e. g. , 1% or less.
During the Mercury III encounter sequence,
the power system provided 470 W from the-solar
panels at the bus voltage of 43. 25 V. The panels
were both at 71 deg tilt, and the zener diodes were
not dissipating any power. The average solar
cell temperature was estimated at 85°C. This
performance, assuming operation at the maximum
power point, would imply that the solar panels
had a capability in excess of 600 W at launch and
near Earth. The power subsystem performed
well throughout the entire mission. The design
proved to be reliable enough to sustain the fail-
ures and anomalies without compromising the
mission objectives.
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Figure 50. Solar panel degradation
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. VII. NAVIGATION
A. Introduction
The navigation activities duri-ng-the Extended
Mission were a natural extension of the activities
during the baseline mission in the sense that both
the personnel, and to a major extent the software,
were carried over from the baseline mission.
However, due to both spacecraft anomalies and
the Extended Mission science requirements, the
details of the navigation effort between the two
phases were distinctly different.
After the first Mercury encounter an evalua-
tion of the science requirements along with the
remaining capability for controlling the space-
craft orbit showed that the maximum science
return would be obtained by targeting the space-
craft for a far Sun-side flyby on the second
Mercury encounter and for a close dark-side
flyby on the third encounter. The far Sun-side
flyby was designed to complete the TV coverage
and the close dark-side flyby to investigate the
magnetic field properties.
Following the first Mercury encounter the
uncorrected trajectory would have taken the
spacecraft to a closest approach point approxi-
mately 800,000 km below Mercury on the second
encounter. The navigation activities required to
achieve the desired closest approach distance of
50,000 km included two trajectory correction,
maneuvers (TCMs 4 and 5) and three periods of
orbit redetermination. The first TCM (TCM 4)
was designed to correct the major portion of the
error during a period when the AV requirements
were low and the second (TCM 5) to correct any
residual errors and achieve an accurate flyby.
The orbit determination activities involved recon-
verging the orbit prior to each of these maneu-
vers .plus a final reconvergence after the TCM 5
to support the encounter sequence planning.
Navigation between the second and third
Mercury encounters became much more challeng-
ing than on the previous leg. This was due to two
opposing factors. On one hand, the science
return improved as the closest approach distance
decreased, provided the spacecraft did not
impact the planet. Thus the need for highly accu-
rate navigation. On the other hand, the reduced
supply of attitude-control gas forced the project
to adopt the "solar sailing" mode, (in this mode
the roll-orientation of the spacecraft is not con-
trolled) which, in turn, severely degraded both
the doppler and range data. This data degrada-
tion had a potentially catastrophic effect upon the
orbit determination accuracy and a major portion
of the navigation effort on this leg was applied to
correcting and working around this problem. As
with the maneuver strategy on the previous leg, it
had been hoped to achieve the final flyby trajec-
tory with two maneuvers (TCMs 6 and 7). How-
ever, due to a combination of large execution
errors on the last planned maneuver and the
degraded orbit redetermination capability, the
probability of Mercury impact was unacceptably
high after TCM 7 which forced the execution of
TCM 8 in order to decrease the impact proba-
bility. Even with all of the problems the space-
craft was delivered to a closest approach point
only 327 km above the surface. This distance
was less than half the closest approach distance
on the f i rs t Mercury encounter.
The Extended Mission was supported by
roughly one third the personnel supporting the
baseline mission. The full-time support included
a team chief, an orbit determination analys t , a
data editor, and a maneuver analyst. There was
also regular part-t ime support for the orbit
determination, targeting, and reconnaissance
areas. Additionally, when particular problems
arose that required either specialized support or
a short-term effort exceeding the capabil i ty of
the navigation team, fur ther manpower was pro-
vided by the Mission Analysis Division.
The reduction in the manpower level was
possible because of a number of factors. First,
the software and operational procedures had, for
the most part, been thoroughly developed and
debugged during the baseline mission and were
used during the Extended Mission without a fu r -
ther expenditure of effort. Secondly, the entire
operational staff was much smaller, which greatly
reduced the time required for coordination of the
inter-team activities. The availability of the out-
side support for the solution of special problems
eliminated the necessity of maintaining the capa-
bility to handle these problems from within the
normal navigation team. Finally, the pressure
to rapidly process the received tracking data and
maintain an updated orbit was reduced which
allowed an extended schedule for orbit
redetermination.
The transition from prime mission status to
Extended Mission status had some negative effects
in terms of increasing the workload during the
extended mission. The most noticeable effect
was the loss of priority in the use of the 1 108 com-
puter. Due to the large size of the navigation
software, especially in the orbit determination
area, it is not possible to execute these pro-
grams when the general computer user is also
using the 1108. This incompatibility forces the
scheduling of periods where the 1108 is used
exclusively by the navigation team (block time).
During the baseline mission block time was
normally scheduled during normal working hours.
However, during the Extended Mission block time
was available only after the normal hours (typi-
cally 5:00 pm to 3:00 am during the week). This
forced the personnel executing these programs
(primarily the orbit determination analyst and the
data editor) to work a very abnormal shift and
greatly increased the communication problems
between these functions and the remainder of the
project. While this situation was acceptable for
short periods of time, it became increasingly
evident that over-extended periods of time this
arrangement was reducing the efficiency of the
navigation team.
The reduction in priority also increased the
effort associated with obtaining the required
tracking coverage. During the baseline mission
both the priority of the project and the DSN work-
load allowed sufficient tracking coverage to be
easily scheduled. During the Extended Mission
the reversal of both of these factors required that
the tracking requirements be carefully generated
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and coordinated with the DSN. In various portions
of the Extended Mission the tracking coverage
became critical to the .success of the mission and
the scheduling effort imposed a considerable work-
load on the navigation team.
B. Radiometric Tracking
1. Introduction
The MVM '73 Extended Mission was con-
strained to use only about half the tracking cover-
age time available to the prime mission. This
sparser coverage by itself naturally complicated
the navigation of the Extended Mission. Additional
difficulties arose from the comparative degrada-
tion of much Extended Mission tracking data due
to (1) solar plasma corruption around superior
conjunction June 6, 1974, (2) rolling spacecraft
data signatures during the period of solar sailing
from Mercury II to Mercury III, and (3) increas-
ing reliance on 26-m stations for coverage.
The goals of this subsection are to provide
more detail of the manner in which MVM '73
accumulated and prepared tracking data for the
orbit determination process and to outline several
unique difficulties facing the navigation team in
the accomplishment of its task.
2. Creation of Radiometric Tracking Data
In order to create doppler data types (to
measure range rate) a synthesizer frequency
(FT)J of approximately 22 MHz (Block III S-band)
was multiplied by a factor of 96 to produce a car-
rier tone of about 2200 MHz (see Table 10 for list
of Deep Space Stations), and transmitted to the
MVM '73 spacecraft. The received signal was
then retransmitted at an S-band frequency 240/221
times higher and returned to Earth. (An X-band
transponder also returned the carrier at a fre-
quency adjusted by 880/221, but this could only be
received by a Block IV receiver located at DSS 14.
The X-band data was not used to support naviga-
tion. ) When the receiving DSS is the same as the
transmitting deep space station, the data is
labeled F2 (two-way doppler), but if the receiv-
ing deep space station is different, the data is
labeled F3 (three-way doppler). When the space-
craft did not receive a carrier signal from Earth,
it would transmit a constant beacon tone of about
2300 MHz. When this was received by a deep
space station, it was labeled Fl (one-way doppler).
The cycles of the received signal are counted
by a doppler counter at the DSS. The cycle
counter is then interrogated at a specified sample
interval, and the count is transmitted along the
high-speed data line to the MCCC. The radial
spacecraft velocity is a function of the measured
Table 10. Deep Space Stations used to support Mariner 10
DSS
Echo
Venus
Mars
Weemala
Ballima
Robledo
Cebreros
Robledo
Station
No.
12
13
14
42
43a
61
62
63a
DSCC
Goldstone, Calif.
Goldstone, Calif.
Goldstone, Calif.
Tidbinbilla, Australia
Tidbinbilla, Australia
Madrid, Spain
Madrid, Spain
Madrid, Spain
Antenna
size, m
26
26
64
26
' 64
26
26
64
Comments
PLOP ranging during prime;
PRA removed during Extended
Mission
Used to track ATS-1 and ATS-5
for ionospheric charged parti-
cle calibration
First usage of a Block IV
receiver during prime; Block
III installed during Extended
Mission with PLOP ranging
Conjoint PLOP ranging during
Extended Mission with DSS 43
PRA
PLOP ranging
Conjoint PLOP ranging during
Extended Mission with DSS 63
PRA
No ranging capability
PLOP ranging
aUsed for the first time by MVM '73.
The exact value of the synthesizer frequency for optimal spacecraft communication is established by
PREDDC runs. Deep Space Station operations personnel dial this value into the station hardware.
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doppler shift in the received signal,
for a diagram of F2 creation. )
(See Fig. 51
Measurements of spacecraft range are
obtained by transmitting a series of coded pulses
via sidebands of the main carrier 'frequency to
the spacecraft which are then retransmitted by
the spacecraft back to Earth. The Earth-
received code is matched against the transmitted
code. The spacecraft range is a function of the
phase shift between the two signals. In practice,
the range measurements are influenced by daily
variations in the spacecraft and deep space sta-
tion hardware timing delays, as well as local
weather conditions at the station. Calibrations of
local ranging delays must be taken at each station
during its ranging pass, which must be combined
with the current spacecraft delay to produce
ranging adjust values as described in Section
VII-A-5. These calibrations are added to the
measured value in order to obtain the proper
range measurement.
Table 11 summarizes all navigation data
types used in the MVM '73 mission. Figure 52
summarizes the flow of tracking data and the
relationships of personnel and interfaces involved
in the navigation process. Reference 19 further
describes the manner in which the DSN accumu-
lates tracking data.
3. Data Conditioning
All incoming data must be evaluated for
quality and validity before the orbit determination
fit. Calibrations and recovery procedures are
employed whenever possible to correct deficien-
cies, but much data is not recoverable and must
be removed from the final data file. This was a
formidable task, since about 1000 data points
were received each day.
Radio metric data measurements of space,
craft range and range rate are corrupted by error
sources classified into three groups:
(1) Spacecraft error sources
Spacecraft rotational motion
Spacecraft nongravitational
accelerations
Spacecraft electronic irregularities
(2) Earth-based error sources
Ground facility hardware malfunc-
tions and irregularities
Table 11. DSN data types used to support navigation
Designation
Fl
F2b
F3
PLOPa b (PRA)
MU23
MARK 1A
DRVID
F3Ca
CHPART
Definition
One-way doppler
Two-way doppler
Three-way doppler
Discrete planetary
operational
ranging
R&D planetary
ranging (discrete)
Near-Earth ranging
Differenced range
versus integrated
doppler
F3-F2
Faraday rotational
data
Band0
S, X
S, X
S, X
S
S, X
S
S
S
Comments
Primarily used for radio science
S-X band dual doppler also used to cali-
brate charged particles
Requires use of two deep space stations
simultaneously
Primary range type used in extended
mission
Used only with DSS 14 Block IV
receiver
Post-launch ranging system; originally
designed for lunar distances
Used to calibrate charged particles
A pseudo-data type which eliminates
spacecraft stochastic accelerations
Used to calibrate charged particle con-
tent of Earth's ionosphere
aData types used for the first time by MVM '73.
Primary data types used to navigate MVM '73.
°X-band data from DSS 43 was available, using the Block IV receiver, until July 1, 1974, at
which time the Block IV receiver was replaced by the Block III receiver.
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SPACECRAFT
... 240
 c96
-227FT
DSS
MIX COUNT
BIAS
TWO-WAY DOPPlfR: F2= BIAS + 96 -^p VCOT (UP*c DN)
UP = SPACECRAFT RADIAL VELOCITY (km/we) RELATIVE TO TRANSMITTING STATION
*DN = SPACECRAFT RADIAL VELOCITY (Wi«c) RELATIVE TO RECEIVING STATION
C = SPEED OF LIGHT (W»c)
FT = SYNTHESIZER FREQUENCY OF TRANSMITTING STATION (NOMINALLY 22 mHz FOR BLOCK III1
 RECEIVER AND 44 mHz FOR BLOCK IV RECEIVER)
VCOT = COUNTED VCO FREQUENCY OF TRANSMITTING STATION, NOMINALLY 22 mHz
BIAS - 1C6 Hr FOR BLOCK III AND 5 TIMES 10* FOR BLOCK IV RECEIVER
Figure 51. Block diagram to generate two-way doppler (F2)
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SOFTWARE
Figure 52. Tracking data flow block diagram
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Human error
Tracking station motion (polar
motion-and irregularities in Earth
rotation rate)
(3) Intervening tracking mediums
Tropospheric refraction
Ionospheric charged-particle
influences
Space plasma charged-particle
effects.
The data editing procedure employed by
MVM '73 is shown schematically in Fig. 53. .At
specified times a t racking tape, containing
recently received data consisting primarily of
doppler counter samples, is t ransfe r red to a
Univac 1108 computer. Here the Orbit Data
Editor (ODE), a general-purpose data file manip-
ulation program, f i rs t converts the tracking data
file into an 1108 compatible format (decode pro-
cess), and subsequently creates an orbit data file
containing differenced, t ime-normalized values of
the doppler counter samples. The doppler shift
in this frequency is a function of the spacecraft
velocity. The orbit data file was next processed
by the Tracking Data Editor (TRKED) which
creates a file of residuals based on an assumed
a priori orbit. The residual file permits an eval-
uation of the data quality.
MVM '73 was the first interplanetary mission
to make use of a computer interactive graphics
system as a data quality analysis aid. Previously,
support personnel have been constrained to first
create hard-copy data residual plots, and then
refer back to hard-copy listings of the data in
order to manually produce edit control cards.
MVM '73 implemented an Interactive Orbit Data
Editor (IODE)2 for use on JPL's Univac 1108 com-
puters in conjunction with a Univac 1557/1558
interactive graphics display device (Fig. 54).
Using the graphics system, data residuals
for each tracking pass can be immediately dis-
played on the face of a cathode ray tube. Although
the interactive orbit data editor employs auto-
matic scaling features within each tracking pass,
any interval of data can be quickly replotted to any
desired scale. Data can be flagged for rejection,
and the entire pass replotted and rescaled minus
the rejected data. The image on the CRT may be
stored at any point for subsequent production of
hard-copy records.
It is estimated that the use of computer video
graphics reduced the time required to produce
edit control cards by a factor of from 10 to 20.
At the same time reliability had been improved by
removing the human error in the traditional man-
ual techniques. Interactive graphics also allowed
the analyst great flexibility to make qualitative
evaluations of subtle data signatures.
The resultant file of edit control.card images
was used to form the final data file. Intervals of
data not rejected were averaged into compressed
points, thus reducing the process time necessary
to determine the Mariner 10 trajectory.
Much activity was devoted to calibrate or
further understand error sources that affect
tracking data. These activities are briefly
described as follows:
(1) Calibrations of the variations in the
Earth' s rotational rate and polar motion
were updated weekly^ and incorporated
into the orbit fits.
(2) Tropospheric refraction was modeled to
include an observed seasonally varying
component as described in Ref. 2.
(3) Calibrations of the charged particle con-
tent of the total intervening tracking
mediums were made using S/X dual dop-
pler data,4 available mostly during the
prime mission. These measurements
were compared against calibrations of
the ionospheric charged particle content
from Faraday rotation data. The charged
particle calibrations, however, were per-
formed as a demonstration only, and
were not incorporated into the orbit fits
used to support navigation.
(4) Calibrations of the spacecraft and DSS
hardware delays were factored into the
range measurements as described in
VII-A-5.
4. Ranging Parameters
Discrete Planetary Operational Ranging
(PLOP) from the Planetary Ranging Assembly
(PRA) was the primary range data type used dur-
ing the extended mission. For a PLOP point of
N components, the final range value is ambiguous
by multiples of 2^+^ range units (1 range unit
- 1/7 m). Thus to properly interpret a range
point of 10 components, the spacecraft orbit posi-
tional uncertainty must be no greater than about
150 km.
The ranging system effectively divides the
solar system into concentric shells, each shell
being 2048 ranging units thick. The spacecraft
position is determined with respect to this mea-
suring system. The TQ time is the second when
the range code first returns to the ranging deep
space station from the spacecraft. Then follows
an interval of (Tj +1) sec during which the
2Programmed by B. M. Cooper of JPL.
Supplied by M. Dodds and J. Humnicky of JPL as "STOIC" decks.
Performed by B. Winn and K. Yip of JPL. References 20 and 22 describe this topic in greater depth.
Refer to Ref. 21 for a more comprehensive discussion of the Planetary Ranging Assembly.
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spacecraft location is defined within one of the
ranging shells. Following the Tl interval are
(N - 1) T2 intervals, each (T2 + 1) seconds in
duration, which successively define the particu-
lar shell containing the spacecraft. .-After the
last T2 interval, a series of T-3 intervals (each
T3 seconds long) define DRVID data.
The range parameters were calculated as
follows:
Clock acquisition time parameters
Tl = sec
where
N,
=- (watts /watt) = 10 'p/1°
<r is the desired range accuracy in meters
N- is the system noise spectral density
P_ is the power in the ranging channel
Rp = ^— (dB), signal-to-noise ratio, available
0 from dumps of project tracking
tapes or telecommunications
predictions.
Constraint
Tl = J Tg - 1 sec
where TS is the Tracking and Data Handler sample
rate and J is an integer.
Probability of False Acquisition Parameter
T2 = 10< 9 -<>> / 1 0 sec
provides for PE < 1/1000
Constraint
T2 = 20K - 1 sec (K an integer)
DRVID Post Range Acquisition Integration
Time
Constraints
T3 = L(TZ + 1) sec (L an integer)
T3 = MT sec (M an integer)
s
Optimal values of N, Tl, T2, T3 and the suggested
interval between successive TO times were peri-
odically transmitted from the navigation team to
the ACE and the OPS CHIEF, who would com-
municate the values to the individual DSS. During
the MVM '73 extended mission, the capability was
developed to take conjoint ranging from the 26-m
facilities DSSs 42 and 61. The technique involves
borrowing the planetary ranging assembly of the
adjacent 64-m facility. Due to its smaller
antenna size, the PR/NQ for a 26-m facility will
be almost 16 dB weaker than a corresponding
PJ^/NQ at a 64-m facility. Consequently, longer
range integration times are required for conjoint
ranging. In one instance, when the spacecraft
was in the solar-sail mode and communicating to
Earth via its low-gain antenna, more than 3-1/2
hours were required to integrate a single
7-component <r = 1 5 m conjoint range point. How-
ever, when the spacecraft ranging signal-to-noise
ratio was favorable, range point parameters were
generally adjusted to provide <r < 5 m and N 2 10.
5. Ranging Calibrations
The raw range reading provided by the
planetary range assembly at a deep space station
is not the final desired range measurement. As
seen in Fig. 55, the raw PRA range value will
contain an unwanted round-trip through path ABC
plus a station hardware delay (as electronic
impulses pass through cabling and are processed
by the ranging equipment). In order to calibrate
the unwanted component (which may vary daily
due to local meteorological conditions at the sta-
tion), a signal is transmitted from a zero delay
device (ZDD) through the station feed horn and
electronics and then returned to the ZDD. The
round-trip through path DEF and the station
equipment duplicates the travel of the actual
spacecraft signal, so that when the ZDD calibra-
tion and the current spacecraft delay are sub-
tracted from the raw PRA reading, the range
measurement PQ (Fig. 55) results. Since the
desired range measurement is PR (the distance
from the spacecraft to the deep space station axis),
the Z-height value (the distance between the ZDD
and DSS axis) is then added to the intermediate
result.
In practice, the ZDD measurement for each
ranging pass was transmitted to the Network
Analysis Team (NAT) in the form of a post-track
report, which then became available to the navi-
gation team. Ranging adjust cards for the Orbit
Determination Program during the MVM '73
Extended Mission were produced by G. Pease
using the 1108 computer program GORC.6 The
""(Generate ordinary range calibrations) programmed by G. Sievers and S. Reinbold for use on a real-
time computer demand device.
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Figure 54. Univac 1557/1558 d i sp l ay device
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Figure 53. Data quality analysis edit procedure
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Figure 55. Theory of range calibration at a
deep space station
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user inputs range data type, station ID, pass ID,
transmitter-receiver frequency, band, spacecraft
delay, and station delay and the program computes
the range adjust value (using a stored table of
Z-height values for each deep space station). The
internal calculations are performed in terms of a
naturalized measurement system composed of
range units (1 RU - 1/7 m; 1 RU - 1 ns).
In the course of the mission it was observed
that the consistency of valid range measurements
at a particular deep space station was on the order
of a few meters. This minor variation could in
part be due to the limitation on the clock acquisi-
tion time parameter, Tl. However, there still
remain serious biases on the order of 20 m
between individual deep space station facilities,
which apparently arise due to inconsistencies in
the calibration procedures within the DSN, as well
as survey errors in the deep space station
location (Fig. 56).
6. Superior Conjunction Data
As expected, near superior conjunction the
doppler data was seriously corrupted by interac-
tions with solar plasma (Fig. 57). It was not,
however, anticipated that serious charged-
particle corruption would be apparent as soon as
or for as long as it in fact was observed. Plasma
interactions in the form of spurious wavy signa-
tures were developing in early March of 1974
when the Sun-Earth-probe angle was greater than
30 deg (Fig. 58). Consistently serious corrup-
tions were observed from mid-April through late
August of 1974. Figure 59 shows an example of
the characteristically poor data received during
this period which may be contrasted against the
clean data received for most of the prime mission
as in Fig. 60.
7. Calibration of Rolling Spacecraft
In order to conserve attitude-control gas, the
spacecraft roll correction jets were inhibited
from Oct. 6, 1974 to March 1 5, 1975. The roll
period was controlled by the spacecraft team to be
between several hours and about one day. This
was accomplished by adjusting the high-gain
antenna position and tilting the solar panels
periodically to manipulate solar radiation torques.
During this period, communication was through
the low-gain antenna. Circulatory motion in the
transmission point of the low-gain antenna intro-
duced a sinusoid in the doppler tracking data
(Fig. 61).
Since it was not known at the outset of the
solar sailing period how an irregular sinusoid in
the doppler tracking data would affect the orbit
estimation process, it was decided to code new
software to model the physical process taking
place and remove the extraneous signature from
the data. This resultant program, ROLL/
TORQUE,' used a current probe ephemeris tape
to model the spacecraft-Earth salient geometry.
A series of Canopus-crossing-time° observations
(values provided by the spacecraft team) were
input on punched cards, and fit in a least-squares
manner to provide a simple second-order poly-
nomial expression for the spacecraft roll motion
during intervals of nearly constant acceleration.
Every time a new high-gain antenna adjustment or
panel tilt occurred, a new calibration interval had
to be begun. ROLL/TORQUE then produced a
series of DRVID adjust cards for the ODP to
remove the unwanted roll signature. Unfortun-
ately, it appears that the actual physical process
taking place on the spacecraft was much more
complicated than just a simple single point source
on the end of a 3. 763-m rotating pipe. Indeed, by
inspecting corrected Orbit Determination Pro-
gram residuals (such as in Fig. 62), it appears
that the radio signal underwent interactions with
the spacecraft assembly (high-gain antenna, Sun
shield, solar panels, TV cameras, etc.), creat-
ing a very difficult situation to model exactly.
The calibrated residuals seemed to vary in
appearance as the Earth-spacecraft geometry
changed in time. Deviations of the roll signature
from a true sinusoid support the hypothesis of
signal/structure interactions.
Another problem experienced was that the
correction tended to go out of phase somewhat
over longer intervals, indicating that perhaps a
higher order polynomial fit to the Canopus cross-
ings was needed. Thus, ROLL/TORQUE only
removed between 60 and 90% of the total roll
signature. Fortunately, at least over a long data
arc, it was found that the uncorrected data solu-
tions were very close to the calibrated data
solutions.
C. Orbit Determination
1. Introduction
The Mariner 10 mission was one of the most
successful interplanetary projects in history. All
scientific objectives were met or exceeded with
the first Mercury encounter in March of 1974.
Additionally two bonus encounters with Mercury
were achieved in September 1974 and March 1975,
under the budgeted cost.
The Mariner 10 spacecraft demanded more
accurate navigation than any other interplanetary
spacecraft in history, and can boast of several
navigational firsts. It was the first spacecraft to
successfully fly by two planets, using the gravity
assist of the first to aim it toward the second; it
was the first to fly by Mercury; it was the first to
accomplish repeated flybys of the same planet.
Large delivery errors at any of the earlier
encounters would have imposed abnormal correc-
tive propellant costs, jeopardizing the later
encounters. Thus, highly accurate trajectory
estimates were paramount to mission success.
This subsection will discuss the orbit determina-
tion (OD) activities and results in support of each
phase of the extended mission. The OD effort for
the primary mission is discussed in Ref. 21.
Coded by G. Rinker of JPL.
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JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
44
43
42
41
1
if 39
O
38
37
X X
X
O
O
O
o§ o
a
a
X
x
4- -I-
D DSS 14 S-BAND MU2
ODSS 14X-BANO MU2
A DSS 12 S-BAND PLOP
+ DSS 13 S-6AND PLOP
XDSS 63 S-BAND PLOP
I I I
16 18 20 22 24 26
DAYS PAST 3/16/74 OOh
Figure 56. DSS range residuals
28 30 32
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II 75
1.03
0.76
0.50
0.24
0.03
-0.18
O
0
 -0.39
-0.60
-0.81
-1.02
1
DSS63
DATA TYPE F2
ISmHz
1 2 3 4 5 . 4
TIME, HOURS PAST 74:06:06 06:35:32:00
Figure 57. F2 data on day of superior conjunction
1.380
1.325
1270
1.215
a
fc 1.105
O
o
S
£ 1050
0.995
0.940
0.885
DSS43
DATA TYPE F2
ISmHz
.
•• .* •• ,. *^• . ••**. . .•
• * • •
•* . * »
76
0 1 2 3 4
TIME, HOURS PAST 74-03-07 18:50:32:00
Figure 58. Assumed plasma-corrupted F2 residuals
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
•T687 -
3 4 5 6 7
TIME, HOURS PAST 74:04:28 06:01:32:00
Figure 59. Plasma-corrupted F2 residuals
JPL, Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II 77
2.263
2.035
'o 1-806
2- '-577
<
o
£ 1.348
ae
a
o 1.120
o
s
" 0.891
0.662 -
0.443 -
0.204 -
1 I
DSS 12
DATA TYPE F2
1 2 3 4 5
TIME, HOURS PAST 73:11:19 21:04:32:00
Figure 60. Clean F2 residuals data
15mHi
78 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
0.6667
0.3333
Q
0.3333
0.6667
DSS43
DSS63
8 12 16
TIME, HOURS FROM MARCH 3, 1975
Figure 61. Uncorrected F2 residuals
20
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume 11 79
o. looor
0.6667
0.3333
0.3333
0.6667
0.1000
\
DSS43
DSS63
I
8 12 16
TIME, HOURS FROM MARCH 3, 1975
Figure 62. Roll-corrected F2 residuals
20 24
80 JPL, Technical Memorandum 33-734, Volume II
2. Philosophy
It was standard practice during the Extended
Mission to run a series of orbit determination
runs once a week during cruise phases. During
critical phases such as preparation for TCMs and
encounters, OD fits were done more frequently.
Normally the data was updated and validated
every Monday as described in the tracking section.
The resultant current data file would then be fit
on Tuesday night with the Orbit Determination
Program. Block time on the 1108 B-string was
necessary in order to process the many large
ODP cases required.
3. Procedures
a. Software. Orbit determination was per-
formed with two filters: (1) a classical least-
squares batch filter, and (2) a batch sequential
filter. The batch filter has been the standard
orbit determination tool for interplanetary mis-
sions in the past. The sequential filter was
designed and implemented specifically for use in
the Mariner 10 Mission. This effort was under-
taken because of the critical orbit determination
requirements of Mariner 10. The concern was
that the Mariner 10 spacecraft would pass rela-
tively close to the Sun, and the action of solar
pressure upon the complicated spacecraft struc-
ture might produce nongravitational force signa-
tures that could not be modeled in the batch
filter, perhaps confusing its estimation process.
Also there was concern regarding the amount of
leakage and uncoupling in the attitude-control sys-
tem and leakage in the propellant system which
would contribute to the total stochastic nongravi-
tational force signature (Ref. 16).
A major advantage of the sequential filter is
its capability to estimate stochastic parameters
as piecewise constant functions during each batch.
(The data arc is divided into batches of typically
one-day duration. A particular stochastic param-
eter is treated as being exponentially correlated
between batches with correlation time T. For a
further discourse on the theory of sequential esti-
mation see Ref. 17. The mathematical formula-
tion of the Orbit Determination Program is dis-
cussed in Ref. 18.
Although the sequential filter was used
heavily during the prime mission, the Extended
Mission emphasized the batch filter. This condi-
tion was largely due to the length of the solar sail-
ing period, when the Orbit Determination Pro-
gram could notmodel the rolling spacecraft in
order to estimate stochastic forces in the pitch
and yaw directions. Previous experience had
also shown that the batch filter was relatively
insensitive to the levels of stochastic nongravita-
tion accelerations experienced by the spacecraft.
Also, there was little danger that the batch filter
would misidentify Mercurial gravity harmonics
in an encounter phase. The batch filter provided
stable solutions adequate for navigation, while
reducing manpower demands, cost, and quantity
of computer runs.
b. Data. The tracking during the Extended
Mission was approximately one-half continuous
coverage and was described in the previous sub-
section. The primary navigation data types were
two-way doppler (F2), nominally sampled at
60-sec intervals, and PLOP ranging. The dop-
pler data was edited and then compressed to a
count time of either 300, 600, or 1200 sec,
depending on the data arc length and phase (very
close to encounter, the count time was retained
as 60 sec).
Throughout the Mariner 10 Mission, solutions
were made using three data sets: doppler only,
doppler and range, and range only. Consistency
in the solutions increased the confidence in their
validity. Generally, the doppler and range solu-
tions were regarded as being the most powerful.
c. Solution Sets. Each OD solution was in
reality a large set of solutions, each estimating
a particular parameter set. For the batch filter
the following constant parameter sets were
estimated:
(1) Spacecraft state plus other parameters
(2) Spacecraft state plus station locations
(3) Spacecraft state plus solar pressure
(4) Spacecraft state plus attitude control
forces
(5) Spacecraft state plus station locations
plus solar pressure
(6) Spacecraft state plus station locations
plus solar pressure plus attitude control
(7) All parameters including J2
Other parameters include the Mercurial mass
and ephemeris when in an encounter phase, and
motor burn parameters following a TCM.
Parameter sets for the sequential filter con-
sist of all but (4) and (6) above. The attitude-
control forces, i. e. , spacecraft accelerations
along the three spacecraft axes, were treated as
estimative stochastic parameters in each sequen-
tial filter run. A priori sigmas of 10-12 km/s2
and 10-11 Icm/s2 were used for stochastic param-
eters, with a batch size of one day and a correla-
tion time of from one to five days.
d. Method. The first Orbit Determination
Program run generated during a session would
integrate an updated spacecraft trajectory using
the best estimate of spacecraft state obtained
from the last session. The second run produced
a file of data residuals based upon this current
trajectory, plus partials of each observable.with
respect to the total parameter set. This run pro-
vided a precise evaluation of all data, particu-
larly the range, and any remaining poor quality
points could be removed before proceeding fur-
ther. Subsequent runs yielded specific trajectory
estimates as various functions of data set,
parameter set, filter type, and filter a priori
parameter uncertainty. Each run was assigned
a unique catalog number, recoded and
summarized.
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Every Orbit Determination Program run
required about 65K of computer core. Thus three
runs in the 1108B (approximately 170K to 200K of
user-available core) would effectively use all of
the machine's capacity. Considering, the large
volume of data to be processed, the-number of
runs needed, and the large program size and
software processing time for each run, it became
apparent that this critical work could only be com-
pleted using regularly scheduled computer block
time. Even so, the entire set of required runs
generally consumed between seven and twelve
hours of computer time. (The block time was
scheduled during evening hours, so as not to
impact the general laboratory user significantly.)
4. Results
A calendar of major mission events is shown
in Fig. 3 in Sect. II. The spacecraft orbit is
shown in Fig. 63 from Mercury I to Mercury III.
Orbit determination activities can be broken up
into phases and described separately. It is cus-
tomary to express results in terms of the B-plane
parameters, described in Fig. 64.
a. Mercury I to TCM 4. It was decided by
the science team to go for a bright-side pass at
Mercury n, which would allow a good probability
for a dark-side Mercury III pass. The bright-side
Mercury II would be excellent for TV, whereas
the dark-side Mercury III would be excellent for
the magnetic field experiment and celestial
mechanics and good for TV.
The determination of the orbit for TCM 4 was
aided by the large spacecraft acceleration experi-
enced during the first Mercury flyby. This advan-
tage was somewhat negated, however, by the long
mapping time of an entire spacecraft revolution to
the next encounter. Another problem was pre-
sented by the gradual degradation of the doppler
data as the spacecraft was approaching superior
conjunction (for example, see Fig. 59). Although
the actual doppler gaussian data noise about the
mean was not extreme; wavy signatures were
developing for quite some time as far back as
early March (for example, see Fig. 58). These
signatures were correlated with the spacecraft's
proximity to the Sun in the sky, perhaps indicat-
ing an interaction of the radio signal with charged
particles from a solar plasma arm. The danger
of such wavy signatures is that they are difficult
to edit properly, and they may cause important
parameters to be misestimated by the orbit deter-
mination filters. Orbit determination accuracy
was not, however, a major concern in preparing
for TCM 4, since the maneuver would most likely
be dominated by execution errors.9
Two primary data arcs were examined to
prepare for TCM 4: (1) EM - 4 days to EM +
4 days; and (Z) EM + 2 days to the latest data
available. The solution finally chosen was from
(2) . (1) was not especially good for OD due to
large associated mapping errors. A 1-km uncer-
tainty in the Mercury I B-plane mapped to a
3000-km uncertainty in the Mercury II B-plane.
Thus even a plausible error of 1/E km at
Mercury I mapped into a 1500-km error at
Mercury II. Solutions from (1) did, however,
serve as useful comparators.
Figure 65 plots the final set of OD solutions
available to compute TCM 4. Only data to
April 22 was contained in these solutions due to
the time constraints imposed by the project to
compute, design, and load the maneuver sequence.
Solutions among the various parameter sets were
quite consistent, and the most faith was placed in
the state-only solutions. The final solution chosen
was for the sequential filter, F2 + range, 10'^
km/s^ a priori uncertainty on stochastic forces
(Case 370013) and had the following Mercury II
B-plane parameters:
B • R = 584,225 km
B • T = 545,020 km
TCA10 = 9/19/74 20h6m21s GMT
This solution changed very little when data up to
TCM 4 became available (Case 400002):
B - R = 583,978 km
B • T = 545,119 km
TCA = 9/19/74 20h5m46S GMT
Inconsistencies among the various OD runs and
1 o- OD uncertainties were well within the expected
l-<r maneuver execution error of 10,000 km.
Figure 66 shows TCM 4 in the Mercury II
B-plane.
b. TCM 4 to TCM 5. Superior conjunction
occurred midway through this phase, degrading
the orbit determination capability by causing high
data noise and spurious data signatures. Fig-
ure 67 plots the observed l-<r data noise (for one-
minute doppler samples) as a function of time
during the superior conjunction phase. Also
plotted is the Sun-Earth-probe angle, and the
predicted data noise based upon the results of the
Mariner 9 superior conjunction. The agreement
with the observed noise was good at the limbs of
the curve, but not at its peak.
It had been expected that charged particles
in the solar corona would affect a radio signal
passing through it. The amount of corruption
would be proportional to 1/R.4, where R is the
Sun-radio signal distance. The Sun's corona is
thought to extend to a SEP angle of about 4 deg.
However, the Mariner 10 radio signal was
TCM 4 would move the spacecraft on the order of 800,000 km in the Mercury II B-plane. In fact TCM 4
was so large, that it was divided up into two segments, TCM 4A and TCM 4B, to avoid engine over-
heating. See Sect. VII-C-6.
Time of closest approach (Ephemeris Time).
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seriously corrupted at SEP angles greater than
ten degrees.
TCM 5 in the Mercury II B-plane is shown in
Fig. 68. The solution passed on to the Maneuver
Operations Program System- (MOPS) to calculate
TCM 5 was limited to about one month of tracking
data (from TCM 4 to June 6, 1974). Although the
associated OD error ellipse was fairly large, on
the order of 1ZOO km x 400 km, this was not a
critical consideration, since the acceptable
science zone was extremely large. The ODP case
passed on to MOPS used the batch filter, F2 +
range data, and estimated state only. The
Mercury II B-plane parameters (pre-TCM 5) were
(Case 450015):
B • R = 24,061 km
B • T = -24,024 km
TCA = 9/21/74 21h46m16S GMT
This solution proved to be extremely close
to the best solution eventually available, which
was based on data up to TCM 5 (Case 490001):
B • R = 24, 112 km
B • T = -23,983 km
TCA = 9/21/74 21h48m37S GMT
c. TCM 5 to Mercury II. This was a long
cruise phase, relatively undemanding for orbit
determination. The OD group's major responsi-
bility in this period was to-provide the science
team with a trajectory prediction with which to
plan the TV camera pointing strategy. Because
of the large encounter distance at Mercury II, a
precise estimate of trajectory was not needed.
An acceptable trajectory estimate was passed on
to the Science Team, based on data (F2 and
range) from TCM 5 to August 5, 1974. State only
was estimated using the batch filter. This case
(530003) showed good stability among its various
estimated parameter sets and good consistency
with other data arcs examined, having Mercury II
B-plane parameters of
B • R = 32,753 km
B • T = -38,585 km
TCA = 9/21/74, 20h59m46f9 GMT
This solution is quite close to the current
best estimate of the flyby point which was based
on data (F2 only) from EM 3-4 days to EM +
4 days. For this run the batch filter was used,
estimating state, station locations and Mercurial
mass. The Mercury II B-plane parameters are
found to be (Case 600010):
B • R = 32,779 km
B • T = -38,690 km
TCA = 9721/74, 20h59m44f9 GMT
d. Mercury II to TCM 6. Orbit determina-
tion for TCM 6 was complicated by the solar
sailing mode, which began on Oct. 6, 1974. As
described earlier, the rolling spacecraft intro-
duced an extraneous sinusoidal signature into the
data. It was not clear at this point how such an
unmodeled signature would affect the orbit estima-
tion process (subsequently the program ROLL/
TORQUE was developed to model the roll signa-
ture as described in Sect. VII-A-7). Thus
increased reliance was placed upon solutions
containing only near Mercury II encounter data,
since (1) planetary bending of the spacecraft
trajectory would act as an orbit determination
aid, (2) the large encounter distance minimized
mapping errors — 1 km error at Mercury II
mapped to only about 250 km at Mercury III, and
(3) these data sets did not contain any roll signa-
tures. Also TCM 6 would be a large maneuver,
dominated by maneuver execution errors, and
pinpoint OD was not needed. Thus the safest OD
estimates would be more desirable.
Many different data arcs were examined, but
the most confidence was placed in the arc from
EM 3-4 days to EM 3+4 days. Figure 69 shows
the Mercury III B-plane solutions presented at the
TCM 6 maneuver conference. The EM 3 -
4 days —» EM 3+4 days solutions all show good
consistency as well as good agreement with a case
containing data to Oct. 7, 1974. The solution
chosen as the best (Case 600010) estimated state,
station locations and Mercurial mass, and had
Mercury III B-plane parameters of
B • R = 244, 583 km
B • T = 102,718 km
TCA = 3/16/75, 2h13m31S GMT
Figure 70 shows TCM 6 in the Mercury III
B-plane.
e. TCM 6 to TCM 7. The :purpose of TCM 7
was to correct the maneuver and OD errors
associated with TCM 6 to bring the spacecraft
to an optimal flyby point for science at Mercury
III. The magnetic field experiment had top pri-
ority, and since the value of its return was pro-
portional to 1/B^, it was desired to come as close
to Mercury as possible without actually impacting.
The introduction of the solar sailing mode
caused a major modification to the precision tra-
jectory program, DPTRAJ, used by both the ODP
and the maneuver analysis program, MOPS.
Two distinct modifications were required. First
the existing solar pressure model was not capable
of modeling the forces acting on the spacecraft
with a continuous roll rate. Due to the configura-
tion of the spacecraft, in particular the tiltable
solar panels, solar pressure produces forces
which are both along and normal to the space-
craft sun-line. When the spacecraft is stabilized
in roll, the normal forces act on inertial direc-
tion which changes slowly due to the orbital
motion of the spacecraft. However, with a con-
tinuous roll rate, the normal forces change
direction sinusoidally. Since the motion was
fast with respect to the orbital motion, the
normal forces tended to cancel. Thus the solar
pressure model was modified to allow the normal
forces to be set to zero during specified periods.
With this modification, trajectories containing
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both rolling and non-rolling periods could be
handled.
The second modification involved the tables
specifying the orientation of the solar panels and
the high-gain antenna. Under normal operating
conditions the orientation of these appendages
changed only infrequently and, accordingly, only
limited tables had been provided within DPTRAJ
to describe the various positions. However, the
process of controlling the roll rate in the solar
sailing mode demanded that these orientations be
changed more frequently, and a major effort was
required to increase the size of the tables. Due
to the structure of DPTRAJ, this turned out to be
a more complex change than the change to the
solar pressure model.
There was considerable concern that the roll-
ing spacecraft signature introduced into the data
by solar sailing might seriously affect the OD
capability. As mentioned earlier, the program
ROLL/TORQUE was developed to remove this
signature as best as possible. However, the
extremely long data arc available during this
phase, describing 180 deg of central angle travel,
reduced OD errors to a very small level (Fig. 71).
Both long-arc simulations and actual data solu-
tions showed very small perturbations between
uncalibrated and roll-calibrated data — few tens
of kilometers at most.11
A separate effort was also undertaken to
estimate the orbit using differenced doppler data
with a technique known as QVLBI (quasi-very
long baseline interferometry).1 2 The technique
differences two-way and three-way doppler data
being received simultaneously and hence has the
advantage of removing short-term nongravita-
tional accelerations affecting the spacecraft.
The results of this effort agreed favorably with
the results of the OD team (using F2 and range).
Thus an OD solution of high confidence could
be passed on to the Maneuver Analysis Team.
The solution regarded as the best was for the
batch filter, uncalibrated data (F2 + range) from
TCM 6 to January 26, 1975, estimating state
only. This case (750006) had the following
Mercury III B-plane parameters:
B • R = -6926 km
B • T = 3644 km
TCA = 3/16/75, 22h44m35SGMT
f. TCM 7 to TCM 8. This period was the
most challenging one of the mission for the orbit
determination team. TCM 7 had malfunctioned
somewhat, and many orbit solutions shortly after
TCM 7 were predicting impacts with Mercury
(Fig. 72). Hence it appeared that another maneu-
ver might be needed to back the spacecraft away
from the planet. Orbit determination was critical,
and very difficult, during this phase due to (1) the
short data arc available, (2) the roll signature in
the data, (3) limited coverage due to the high pri-
orities of competitive missions (as well as deep
space station reconfigurations), (4) absence of
ranging during much of this period due to equip-
ment reconfigurations and malfunctions at DSS 63,
and (5) Mariner 10's weakening signal strength
while on its low-gain antenna. Real-time negotia-
tions were carried out with the DSN to supplement
the tracking coverage during this critical phase.
When the decision point was reached whether
or not to perform TCM 8, many orbit solutions
were actually impacting, or showing an unac-
ceptably high probability of impact (several of
these solutions are shown in Fig. 72). Thus,
although TCM 8 implied some risk to the space-
craft, it was necessary to move the orbit farther
from the planet so as to reduce the impact
probability.
The estimate thought to be the best at this
time was for the batch filter, data from TCM 7 to
March 4 (F2 plus range), estimating state only.
This solution was roughly in the middle of the
group of solutions then available and also clus-
tered with several others. The estimate predicted
a probability of impact of about 31 percent and had
the following Mercury III B-plane parameters
(Case 870003):
B • R = -2600 km
B • T = -680 km
TCA = 3/16/75, 22h39m42f 8 GMT
g. TCM 8 to Mercury III. TCM 8 is shown
in the Mercury III B-plane in Fig. 75. TCM 8
appeared to have been executed nominally. The
science team had an adequate trajectory for
science sequence planning. The mission of the
navigation team was not complete. All that
remained was to process routine orbits, and to
evaluate the effectiveness of navigation after the
Mercury III encounter.
The navigation team received a brief scare
on the morning of the third encounter with
Mercury, as several Orbit Determination Pro-
gram cases were indicating impacts (the solu-
tions were on the order of a few tens of kilom-
eters below the surface at closest approach). At
this time only data to EM - 9 hours was available
(roughly 300,000 km from Mercury). The space-
craft still had not undergone appreciable perturba-
tion from Mercury's gravity field to help deter-
mine the orbit and the available data arc was very
short. The great dispersions in the solutions —
about 250 km— plus the large statistical uncer-
tainty (o-fi-R - 1 50 - 200 km) caused the Orbit
11
12
In practice, a disadvantage of roll-calibration was that during periods with frequent high-gain
antenna and solar panel redeployments or high spacecraft roll period, not enough Canopus crossings
were observed to model the spacecraft roll motion. Also as mentioned earlier in Sect. VII-A-7, due
to the complexity of the real model, ROLL/TORQUE generally removed only 60 to 90% of the total
signature.
This study was performed by H. Siegel and C. Chao of JPL.
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Figure 67. Doppler noise versus Sun-Earth-probe angle
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Figure 68. TCM 5 in Mercury II B-plane
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Determination Team to place little confidence in
them.
After the encounter was successfully com-
pleted, near-encounter data was used to obtain an
accurate flyby point. The current best estimate
for this point in the Mercury III B-plane is (Case
980002):
B • R = -2780
B • T = 1016
.0 kml
. 0 km J
B = 2959.8 km
TCA = 3/16/75, 22h40m10.02s GMT
This batch filter run contained data from EM 3 -
1 day to EM 3+4 days (F2 only) and estimated
state, station locations, ephemeris and Mercurial
mass. All solutions with this data set are within
a few tenths of a kilometer of each other.
5. Operational Recommendation for Real Time
Range Evaluation
Highly accurate range fits were only possible
with the Orbit Determination Program. Since
orbit fits with the Orbit Determination Program
were generally done on a weekly basis, subtle
failures in the ranging equipment at a particular
deep space station, or errors in the ranging cali-
bration procedures, could go unnoticed for some
time. It would be of great benefit to the Naviga-
tion Team to have available a software program
which could fit and evaluate range points in real
time. The program should operate from the cur-
rent probe ephemeris tape. It should have the
capability to include range calibrations, and to
plot all desired range residuals both before and
after calibrations. The user should have the flexi-
bility of using the software from a demand device
or in a batch processing mode. The primary
user inputs would be "to" times, range observable
values (available immediately after end of acquisi-
tion from MOAT) and the number of components.
If calibrations are to be included, they would be
handled as in the program GORC, described in
Sect. VII-A-5.
encounter. In the discussion to follow, a
maneuver strategy is developed in light of the
demands imposed by prevailing engineering con-
straints and the science objectives for the
extended mission.
2. Maneuver Constraints
Two constraints played a primary role in the
development of maneuver strategies for the
Extended Mission. The first and most demanding
constraint was imposed by the necessity to avoid
conditions where the roll gyro oscillation would
reoccur, since the resultant loss of attitude-
control gas would reduce the supply below the
level required for attitude stabilization during
cruise and encounter. This constraint required
that all trajectory correction maneuvers made at
heliocentric ranges less than 2 suns would be
limited to Sun-line (radial) maneuvers which have
only limited correction capability. 13 Maneuvers
at heliocentric ranges greater than 2 suns could
be unconstrained. The rationale for relaxing this
constraint was based on the results of TCM 2,
performed in the vicinity of 2 suns, which showed
no roll gyro oscillation.
The second constraint was the available AV
capability of the spacecraft propulsion subsystem.
Prelaunch estimates of the total corrective capa-
bility was 122 m/s. However, inflight estimates
showed that an additional 4 m/s could be made
available. Since 27 m/s had been used to achieve
the first Mercury encounter, 100 m/s were avail-
able for the remainder of the mission.
Although not a hard constraint, it was deemed
highly desirable to target each maneuver such
that a productive Mercury flyby would result.
This precautionary strategy was adopted in order
to compensate for any additional anomalies that
might have precluded the execution of subsequent
maneuvers. As a result of this strategy, the
maneuvers were targeted to fly by points which
maximized the delivery probabilities into accept-
able regions as opposed to flyby points which
minimized the overall AV requirements.
D. Maneuver Analysis
1. Introduction
The completion of the primary mission cul-
minated in the gathering of a wealth of scientific
data, the quality of which exceeded all expecta-
tion. Attention was then focused on an extended
mission for additional encounters with Mercury
which would serve to enhance and/or verify the
scientific data collected at the first encounter.
The science objectives for the Extended Mission
were, by necessity, determined in flight, since
these objectives were largely dependent on both
the science return of the primary mission and the
state of the spacecraft after the Mercury I
3. Science Objectives
Based on an evaluation of the science return
from the first Mercury encounter, two mutually
exclusive target zones were defined. The zones
were:
Zone I: Television Experiment. This zone
required a southern latitude bright side passage
at 40, 000 < B < 50, 000 km and 1 50 deg > 6 > 105
deg. Aim points in this region provided coverage
of the unphotographed region between the portions
of Mercury seen on the incoming and outgoing legs
on the first encounter. Further, these trajec-
tories would improve detail in various regions
where the existing photographs were highly
foreshortened.
13In the cruise attitude, the thrust vector of the spacecraft is directed toward the Sun. Thus, without a
pitch turn, only radial velocity changes could be applied. Radial maneuvers are restrictive due to the
reduced set of flyby errors that can be corrected. The only controls available are the magnitude of
the maneuver and the time of engine burn.
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Zone II; Fields and Particles Experiment.
This zone required a dark-side passage at
B < 5,000 km and -30'< 6 < 30 deg. Aim points in
this zone would provide expansion and/or con-
firmation of fields and particles observations
obtained during the first encounter.
4. Sunline Maneuver Strategy
Based on the definition of the two mutually
exclusive science zones, a maneuver strategy
was designed to achieve either of the two zones
with the stipulation that the TV experiment would
be given first priority at Mercury II. However,
in the event of a camera failure, for example,
trajectories targeted for aim points in the TV
zone could be retargeted for the fields-and-
particles zone. This strategy adhered to the sun-
line constraint for early maneuvers in regions
where the solar intensity was greater than two
suns. Total attitude freedom was allowed for
maneuvers where the solar intensity was less than
two suns.
Based on these targeting objectives and
maneuver constraints, the most efficient Sun-line
strategy in terms of minimum propellant cost
required at least two maneuvers. The Sun-line
maneuver (TCM 4) would provide the majority of
the B.-plane correction required to reach the
vicinity of the TV zone. A second unconstrained
maneuver (TCM 5) would then provide the remain-
ing correction to achieve a flyby in either the TV
zone or the fields and particles zone. Analysis of
this strategy showed that aim points in the televi-
sion zone could be achieved with two maneuvers
for a mean velocity of not more than 95 m/s.
However, aim points in the fields-and-particles
zone would require a third maneuver in order to
reduce the delivery dispersions to an acceptable
level. The resulting three-maneuver strategy
required a mean AV in excess of 100 m/s. The
two maneuver strategy to the TV zone satisfied
all of the science requirements with the exception
of arrival time. A requirement for the TV experi-
ment was to arrive at Mercury II over the Gold-
stone DSCC in California near the time for maxi-
mum elevation angle 20:30 GMT on Sept. 21, 1974,
in order to provide the highest possible data
quality during the encounter period. However,
the sunline maneuver strategy would allow an
.arrival time no later than 17:00 GMT. The
resulting 3. 5-h discrepancy would have seriously
compromised the quality of the received data.
5. Unconstrained Maneuver Strategy
In light of the limitations imposed by con-
straining TCM 4 to be along the sunline, a paral-
lel study was conducted to develop a maneuver
strategy assuming that the sunline restriction
could be removed for a period of time in the
vicinity of 3 suns. This study showed that the
removal of the sunline constraint allowed the
achievement of all the science objectives at
Mercury II, including the capability to retarget
from the TV zone to the fields and particles zone.
A separate attitude-control gas analysis showed
that a proposed conservation scheme would pro-
vide enough gas for a Mercury III encounter
assuming that gyro oscillation did not occur dur-
ing the unconstrained maneuver.
The maneuver and attitude-control gas
studies provided the impetus for conducting a
roll-attitude structural interaction test. This
test consisted of performing a small roll turn with
the solar panels in the maneuver configuration.
The outcome of this test showed no gyro oscilla-
tion in roll, and it was decided to attempt TCM 4
unconstrained.
6. TCM 4
TCM 4 was performed in two segments with
the solar panels in the gyro test configuration.
The first segment, TCM 4A, was performed on
May 9, 1974, 41 days past Mercury I encounter,
at a solar intensity of approximately 3. 1 suns as
shown in Fig. 63. The second segment, TCM 4B,
was performed the next day, May 10, 1974. The
requirement to segment the maneuvers was
imposed by a hardware soakback temperature
constraint, limiting the allowable engine burn time
for the first segment.
Selection of the TCM 4 epoch had large
impact on the AV requirements for the Extended
Mission. The final selection was based on two
considerations. First was the desire to provide
some safety margin in satisfying the three suns
thermal constraint, and second was the desire to
minimize the required velocity. Fortunately, the
epoch imposed by the thermal constraint (May 5,
1974) and the epoch for minimum velocity were
nearly coincident. Consequently, negligible pro-
pellant penalty resulted from this choice.
Aim-point selection for TCM 4 was based on
the desire to maximize the probability of an
acceptable return from the television experiment
in the event that a second maneuver could not be
performed. Thus the aim point was chosen to
maximize the intersection of the previously
defined TV zone and the expected post-maneuver
dispersions. This aim point did not preclude the
retargeting to the field and particles zone on the
next maneuver.
Table 12 presents a summary of the B-plane
conditions for all maneuvers on the Extended
Mission, including flybys. These data present
the Mercury encounter conditions on the uncor-
rected trajectory (prernaneuver nominal) and the
predicted (postmaneuver nominal) flyby conditions,
based on perfect execution of the commanded
maneuver. The commanded maneuver differed
from the ideal maneuver due to quantization
errors in the two turns and the thrust duration.
The mechanization of the spacecraft was such that
the turns and thrust duration were controlled by a
digital timer which restricted the turn angles and
thrust duration to discrete values. In order to
reduce the effect of the resulting maneuver error,
values of the turns and thrust duration were cho-
sen to minimize'an error criterion. Typical
criterion were errors in the miss at the forth-
coming encounter and the projected AV at the next
maneuver epoch.
Also presented on Table 12 are the standard
deviations in the parameters describing the
Mercury encounter postmaneuver. The prernaneu-
ver statistics reflect only the uncertainty in the
orbit determination at the time of the maneuver
while the post-maneuver a priori statistics
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Table 12. Trajectory correction maneuver and flyby summary for the Extended Mission
Event
TCM 4
TCM 5
Flyby Mercury II
TCM 6
TCM 7
TCM 8
Flyby Mercury III
B-plane
conditions
B • T
B • R
TCA
B • T
B • R
TCA
B • T
B • R
TCA
B • T
B • R
TCA
B • T
B • R
TCA
B • T
B • R
TCA
B • T
B • R
TCA
Premaneuver
Nominal
545, 323 km
584,482 km
9/19/74
20:05:12
-24,024 km
24,061 km
9/21/74
21:46:16
102,727 km
244, 578 km
3/16/75
2:13:31
3644 km
-6926 km
3/16/75
22:43:50
680 km
-2600 km
3/16/75
22:38:56
Standard
deviation
408 km
961 km
240 sec
230 km
920 km
122 sec
953 km
2044 km
540 sec
130 km
72 km
22 sec
18 km
100 km
16 sec
Postmaneuver a'c
Nominal
-18,631 km
42,965 km
9/21/74
20:19:41
-38,308 km
32, 143 km
9/21/74
20:58:17
-38,690 km
32,779 km
9/21/74
20:59:45
5557 km
-1446 km
3/16/75 .
22:20:52
1010 km
-2767 km
3/16/75
22:39:51
992 km
-2665 km
3/16/75
22:40:11
1016 km
. -2780 km
3/16/75
22:39:24
Standard
deviation
6894 km
12438 km
3798 sec
616 km
1067 km
150 sec
14 km
7 km
0.8 sec
2017 km
6208 km
1740 sec
123 km
147 km
23 sec
18 km
100 km
16 sec
1.0 km
1.0 km
0. 10 sec
aTCA in GMT. Small differences between these results and the results presented in Sect. VII-B
are due to mapping techniques.
Represents nominal encounter conditions for the uncorrected trajectory at the time of the maneu-
ver. Statistics contain uncertainties in orbit determination only.
Represents targeting conditions for the maneuver. Statistics contain uncertainties in both orbit
determination and maneuver execution. Flybys represent postmaneuver conditions obtained
from tracking data through planet encounter.
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include this uncertainty plus the statistical errors
in the maneuver execution.
Table 13 presents a summary of the param-
eters (roll, pitch, turn, and magnitude of the
maneuver) for all maneuvers"6ri the Extended
Mission. Quantities associated with the nominal
parameters are, the computed values, the com-
manded values (which differ from the computed
values by the quantization errors previously men-
tioned), and the best estimate of the actual
parameter.
The best estimate of the parameter was
obtained using the Orbit Determination Program
and estimating the maneuver parameters along
with the orbit using tracking data on both sides of
the maneuver. The fourth column of Table 13
lists the a priori standard deviations which were
assigned to the various maneuver parameters
based on system models and preflight testing.
The fifth column relates the difference between
the best estimate of the maneuver and the com-
manded maneuver in terms of the a priori stan-
dard deviations in the previous line. Column six
gives a measure of the uncertainty in line 3.
Table 12 presents a summary of the flyby
conditions for TCM 4 at Mercury II. Figure 66
shows TCM 4 in the Mercury II B-plane relative
to the TV zone. Shown are the post-maneuver
aim point and a priori statistics. Also shown in
Fig. 66 (see inset) is the uncorrected flyby point
and associated 1-cr orbit determination statistics.
As may be seen from Table 12 and Fig. 66, the
accuracy of TCM 4A and TCM 4B were limited by
execution errors. This assessment is verified in
the discussion of TCM 5 results.
Table 13 presents a summary of the maneu-
ver parameters for TCM 4A and TCM 4B. Com-
paring the errors in the parameters with those of
previous unconstrained maneuvers, it may be
seen that both the AV and pitch errors were 1 cr
or less. However, the roll error was dominant
at about 1. 5 <r.
The impact of the Mercury I flyby on the AV
requirements for the Extended Mission is reflected
in the magnitude of TCM 4 (77.5 m/s). Prior
to Mercury I encounter, it was shown that aim
points in the vicinity of the TV zone at Mercury II
could be targeted in two unconstrained maneuvers
for a mean velocity of no less than 25 m/s. How-
ever, the maneuver sequence for this strategy
was based on the assumption that the aim point at
Mercury I would be located near the free return
contour. Based on the best estimate of the
Mercury I flyby point immediately following
TCM 3, the magnitude of the post Mercury I
maneuver was found to be in excess of 65 m/s.
However, it was a project decision not to jeop-
ardize the success of the baseline mission in
favor of the AV requirements for the extended
mission by performing a fourth maneuver prior
to Mercury I encounter.
7. TCM 5
The selection of the aim point for TCM 5
involved a tradeoff between the coverage for the
TV experiment on the Mercury II encounter and
the propellant required to achieve a fields and
particles zone on the Mercury III encounter.
While the premaneuver flyby point (see Table 12
and Fig. 66) at B = 34,000 km, 6 = 135 deg
satisfied the scientific objectives of the TV
experiment, a Monte Carlo analysis showed that
the AV required to accomplish 99% of the sample
missions exceeded the 22 m/s remaining.
Further analysis showed that the maximum
return from the television experiment required
an aim point at B = 50,000 km, 0 = 135 deg and
that the 99% AV requirement would be less than
22 m/s for B = 50,000 km, if the orientation
was changed to 6 = 140 deg. This compromise
was made and the aim point at Mercury II was
chosen to be B = 50, 000 km and 6 = 140 deg.
TCM 5 was performed on July 2, 1974,
95 days after Mercury I encounter as shown in
Fig. 63. Selection of TCM 5 epoch reflected the
following considerations:
(1) The desire to minimize propellant cost
(2) The requirement to redetermine the
orbit following TCM 4
(3) The requirement to satisfy the 2 suns
constraint (this constraint was satisfied
in the period May 30 to Aug. 1, 1974)
(4) The desire not to interfere with experi-
ments being conducted during the solar
conjunction period from May 23 to
July 1, 1974.
Considering the two weeks of tracking required to
redetermine the orbit following TCM 4 and the
negligible propellant penalty as a function of
epoch in the interval from May 23 to July 7, it
was decided to perform TCM 5 as soon as pos-
sible after the exit of solar conjunction.
Table 12 presents a summary of the flyby
conditions for TCM 5 at Mercury II. Based on
the a priori delivery dispersions at the time of
TCM 4, the difference between the flyby point
prior to TCM 5 and the predicted flyby point
after TCM 4 represents a 2-cr B-plane miss at
Mercury II as shown in Fig. 66. This result
compares favorably with the best estimate of
TCM 4 as shown in Table 13, indicating that
orbit determination errors at the time of TCM 4
were small compared to TCM 4 execution errors.
The maneuver parameters for TCM 5 are
summarized in Table 13. Table 13 shows that
the errors in all parameters were less than 1 <r.
Figure 68 shows TCM 5 in the Mercury II
B-plane. Shown are the post-maneuver aim
point, the premaneuver flyby point and the
Mercury II flyby computed from tracking data
through Mercury II encounter. Based on initial
engineering telemetry observations of the doppler
shift during the maneuver and the results of the
first two weeks of tracking following the maneu-
ver, the flyby at Mercury II was deemed success-
ful and a final trim maneuver was not considered.
8. Mercury II Flyby
The encounter parameters for the Mercury II
flyby are presented in Table 12. The flyby was
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Table 13. Trajectory correction maneuver parameter summary for the Extended Mission
Event
TCM 4 A
TCM 4B
TCM 5
TCM 6
TCM 7
TCM 8
Parameter3
Roll
Pitch
AV
Roll
Pitch
AV
Roll
Pitch
AV
Roll
Pitch
AV
Roll
Pitch
AV
Yaw
Pitch
AV
Computed
value
(1)
-181.34
25.600
50.000
-178.51
36.056
27.546
56.061
57.813
3.3151
-100. 11
86.284
14.536
-21.264
114. 553
2.0139
0
0
0.4842
Commanded
value
(2)
-181.43
25.607
49.998
-178.48
36.028
27.554
56.100
57.828
3.3210
-100.80
86.344
14. 543
-21.364
114.494
2.0217
0
0
0.4863
Best
estimate
of
actual
value
(3)
49. 542
127.597
49.865
-177.22
35.589
27.738
56.626
57.826
3.3696
-99.021
85.608
14.813
-18.480
111.946
2 2.0841
-0.0652
0.1225
0.4952
Maneuver
execution
(T
(A priori)
(4)
1.090 deg
0.471 deg
1.130 m/s
0.809 deg
0.471 deg
0.625 m/s
0.556 deg
0.471 deg
0.080 m/s
0. 501 deg
0.471 deg
0.333 m/s
0. 517 deg
0.471 deg
0.053 m/s
0. 370 deg
0.370 deg
0.016 m/s
Maneuver
execution
<r
A posteriori
|(3) -(2)| /(4)
(5)
1.70
0.30
0.1
1.50
0.90
0.30
0.95
0.004
0.60
3.56
1.56
0.811
5.58
5.41
2 1.17
0.176
0.331
0.556
a
Iri estimate
of
actual
value
(6)
0.057 deg
0.331 deg
0. 172 m/s
0.052 deg
0. 178 deg
0.257 m/s
0. 06 deg
0. 12 deg
0.01 m/s
0.046 deg
0.018 deg
0. 0063 m/s
0.275 deg
0.264 deg
0.016 m/s
0. 3084 deg
0. 3084 deg
0.0027 m/s
Roll and pitch, deg; AV, m/s
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within 740 km of the aim point and within 32 s of
the desired closest approach time. Figure 68
(see inset) shows the. flyby in relation to the post-
TCM 5 statistics. Shown are the a priori statis-
tics on the predicted flyby, the contribution to the
a priori statistics from execution errors and the
best estimate of the execution error vector
mapped to Mercury II encounter. A comparison
of the total error ellipsoid with the execution
error ellipsoid shows that orbit determination
errors provided the largest contribution to the
total a priori statistics. However, a comparison
of the perturbations (about the nominal aim point)
from execution errors with the total error shows
that orbit determination and execution contributed
equally to the total error.
9. Mercury III Encounter
The third and final encounter of Mariner 10
was the most ambitious ever attempted, requiring
precision navigation in the presence of many and
varied anomalies. While the previous flybys of
Venus and Mercury had each presented their own
navigation problems, this mission phase pre-
sented a new and unique set of problems due to a
combination of low AV capability, adverse space-
craft "configuration, and stringent science require-
ments. In particular, the science return at
Mercury III was highly dependent on navigation
..capability because the scientific value of the
encounter was extremely sensitive to closest
approach (periapsis) altitude. It is subsequently
shown that orbit determination uncertainty was
the major criterion for aim-point selection since
it was a science objective to minimize periapsis
attitude, maintaining impact probability acceptably
small. The navigation strategy was further com-
plicated by the requirement to track a variable
period rolling spacecraft with a critical shortage
of station coverage.
10. TCM 6
Soon after the second Mercury flyby it was
determined that, on the uncorrected trajectory,
the spacecraft would pass about 275, 000 km below
Mercury and, since less than 20 m/s were avail-
able,- it was necessary to execute the next trajec-
tory correction maneuver as soon as possible.
Accordingly, on Oct. 30, 1974, 38 days after the
Mercury II encounter (TCM 6) was performed as
shown in Fig. 63.
The purpose of TCM 6 was to synchronize the
orbital period of the spacecraft to approximately
twice that of Mercury, thereby assuring a flyby
point in the near vicinity of the planet at the third
encounter. The epoch for TCM 6 was chosen to
minimize the AV required in the presence of the
3-suns thermal constraint. Fortunately, the
epochs for minimum AV and 3 suns were nearly
coincident and negligible propellant penalty
resulted from the selected epoch.
The target for TCM 6 was selected to maxi-
mize the return from the fields and particles
experiment in the presence of the Earth occulta-
tion constraint, which arose due to the loss of the
tape recorder shortly after the first Mercury
encounter. The target for TCM 6, the Earth
occultation zone and the total post maneuver
errors are shown in perspective in Fig. 73. Also
shown in Fig. 73 are the total a priori 1-cr uncer-
tainty about the nominal aim point and the orbit
determination (see inset) uncertainty about the
uncorrected flyby point.
TCM 6 was unique from previous maneuvers
in terms of implementing the roll turn. Due to
the occurrence of a bright particle acquisition on
Oct. 5, 1974, resulting in the loss of approxi-
mately 109 g (0. 240 Ib) of attitude-control gas it
was decided to inhibit the roll channel of the
attitude-control system thus rendering the space-
craft to a roll attitude drift mode. The desired
roll angle for the maneuver was obtained in the
roll drift configuration by timing the turn from
known Canopus crossings. The turn was termi-
nated by an all-axis inertial ground command.
Relative to the calibrated roll turn normally
employed, the roll drift acquisition mode was
considered to offer the least probability of excit-
ing the structural interaction in the roll channel
with resultant excessive loss of attitude control
gas.
Table 13 presents a summary of the maneu-
ver parameters for TCM 6. The fourth column
of Table 1 3 lists the a priori standard deviations
which were assigned to the parameters based on
system models and preflight testing with the
exception of the roll-turn uncertainty. This
quantity was assessed by a consideration of the
error sources in the implementation of the roll-
drift turn.
The roll-drift acquisition offered some
adaptive capability normally unavailable with the
calibrated computer turn. This capability was
utilized in the final selection of the commanded
roll turn. During the sequence of events that led
to final stabilization of the roll rate (by ground
commanded solar panel and high-gain articulation)
to a final value of approximately 180 (j.r/s, it was
found that the design maneuver at 19:00 GMT
would be postponed by 2.7 h. Since the pitch turn
and burn duration were to be activated through
computer commands, only the roll turn adjust-
ment was available as a means of minimizing the
effect of the epoch lag, which was approximately
235 km in the B-plane. Neglecting time of flight
error, a lag of 2. 7 h indicated that the roll turn
should be altered by -0.5 deg from a nominal
value of -100.3 to a final commanded value of
-100.8 deg. The result of the adjustment was to
lower the B-plane error due to lag from 235 km
(principally along AB) to 90 km normal to AB.
Table 12 presents a summary of the flyby
conditions for TCM 6 at Mercury III. The first
two columns of Table 13 show that the predicted
accuracy of TCM 6 was limited by execution
errors. This assessment is verified in the dis-
cussion of TCM 7 results.
11. TCM 7
Since the expected post-TCM dispersions
were large with respect to the size of the target
zone, the overall maneuver strategy was depen-
dent upon the actual outcome of this maneuver.
If the maneuver errors were large, then to
remain within the available AV, a maneuver near
aphelion would be required with a possible trim
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Figure 73. TCM 6 Mercury III flyby
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maneuver nea r the incoming 3 sun's thermal con-
straint boundary. If the maneuver errors were
small, then a single maneuver near the incoming
thermal boundary would yield the minimum closest
approach distance.
After approximately one month of tracking it
became clear that an excellent maneuver'^ had
been achieved and that the new flyby point was
within 5,000 km of the target zone. Accordingly,
plans for an aphelion maneuver were abandoned
and the emphasis was placed on precise orbit
determination for a mid-February maneuver.
On February 13, 1975, 144 days after the
second Mercury encounter and near the inbound
3-suns thermal constraint boundary the seventh
Trajectory Correction Maneuver (TCM 7) was
performed as shown in Fig. 63. The purpose of
TCM 7 was to retarget the TCM 6 flyby at
Mercury III in order to maximize the return from
the fields and particles experiment in the presence
of the prevailing constraints. The principal engi-
neering constraint boundaries affecting the selec-
tion of a target for TCM 6 were the capture circle
(the desire to avoid impact) and the Earth occulta-
tion zone (the desire to maintain real-time com-
munication during the flyby).
The science objectives were directed pri-
marily toward the verification of magnetic field
measurements taken at Mercury I encounter.
These measurements indicated the unexpected and
.scientifically exciting possibility that Mercury
may very well have an intrinsic magnetic field.
Based upon theoretical models of the field charac-
teristics deduced from Mercury I encounter data
indicated that the third Mercury encounter should
be targeted for high latitudes and minimum
achievable periapsis altitude. The target for
TCM 7, capture circle and total expected post-
maneuver errors are shown in Fig. 74. This
choice of flyby reflects an Earth occultation
probability of 9% and an impact probability (af ter
correction and no subsequent maneuvers) of 2%.
The epoch for TCM 7 reflected three princi-
pal considerations. First was the desire to pro-
vide a tracking arc of maximum length in order to
reduce the TCM 7 orbit determination error to a
minimum (i. e. , to the same relative size as the
execution errors). This consideration arose due
to modeling uncertainties associated with the
knowledge of the system of forces acting on the
spacecraft in the rolling mode. Second was the
desire not to violate the 3-suns thermal con-
straint. The third consideration was the avail-
able propellant at the time of TCM 7 which was
estimated to be 4.4 m/s. Fortunately, the 3-suns
epoch allowed a tracking arc of adequate length
and in addition provided enough residual correc-
tive capability for a "backaway sunline" maneuver
in the event of an anomalous TCM 7.
Table 12 presents a summary of the flyby
conditions for TCM 7 at Mercury III.
Based on the total uncertainty at the time of
TCM 6 the dif ference between the flyby point
prior to TCM 7 and the predicted flyby point after
TCM 6 represents a one sigma B-plane miss at
Mercury III, as shown in Fig. 73. However,
when the total error (including time of flight) is
considered, TCM 6 outcome was 3.6 a. This
result is in close agreement with the a posteriori
execution errors derived from the best estimate
of the parameters as shown in Table 13. An
analysis of the velocity error in terms of the
total a priori maneuver uncertainty has shown that
the resultant 3.6 cr error was due to large turn
errors which map primarily into time of flight.
Initial planning called for the execution of
TCM 7 on February 12, 1975; however, due to a
problem in acquiring the proper roll reference
prior to the maneuver, the maneuver was delayed
one day. The delay required recalculation of the
entire set of maneuver parameters in a period of
roughly 5 hours. TCM 7 was executed the next
day on schedule; however, the doppler data
received during the maneuver indicated that the
burn was anomalous. This initiated an intensive
period of orbit redetermination (see Sect. VII-B)
which culminated in the decision to perform an
additional maneuver. Concurrently efforts were
made to estimate the maneuver errors during
TCM 7 in order to isolate the cause of the large
doppler errors and establish confidence in the
ability of the spacecraft system to execute another
maneuver. While this analysis effort did confirm
the basic stabilizing of the spacecraft during a
maneuver, the accuracy was not sufficient to
isolate the TCM 7 maneuver errors . The esti-
mates of the actual maneuver presented in
Table 13 was obtained after the third Mercury
flyby by mapping back from the known flyby point
and including the uncertainties in TCM 8.
12. TCM 8
On March 7, 1975, nine days before the
third Mercury encounter, the eighth trajectory
correction maneuver was performed as shown in
Fig. 63. The purpose of TCM 8 was to retarget
the anomalous post-TCM 7 flyby point (30%
probability of impact pre-TCM 8) using a sunline
maneuver to obtain a post-maneuver impact
probability of 2%.
Table 12 presents a summary of the flyby
conditions for TCM 8. Based on the statistics at
the time of TCM 8 a comparison of pre- and post-
maneuver statistics shows that the predicted
accuracy of TCM 8 was limited by orbit determi-
nation errors.
Figure 75 presents the flyby point upon which
TCM 8 was computed (A), the aim point for
TCM 8 (B) along with the predicted TCM 8
delivery dispersions. In addition, the actual
Mercury III flyby point is shown (C) along with
the reconstructed post-TCM 7 flybypoint (D).
Due to both the small magnitude of the maneuver
14The maneuver was successful in terms of the B-plane flyby achieved, turn errors not withstanding.
It is subsequently shown in the discussion of TCM 7 results that large turn errors were sustained.
However the trajectory dynamics and maneuver geometry were such that turn errors had virtually no
range in the B-plane.
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and the sunline orientation (which eliminates the
pre -maneuver turns) the predominance of the
error resulted from orbit determination e r rors .
The a posteriori estimates of the maneuver are
presented in Table 13.
13. Mercury III Flyby
The encounter parameters for the Mercury III
flyby are presented in Table 12. The flyby was
within 10 km of the TCM 7 aim point and within
1.0 s of the closest approach time for the
post TCM 7 flyby. A comparison of the total
e r ro r with the execution e r ro r s shows that orbit
determination e r ro r s provided the la rges t con-
tribution to the total a pr ior i statistics. Based
on the total e r ro r at The time of TCM 8 the best
estimate of the maneuver was 1. 1 a inc luding time
of flight. This result f u r t h e r indicates that the
orbit determination statistics pre-TCM 8 were
realistic and provides some confidence that the
TCM 8 execution e r ro r s were nominal.
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VIII. DSN MISSION SUPPORT
.A. The Period April 1 5 to Oct. 15, 1974
This section covers the period from Apri l 15,
1974 through October 15, 1974. April 15, 1974
marked the end of the MVM '73 Project and the
beginning of the Mariner 10 Extended Mission
Project. In addition to the Mercury second
encounter (Mercury II), DSN support dur ing this
report period included other major events, such
as superior conjunction and two t ra jectory correc-
tion maneuvers. The special antenna a r ray ing
experiment that the DSN conducted to enhance the
video data quality at Mercury II is also
summarized.
1. Planning Activities
Only after completion of the primary mission
in early April 1974 was any significant Project or
DSN attention given to Extended Mission planning.
This late start, combined with the number of
required critical events and the occurrence of
additional spacecraft problems, placed a heavy
load on DSN planners during the short six-month
interval between the f i rs t and 'second Mercury
encounters. Detailed planning was, however,
satisfactorily accomplished in advance of each
major event, which included the following:
(1) TCM 4, (2) cruise support, (3) superior con-
junction radio science, (4) TCM 5, and (5) Mer-
cury second encounter.
2. Documentation
During April 1974, the Mariner 10 Extended
Mission Project Support Instrumentation Require-
ments Document (SIRD) was prepared and
approved by JPL. In response to this SIRD, the
NASA Support Plan (NSP) was prepared and
approved by JPL in June 1974. These documents
covered requirements and commitments only
through Mercury second encounter. The Network
Operations Plan for MVM '73 was revised to
incorporate new configurations and capabilities.
3. TCM 4
First priority was given to supporting the
Project in planning for TCM 4. The primary con-
cern in the DSN was in arranging for required
64-m DSS support once the date and time of
TCM 4 were fixed. The Project had many factors
to consider: spacecraft constraints, science
return, encounter aim point, and third Mercury
encounter, before finalizing the TCM design.
On April 26, 1974, the DSN supported a special
spacecraft gyro test conducted to determine if the
roll axis oscillation would occur with the solar
panels and the scan platform set in the planned
maneuver configuration. No oscillation resulted.
Also, spacecraft propulsion subsystem thermal
constraints precluded one engine burn of the
required duration; therefore, the maneuver was
planned to be conducted in two parts. It was
pointed out that real-time telemetry data would
not be possible during the TCM unless the space-
craft high-gain antenna was adjusted to point at
Earth. However, the Project opted to give up
these data in order to maintain the high-gain
antenna in the A p r i l 26, 1974 test conf igura t ion
during the actual TCM. These data would be
recorded on the spacecraft recorder for post-
TCM playback.
4. Cruise Support Plan
The Mar iner Venus /Mercury 1973 pr imary
mission had enjoyed essentially continuous track-
ing coverage from November 3, 1973 through
Apr i l 15, 1974, via a combination of the 26- and
64-m deep space stations. This level of support
could not be continued throughout the extended
mission due to the higher priori t ies of other flight
projects and DSN implementation requirements.
Basically, the plan was for Mariner 10 to receive
approximately'two-thirds continuous coverage by
a combination of full or partial passes each day.
The daily coverage gap would normally occur
over the Austral ian longitude since each of these
stations was planned to be down for upgrade and
repair , in a serial manner , throughout the
extended mission. Therefore , it was planned
that the Mar iner 10 spacecraf t would record non-
imaging science data during coverage gaps and
then play back these data via a 7. 35-kbits/s dump
during the next scheduled 64-m pass.
During the very f i rs t such coverage gap on
Apr i l 16, 1974, analog-to-digital converter num-
ber two in the spacecraft flight data subsystem
apparently failed, causing a loss of 50 of the
134 analog engineering measurements. This
spacecraft failure, unlike some others, had no
direct effect on the DSN. It did, however, raise
some concerns regarding continuation of the
partial coverage plan, but circumstances dictated
a continuation in this mode. Unfortunately, the
spacecraft was not long in putting an end to the
record-playback plan.
On August 14, 1974, the spacecraft recorder
was to serve as the data source for a ground
telemetry test; however, no tape start occurred.
It appeared that the recorder tape was stuck in the
parking window and could not be freed. Trouble
shooting continued through August 19. Some tape
movement was achieved, but it then apparently
became permanently jammed. The recorder was
declared inoperable and turned off on August 21,
1974. This, of course, meant complete loss of
data during DSN coverage gaps. Of more con-
cern, however, was the increased potential for
loss of critical event data even while tracking due
to inadequate telecommunications link perfor-
mance (e. g. , during TCMs) or failures at the
deep space stations. As a result of this loss, the
DSN gave added attention to redundant configura-
tions and backup recordings to assure recovery
of data on Earth.
5. Superior Conjunction Support Plans
Mariner 10 superior conjunction activities
occurred during the period May 24-June 21, 1974.
Recovery of dual-frequency S/X-band doppler,
range, and open-loop receiver data types was
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required. In addition, it was desired that calibra-
tion tracks be provided beyond'the stated interval.
Since Mariner 10 provi'ded the first opportunity
for spacecraft dual-frequency analysis of solar
corona and gravity effects, the DSN gave con-
siderable emphasis to arranging proper support
at DSS 14. Originally, DSS 14's Block IV S/X-
band receiver was scheduled for removal and
rework in preparation for Viking test support in
mid-June 1974 following superior conjunction on
June 6, 1974. The expanded observation period
required negotiation of the removal date and was
subsequently set for July 1, 1974. Support of the
special Block IV receiver trouble-shooting team
was planned to continue in effect until July 1,
1974.
6. TCM 5
In parallel with superior conjunction activi-
ties, the DSN assisted the Project in planning
support for TCM 5. The TCM was planned to
occur on July 2, 1974 over DSS 14, preceded by
a gyro roll test on June 24, 1974. To avoid pos-
sible impact on DSS 14's support of the TCM,
removal of the Block IV receiver was negotiated
to occur on July 5 rather than July 1, 1974 as pre-
viously planned.
7. Mercury II Support Planning
Following the Project's decision in May 1974
regarding the second encounter aim point, detailed
encounter support plans were able to rapidly
progress. Initially, the second encounter differed
in two significant ways from the first encounter:
(1) the second encounter would be a Sun-side pass
having no solar or Earth occultations with empha-
sis on additional TV coverage of Mercury; and
(2) the Earth-spacecraft distance would be greater
than that at first encounter, resulting in a 1-dB
lower signal level in the telecommunications link.
The aim-point difference in fact made second
encounter planning easier for the DSN than that
for first encounter since there were no occur-
rences of radio science occultation and rapid sig-
nal reacquisition requirements. The spacecraft
could be continuously tracked near the planet in a
listen-only mode. However, the lower signal
level due to the increased distance posed some
critical questions and support considerations.
Would real-time 117-kbits/s video still be pos-
sible at Mercury II? Or would the reduced rate
of 22 kbits/s be necessary to stay above the maxi-
mum allowable bit error rate of one in thirty?
Could some improvement in the DSN deep space
stations be implemented to regain the "lost"
decibels?
Telecommunications link analyses indicated
that the bit error rate would be, at best, one in
twenty and somewhat worse during much of the
encounter pass at the 117-kbits/s rate. It
appeared as if TV experimenters had a choice
between a large number of TV frames of poor
quality or a small number of high quality.
In June 1974, engineers of the DSN Communi-
cations Systems Research Section proposed that
DSS antenna-arraying and signal-combining tech-
niques might be employed to gain 0.6 to 0.7 dB.
The feasibility of this approach was pursued in a
number of meetings, and the decision was made
to implement an arrayed antenna capability for
Mercury II. It was understood that data via this
source would be provided on an engineering
experiment basis.in parallel with the standard
configuration at DSS 14.
Tests were planned which would evaluate the
array performance using actual spacecraft data
during far-encounter TV sequences. The Project
would decide between the standard configurat ion
and the array on the basis of these tests. Theo-
retically, the arraying gain was expected to pro-
duce a bit error rate of between one in thirty and
one in fifty over most of the Goldstone DSCC
near-encounter passes. If achievable, this would
exceed minimum requirements and provide pic-
ture quality nearly equal to that of the f i r s t
encounter. This would represent a s ignif icant
increase in TV science data return; consequently,
priority attention was given to the experiment.
The subsequent failure of the spacecraft tape
recorder in August 1974 added a s igni f icant third
difference to Mercury II. There would be no
preservation of high-quality TV frames on board
for later playback; only what was recorded on the
ground in real time would be available to experi-
menters. The optional record-playback mode
was no longer available, and this added more
importance to the arraying implementation.
DSS 43 support was also employed as a par t
of the second encounter TV data acquisition plan.
To provide for reasonable data quality, the low-
noise ultra cone was retained at DSS 43 through
second encounter.
B. Program Control
The DSN continued to provide monthly inputs
to the Project Management Report throughout this
period. With the decision to implement the
antenna arraying capability, the DSN held weekly
status meetings to review progress. These meet-
ings continued until encounter. A DSN encounter
readiness review was conducted on Sept. 6, 1974,
and all action items were closed prior to
encounter.
C. Implementation Activities
Very little implementation activity was
anticipated between Mercury first and second
encounters. However, this proved to be a busy
period, primarily as a result of antenna a r ray -
ing and the possibility of real-time 117-kbits/s
video data.
To provide tracking coverage flexibility in
the Spain longitude, DSS 61 was, for the first
time, configured and checked for Mariner 10
support. This also gave access to DSS 61 's 20-kW
transmitter for commanding during spacecraft
loss-of-Canopus emergencies.
The 230-kbits/s super group communications
service between DSS 14 and JPL was reinstalled
and checked for encounter support. The service
had been removed in the belief that real-time
117 kbits/s would not be possible during the
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second encounter. The 28.5-kbits/s wideband
communications service to the overseas 64-m
stations was reactivated after being down in
cruise for cost avoidance reasons. The DSS 14
to JPL 28. 5-kbits/s circuit had been converted to
50 kbits la in preparation for Viking test support.
Improvements were made in DSS 14's backup
antenna cone-maser performance by relocation of
the maser nearer the feed horn in the cone. This
provided an acceptable backup to DSS 14's stan-
dard cone-maser in the event of failure. Special
configurations were implemented at DSSs 14 and
43 for analog recording of integral values of video
data bits at the symbol synchronizer assembly
output for possible post-encounter processing and
enhancement.
The proposed antenna array and signal com-
bining experiment was successfully implemented
at Goldstone and tested for encounter support.
Tests with the spacecraft demonstrated achieve-
ment of the expected 0.6-0.7-dB improvement,
and the decision was made to use this configura-
tion for real-time handling of encounter data.
The key characteristics of the array experiment
are given in Table 14 and Fig. 76. It should be
noted that DSS 13, which is not normally a flight
support station, was employed as one of the
arrayed stations to take advantage of its lower
system temperature.
D. The Period Oct. 15, 1974 To Feb. 15, 1975
This section covers the period from Oct. 15,
1974 through Feb. 15, 1975. The primary objec-
tives during this portion of the Extended Mission
were to assure survival of the spacecraft for a
third Mercury encounter through conservation of
attitude-control gas and to conduct trajectory cor-
rection maneuvers as necessary to target the
spacecraft for a solar occultation zone pass.
Special support activities included TCMs 6 and 7
conducted on Oct. 30, 1974 and on Feb. 12-13,
1975, respectively. During this period the DSN
interface organization was involved in (1) the
allocation of sufficient coverage to assure accu-
rate orbit determination solutions, (2) monitoring
of DSN implementation for Viking to assure main-
tenance of compatible interfaces and capabilities
required for Mariner 10, and (3)-the development
of encounter coverage, sequences, and readiness
test plans.
Table 14. Goldstone antenna arraying
experiment key character-
istics and comments
Three-station array, two 26-m and one 64-m,
DSSs 12, 13, and 14, all listen-only.
DSS 12 and 13 receiver baseband output
microwaved to DSS 14 for arraying
experiment.
DSS 14 receiver 1 output to DSS 14 string
alpha for normal 117-kbits/s processing
recording.
DSS 14 receiver 2 baseband output micro-
waved to Goldstone area communications
terminal and looped back to DSS 14 via micro-
wave to induce signal delay nearly equivalent
to DSSs 12 and 13.
Signal combiner device located in DSS 14 at
microwave interface. Receives parallel input
from microwave of DSSs 12, 13 and 14 base-
band signal.
Signal combiner correlated and phased signals
providing a combined output to the DSS 14
SDA-string beta for processing, real-time
transmission to JPL, and recording.
DSS 14 string alpha did a little better than
expected on the non-arrayed data.
DSS 14 string beta performed a little worse
than expected on the arrayed data.
String beta appeared to be about 1/2 dB down
from alpha. Arraying was hard-wired into
beta; a switch would have been ideal but no
time to implement. Even so, arraying gave
0. 3 to 0.4 dB better performance. Had array-
ing been on alpha, the expected 0.8-dB gain
would have been realized or exceeded.
Signal combiner worked well, no difficulties.
Promised and delivered pictures at BER of
£3 in 100 for 2-1/2 h near encounter.
Low-rate data (2450 bits/s) microwaved from
DSS 14 to DSS 12 for processing and trans-
mission to JPL.
1. Planning and Operations
During October 1974 the DSN participated
with the Project in planning and preparing for
TCM 6. A major effort went into obtaining suf-
ficient tracking coverage for Mariner 10 in the
face of higher priority tasks: Pioneer 10 and 11,
Helios A prelaunch tests, Viking implementation,
and Deep. Space Station upgrades. During this
period, DSS 44 was converted from the STDN to
DSN configuration; DSS 14 was implemented for
Viking; and DSS 63 underwent gear box repairs.
Limited but adequate coverage was provided for
Mariner 10. TCM 6 was accurately performed
on Oct. 30, 1974, and there were no DSN support
problems.
Due to spacecraft attitude-control problems
and high usage of attitude control gas in October,
Project placed the spacecraft in a roll-drift mode
with the high-gain antenna and solar panels posi-
tioned to produce torques in the pitch, yaw, and
roll axes that would minimize gas consumption.
This required communications to be conducted
over the spacecraft low-gain antenna and lowering
of the data rate to 8-1/3 bits/s. Furthermore,
the spacecraft roll mode seriously impacted the
navigation accuracy achievable with the pre-
viously negotiated DSN tracking time. Project
requested additional radio-metric data, particu-
larly three-way doppler data to understand roll
signatures in the doppler data and additional
ranging points. Special efforts were required to
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resolve the tracking coverage conflicts among
the various users.
Planning for TCM 7 continued through
November and early December 1974. In order to
allow for a single maneuver strategy and to avoid
coverage conflicts during the Helios A launch and
Pioneer 11 encounter periods, TCM 7 was
rescheduled from early January 1975 to Feb. 12,
1975. This permitted allocation of adequate
coverage for Mariner 10 pre- and post-maneuver
orbit determination activities. During this time
the spacecraft continued its flight in the solar
torque, roll-control mode. Following resolution
of the December 1974 to February 1975 tracking
allocations, full attention was given to develop-
ment of a compromise plan for the March 1975
period.
On Dec. 16, 1974, the DSN met with the
Mariner 10 Project to develop an understanding
of essential encounter requirements, as well as
the requirements of other flight projects during
the March 1975 period. This meeting resulted in
a significant reduction of Mariner 10's initial
requirement for 8 days of continuous 64-m subnet
coverage at encounter. This reduction was a key
factor in permitting the DSN to draft a recom-
mended solution to the problem. In summary, the
problem was as follows:
(1) Helios and Mariner view periods were
almost entirely overlapping during
March 1975.
(2) Helios A perihelion, an event of prime
interest, would occur March 15, 1975,
requiring 64-m subnet coverage during
the period March 5-25, 1975.
(3) Mariner 10's Mercury encounter would
occur on March 16, 1975, requiring
64-m subnet coverage during the period
March 12-20, 1975.
(4) Pioneer 11 and 10 solar conjunction
would occur on March 24, 1975 and
April 4, 1975, respectively, requiring
64-m subnet coverage during the period
March 19 to April 4, 1975.
The problem was significantly reduced by the
following:
(1) Helios A would not use DSS 63 since
coverage in this longitude is provided
by the German tracking station.
(2) Mariner 10 agreed to schedule pre-
encounter critical events to occur over
DSS 63. These included: (a) central
computer and sequencer load for encoun-
ter (March 11, 1975), (b) Canopus reac-
quisition (March 13, 1975), and (c) far
encounter TV calibrations and tests
(March 14-15, 1975), thus leaving DSS
14 and 43 free to support other projects.
(3) Mariner 10 reduced the encounter 64-m
subnet coverage requirements to the
minimum essential to recover near-
encounter imaging and non-imaging data,
three consecutive passes on March 16-17,
(GMT),
Meetings and negotiations continued between
the Flight Projects throughout January 1975 to
reach agreements on detailed tracking schedules
based on the proposed compromises.
By early February 1975, plans for TCM 7
were completed, and the re_quired DSS coverage
was allocated. Since the spacecraf t continued in
the rol l -dr if t mode, timing of the roll by moni-
toring Canopus and other star crossings was
critical to proper execution of the maneuver.
Coverage from 64-m stations was required to
acquire these data at 33-1/3 bits / s since link
conditions were inadequate for communications
via the 26-m stations. However, shortly before
start of the maneuver sequence on Feb. 12, 1975,
a change in time of the Canopus cross ing was
noted and the TCM was postponed until
February 13.
Excellent support was provided by DSS 63.
Recovery of data was continuous throughout the
TCM even though a dropout had been expected due
to the planned adverse pitch angle. DSS 63
accomplished two post-TCM replays of telemetry
data acquired during the burn to fill gaps caused
by difficulties at the data processing faci l i ty . As
evidenced by greater than planned changes in the
doppler data, TCM 7 was other than planned.
Early indications indicated a 20% error as a
result of either engine overburn, roll e r ro r ,
pitch error, or a combination of all of these
error sources.
2. Implementation Activities
The low-noise ultra cone was maintained at
DSS 43 for third encounter support. This required
negotiation of the DSS 43 RF cone reconfigurat ion
work scheduled in preparat ion for Viking 75.
During January 1975, the SMT cone was replaced
with the S-band Polarization Diversity (SPD) cone.
The DSN, however, later installed the SMT maser
in the SPD cone to improve system performance.
With Project agreement, it was necessary to
terminate the Block III planetary ranging capa-
bility at DSS 14 in order to meet the Viking
schedule for completing the Block IV configura-
tion. If this configuration is not verif ied and
operational by early March 1975, the Block III
configuration will be restored for Mariner 10
encounter support.
The 230-kbits/s super group communications
service between DSS 14 and JPL was reactivated
for the third encounter. The circuit has been
deactivated during cruise to avoid lease costs.
E. The Period Feb. 15 to April 15, 1975
This section covers the period from Feb. 15,
1975 through April 15, 1975, Mercury II being on
March 16, 1975. Other special support activities
included trajectory correction maneuver No. 8
conducted on March 7, 1975 and restabilization
of the spacecraft via acquisition of the reference
star Canopus. During this period the DSN was
also involved in (1) assisting the Project in
obtaining adequate tracking coverage, (2) moni-
toring DSN implementation for Viking to assure
maintenance of capabilities required for
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Mariner 10, and (3) conducting pre-encounter data
flow tests to verify network support readiness.
1. Mission Support
a. TCM 8. Trajectory correction maneuver
No. 7, conducted on Feb. 13, 1975, was not of the
required accuracy. The DSN interface organiza-
tion assisted the Project in negotiating additional
Deep Space Station tracking time in order to
rapidly and accurately determine the post-burn
orbit.
Trajectory correction maneuver number
eight was planned and supported on March 7, 1975.
In keeping with coverage conflict resolution agree-
ments described in paragraph D-l , TCM 8 was
timed to be supported by DSS 63. This minimized
impacts on other flight project support, particu-
larly Helios A, which obtained zero-longitude
support from the German tracking station. DSN
support of the maneuver, as well as special post-
burn radio metric data generation activities,
were very satisfactory, leading to rapid verifica-
tion that the required aim point had been achieved.
b. Canopus acquisition. Canopus acquisi-
tion, the next critical event prior to encounter,
proved to be a delicate and difficult operation.
Uncertainty in the spacecraft roll rate and less
than continuous 64-m subnet coverage contributed
to the acquisition problem.
Scheduled DSS 63 passes on 10, 11, and
March 12, 1975 were devoted to spacecraft roll
timing, and the Project's calculations indicated
that the best time for an acquisition attempt fell
at a time when no 64-m DSS coverage could be
made available. Therefore, the Project took
action to slow the spacecraft roll such that the
Canopus crossing would be delayed to occur over
DSS 43 where partial-pass coverage could be
scheduled. However, the ensuing acquisition
attempt on March 12, 1975 was not successful.
The next acquisition attempt on March 13,
1975 was also unsuccessful since the spacecraft
roll rate was apparently higher than expected.
Concern grew and a spacecraft emergency was
declared. The DSN negotiated with the JPL
Helios Project representative for release of
DSS 14 and 43 for Helios A to support two
Mariner 10 passes. Although Helios agreed in
this one case, there was strong opposition to any
further reduction in 64-m subnet coverage; to do
so would seriously impact Helios prime mission
objectives at perihelion on March 15, 1975. At
one point, in the absence of 64-m DSS support,
DSS 12 employed an experimental tracking loop
of 3-Hz bandwidth in the Block III receiver to
improve signal detection capabilities. This
effort was successful in providing the Project
critical signal level information which indicated
that the spacecraft was, in fact, rolling toward a
position of improved signal rather than toward a
deep null. It became clear that the low-gain
antenna mapping technique was not an adequate
tool for Canopus acquisition.
It was decided that the spacecraft high-gain
antenna, with its narrow beam and precisely
calibrated pattern, offered the best means of
determining the spacecraft ' s position and, con-
sequently, Canopus acquisition. This required
pointing the high-gain antenna at Earth. The
plan was put into effect, and DSS 42 was employed
to f i rs t get a precise calibration on the roll posi-
tion. Then, using the received signal level and
the pattern to confirm' roll position, the space-
craft was allowed to roll-drift toward Canopus.
This process took place in carefully controlled
steps to assure success. Signal level readouts
from DSS 63 were provided every five seconds as
the spacecraft rolled the last 7 deg. The reported
signal levels tracked very precisely along the
predicted plot. At the proper time, allowing for
one-way communications, the roll-drift stop
commands were sent to be received at the space-
craft while Canopus was still acquired by the
Canopus tracker. The technique worked and
Canopus was acquired. The spacecraft was
stabilized to celestial reference, and the encoun-
ter sequence was initiated shortly thereafter.
c. DSN encounter readiness tests. As
described previously, a brief but adequate test
plan was designed to revalidate DSN 64-m subnet
encounter support configurations and data flow
capabilities. As planned, this test plan was exe-
cuted in early March 1975 but not without some
difficulties. Very limited DSS time was available
for tests due to the higher priority activities of
other projects as well as Mariner 10's critical
events described above. By March 6, 1975, the
situation had become critical, and special steps
were taken to gain additional test time for a con-
centrated effort on March 7 and 8, 1975. Sta-
tions were instructed to give priority to comple-
tion of internal system performance tests.
Negotiations with the Viking Project resulted in
cancellation of one Viking systems integration
test in order to provide DSS 14 test time for
Mariner 10.
All test objectives were met by March 10,
1975, and the DSN held a brief encounter readi-
ness review on March 13, 1975. Although the
review verified that DSN preparations for
encounter were adequate and complete, concern
continued to be expressed regarding the limited
number of test and training exercises and regard-
ing use of the newly implemented Block IV
receiver-exciter configuration at DSS 14.
In addition, it was also planned that end-to-
end data flow tests would be conducted with the
spacecraft following Canopus acquisition on
March 12, 1975. The availability of actual space-
craft data rather than simulated data would have
provided a precise demonstration. Unfortunately,
these tests were canceled due to Canopus acquisi-
tion difficulties. Consequently, the DSN sup-
ported the third encounter having had the benefit
of only one successful test with each supporting
64-m station.
d. Mercury in. The encounter sequence
was initiated on March 15, 1975 with turn-on of
the TV cameras over DSS 63. Ground command-
ing was required to accomplish the color TV
mosaic over DSS 14. Problems at the DSS 14
Block IV exciter-transmitter interface caused
command aborts during the second command of
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this sequence. Action was taken to reestablish
DSS 14 command capability via the Block III
exciter. Although this was subsequently accom-
plished, the color mosaic sequence was too far
behind the time line and had to be aborted.
Before further discussing DSN support for
encounter and another problem associated with
that support, it is important to first understand
the objectives and situation. The primary objec-
tive of Mercury III was the investigation of
Mercury's magnetic field and particles. The aim
point was optimized to provide acquisition and
return of these non-imaging data. Also, as
reported previously, the third encounter offered
excellent geometry for the celestial mechanics
experiment through the continuous acquisition of
two-way doppler data and ranging points. As a
secondary objective, TV data were to be acquired
at the full resolution, 117 kbits/s rate. The non-
imaging 2450 bits/s science was the prime data
type having priority over data for accomplishment
of other objectives. Consequently, the DSN con-
figuration was such to assure the acquisition,
recording, and real-time handling of 2450 bits/s
data rather than video data as on previous encoun-
ters. This meant that redundant DSN equipment
and data paths were assigned to the nonimaging
science rather than to video. Attention was, how-
ever, also given to the generation of radio metric
data for celestial mechanics purposes and to the
acquisition of TV data but not at the expense of
the prime data type.
As with previous Mercury encounters, acqui-
sition of full-resolution video data at 117 kbits/s
depended upon proper operation of an experimental
R&D supercooled maser ultra cone at DSS 43.
This R&D ultra cone was installed at DSS 43 prior
to Mercury first encounter to provide for mission
enhancement well beyond that which could be
gained via the standard 22 kbits/s mission. Suc-
cessful use of the ultra cone on the first two
Mercury encounters resulted in TV science
returns -well beyond expectations. R&D devices
are only occasionally used in the DSN for opera-
tional support with the understanding that they are
for mission enhancement purposes, for experi-
mental tests in parallel with operations, and are
provided on a best-efforts basis with spares,
documentation, testing and training much less
than that normally associated with operational
commitments. Use of such equipment carries a
higher risk of failure which must be weighed
against the potential increase in returns. On
MVM '73, the returns were well worth the gamble.
The foregoing is offered to point out that failures
in R&D equipment should not be unexpected and
that such failures should not be considered as
having a serious effect on primary objectives.
The DSN had problems with the R&D ultra
cone supercooled maser at DSS 43 during third
encounter. On March 14, 1975, word was
received that the maser was not cooling down as
expected. DSN maser cognizant design engineers
were assigned to work with DSS 43 via voice cir-
cuit in an all-out effort to effect repairs. The
maser was removed, equipped with new cross
head and cleaned. JPL engineers continued
coordination with DSS 43 throughout March 14-16,
1975 and provided special recommendations
regarding cool-down procedures. This effort was
not successful and the maser remained warm.
This activity was reported to the Project and
frequent progress reports were provided in order
that the Project could be ready to make a decision
as encounter approached. Even with the standard
cone and maser at DSS 43, two options were still
open: (1) acquire 117 kbits/s video containing a
high bit error rate (6 to 10 bits in error per 100)
while gaining area coverage or (2) change the data
rate to 22 kbits/s to acquire very high quality but
quarter-frame pictures. The Project opted in
favor of quality rather than quantity and flew the
22 kbits/s mission.
The DSN provided continuous, high-quality
acquisition and real-time handling of the 2450
bits/s non-imaging data throughout the third
encounter. Also, continuous two-way S-band dop-
pler data were generated and periodic ranging
points were acquired as required for celestial
mechanics. DSS 43 performed in an excellent
manner for acquisition and transmission of all
22 kbits/s video data in real time to JPL. There-
fore, overall DSN support for this encounter was
very satisfactory.
Following encounter, the DSN supported a
number of science calibration and spacecraft
engineering tests through March 24, 1975. On
March 24, data received reflected that the space-
craft had depleted its attitude gas supply. Shortly
thereafter, at 12:00 GMT, the command was sent
to turn off the spacecraft transmitter. DSS 63
observed loss of signal one round-trip light time
later indicating that the mission indeed had ended.
Table 15 summarizes some of the significant
Project and DSN accomplishments and firsts which
were associated with the very productive MVM '73
Mission.
Table 15. Significant project/DSN
mission achievements
First multi-planet gravity assist mission
First spacecraft to photograph Venus
First spacecraft to approach and
photograph Mercury
First spacecraft to have multiple
encounters with target planet
First spacecraft to effectively conserve
attitude control gas by the solar sailing
technique
First spacecraft to successfully com-
plete 9 TCMs
First JPL spacecraft to transmit full-
resolution pictures in real time from
planetary distances
First mission to use dual-frequency
radio transmission
First mission to use arrayed ground
station antennas to improve SNR
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IX. MISSION CONTROL AND COMPUTING CENTER
A. Extended Mission Planning
MCCC planning for the -extended mission
started in December 1973. An examination of the
Viking requirements for mission support space,
computer facilities and computer time was con-
ducted and compared to similar review of
assumed MVM '73 Extended Mission project
requirements for the time period of the extended
mission. This was complicated by guidelines
generated by the Project regarding the number of
Extended Mission encounters varying in number
from 1 to 3. The MCCC December plan for mis-
sion support area was reviewed by the Mission
Operations System Manager and approved. Sub-
sequent to that, Project requirements were
drastically revised and within a week of that revi-
sion the MCCC had a revised MSA plan. The
Extended Mission period was characterized by
significant MSA perturbations as discussed below
and occasional conflicts with Viking for computer
resources.
B. MCCC Extended Mission Support
The MCCC provided support in the form of
an MTC 1230/1219 string for telemetry process-
ing, a single 360/75 with (occasionally) a second
360/75 for hot backup, and 1108 support.
The software in the MTC 1219 system
remained unaltered during the extended mission,
as it had reached a level of good stability during
the prime mission. Primary concern in the 1219
support was the availability of equipment for
extended missions. The primary limitation for
long-term support was the availability of 1219
computers. The Viking MCCC missions opera-
tions' commitment is for all existing MCCC 1219
computers. Discussions with Viking indicated
that once software development was completed,
little impact between MVM '73 and Viking would
occur until the start of heavy Viking integration
and MOS testing. The Viking test plan indicated
heavy testing would start with the mission sup-
port area beneficial occupancy date of March 15,
1975 (one day before Mercury III). An agreement
was negotiated with Viking which would allow
MVM '73 total usage of the 1219, 24 hours/day
for a period immediately surrounding Mercury III
ending on March 20 and one shift/day support to
April 1.
Prior to Mercury in, judicious scheduling
was necessary to minimize interaction between
MVM '73 and Viking. A principal consideration
in MTC support was to avoid frequent and rapid
shift changes since the MTC budget covered only
1. shift/day operations. This represented a con-
siderable problem during the early Extended Mis-
sion, but as the DSN tracking coverage became
well determined, this problem disappeared.
During the period of cruise to Mercury II
and III, the Project made use of a 360/75 com-
puter for tracking data handling support and for
the operation of the command sequence genera-
tion programs. During Mercury II cruise,
Helios software was loaded into the 360/75 mis-
sion build and a series of Mariner/Pioneer/Helios
cohabitation tests took place. The Pioneer and
Mariner Projects were concerned that a true
understanding of the 360/75 software system per-
formance could only be obtained when all projects
were running under heavy simulated or real load
conditions — a situation very difficult to achieve
during data system integration testing.
The Helios cohabitation testing which
occurred during the months of May and June 1974,
was performed with only one resulting lien. It
was observed that the 360/75 system backlogged
when the Helios 2048 bi ts /s telemetry data stream
was running and in addition the 360/75 was being
heavily used by Pioneer Project. Support from a
single 360/75 was made available to MVM
24 hours/day, 7 days/week with an additional hot
backup computer during short periods of time
near TCMs and encounters. 1108 computer sup-
port was similarly available 24 hours/day, 7 days/
week. MVM '73 chose to schedule block time
once a week on Tuesday swing shifts. On a num-
ber of occasions during the mission the Project
requested prime time 1108 block time. Since it
is GPCF policy to avoid prime shift block schedul-
ing of the 1108s, MVM '73 was requested to use
swing-shift time instead. The Project's require-
ments were satisfied by mutually negotiated com-
promise time periods.
C. MCCC Operations
The Extended Mission support to MVM '73
was made during the heaviest single period of
activity in the history of the MCCC. During the
fourth quarter 1974, for example, the MCCC sup-
ported Viking integration testing, Helios A launch,
Pioneer 11 Jupiter encounter, and Extended
Mission operations, including a TCM.
Prior to Mercury II and III encounters, the
MCCC and the DSN conducted readiness tests to
validate end-to-end data flow. The principal
concern during these tests was to refresh the
Operations Team capability to validate and operate
the wide-band data lines and the super group data
lines. These were only used during the immedi-
ate encounter periods, and inevitably it was these
areas that represented the principal trouble spots
during pre-encounter testing. One major MCCC
readiness test was conducted prior to each
encounter.
D. Mission Support Area
By the time the prime Mariner 73 mission
was completed, sufficient planning for Pioneer
and Viking had proceeded to the point where the
MSA space occupied by Mariner had been com-
mitted to Viking and Pioneer. What resulted was
the formulation of a strategy requiring Mariner
to move their operations team a number of times
(6) to accommodate the Pioneer and Viking MSA
construction schedule. Figure 77 shows the area
occupied by the Mariner 10 Extended Mission
Operations teams for the majority of the Extended
Mission. In some instances (TVSA Channels)
reduced capability resulted because the equip-
ment was recommitted to other projects. These
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moves involved people, furni ture , records equip-
ment, recabling, and cable patching and eventually
resulted in Mariner ' t ime-shar ing the same MSA
area with Viking. This was accomplished during
an era when the facility was in a state of flux due
to MSA occupation and utilization. Many manhours
were spent in the physical moving of people and
equipment together with the additional time
required to revalidate the configuration after each
move.
With hindsight it can be said that the expendi-
ture of the additional manhours and the resulting
increases in cost could have been avoided and a
more cost-effective use of this resource brought
about by sufficient premission planning for an
extended mission/missions. Had this planning
taken place early enough, Extended Mission
MSA space and equipment requirements could
have been factored into the overall laboratory
plan for accommodating all the flight projects
competing for laboratory resources.
E. MSA for Extended Miss ions
With cost e f fec t iveness (manpower and
resources) of prime considera t ion for the fu tu re ,
it would seem axiomatic to carefully consider a
facility wherein extended mission ac t iv i t i e s could
be performed. The funct ions which must be per-
formed are known, and past exper ience gives us
insight to what has been accomplished by a r a the r
small dedicated team with limited resources.
This facility need not be dedicated solely to per-
forming extended mission funct ions . For example,
software development would be a logical choice
when the area was not u t i l i zed for an extended
mission.
In conclusion, it is qui te evident that the pre-
mission planning, not only for the pr ime miss ion ,
but for possible extended m i s s i o n s that may fol-
low has fa r - reaching consequences with regard
to the cost-effect ive use of manpower and labora-
tory resources.
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X. DATA RECORDS
A. Science Data Team Activities
The major activities for the Science Data
Team during the Extended Mission portion of the
flight of Mariner 10 were the following: validation
and shipment of Experimenter Data Records
(EDR's); production, validation, and shipment of
Supplementary Experimenter Data Records
(SEDR's); development of utility programs and
modification of existing data records production
software to aid or make possible the production of
valid SEDR's; and preparation of predicts data for
and real-time support of the Mercury II and in
encounters. At this writing all primary mission
and Mercury II encounter data records have been
processed and shipped to their respective princi-
pal investigators. Production of data records for
the Mercury III encounter is dependent upon the
delivery of EDRs from the MTC. Data record
production activities will be complete approxi-
mately one month after receipt of the final EDR.
B. EDR Activities
These activities involve the receipt and log-
ging of EDR magnetic tapes from the MTC, the
running of EDRVAL to validate the contents of
each tape, the coordination with MTC personnel
for the reproduction, if possible, of EDR's with
unrecoverable data content or invalid data gaps,
the manufacture of individual tape logs describing
EDR data content and the shipment of these data
to the Pi's. In addition to these activities, fur-
ther processing of the magnetometer (EPIM) EDR
received from the MTC must be accomplished.
This tape contains not only all required EPIM
data but a full complement of decommutated space-
craft engineering telemetry data as well. The tape
must be input to the EDRGEN program which out-
puts the following three items: 1) a new EPIM
EDR without the extraneous engineering data,
Z) a Celestial Mechanics and Radio Science
(CMRS) EDR consisting of CMRS engineering data
only, and 3) a Scan Platform Telemetry (SPT)
tape consisting of Guidance and Control engineer-
ing channels, which is used in the production of
SEDR's. During the Extended Mission period
most (all but the Venus encounter and some Earth
to Venus cruise) of the primary mission and all
Mercury II EDR's were handled and shipped.
This amounted to approximately 2400 EDRVAL
and 850 EDRGEN computer runs and the shipment
of 3478 EDR's.
C. SEDR Activities
The production of SEDR's involves the accum-
ulation of required input data and the processing
of these inputs plus control information through
several computer programs to obtain the desired
outputs. The input data consists of spacecraft
telemetry data, navigation data and command/
event data files which are acquired throughout
the mission based upon actual spacecraft history.
The following software is utilized to generate
the input data: spacecraft telemetry data —
EDRGEN, navigation data — DPT RAJ and
command/events data— COMGEN. Once the
input data is accumulated, two methods of
generating SEDR's are used. For CPT, PSE,
magnetometer and UVS (low scan platform
activity periods) SEDR's, SPOP, FIP, RFMT and
COPY are run to produce the desired product.
These SEDR's all have the same data content and
are generally referred to as PAFUVS SEDR's.
TV, UVS (high scan platform activity periods)
and IRR SEDR's are produced by running SPOP,
LIBPOG, and RFMT. Once the SEDR's have
been produced and validated, tape logs are pre-
pared and the tapes shipped to the appropriate
principal investigators.
During the primary mission essentially no
production SEDR's were produced due to the slow
development of the data records portion of SPOP
(processing mode) which derives limit cycle and
scan platform parameters. However, during the
transition period between primary and extended
mission, a version of SPOP was delivered to the
Science Data Team and was used to generate
approximately 50% of the primary mission SEDR's.
Production of the SEDR's was halted at this time
to investigate some abnormal time differences
between the navigation and spacecraft derived
data that are merged together by RFMT to pro-
duce the PAFUVS SEDR's. The source of these
time differences was traced to the fact that the
navigation data was time tagged based on
ephemeris time (ET), a time-base system refer-
enced back to the epoch of 1950.0, while the
spacecraft data was referenced to GMT or uni-
versal time (UTC). The time difference between
these two systems (-45 s) was contained within
the navigation data and a minor modification to
RFMT was required to use this time difference
to convert the ET to UTC so that proper merging
of navigation and spacecraft data could be accom-
plished. While investigating this anomaly, two
other errors related to timing were uncovered.
First, the RFMT algorithm which converts navi-
gation time (total seconds from the epoch of
1950.0) into units of year, day, hour, minute,
second and millisecond was incorrect and all time
tagging of navigation data in this manner was
invalid. Second, inconsistent timing of space-
craft clock values on the SEDR was discovered
and traced back to both the MTC and SPOP. The
MTC based all of its engineering data time tag-
ging upon spacecraft clock values (FDSC) and
minor frame counter in the science frames (SCI).
During periods of spotty or invalid data the
science frame was often incorrect and led to
incorrect time tagging by the MTC resulting in
minor frame time duplications and regressions.
SPOP was programmed to receive and process
data on a FDSC basis rather than a minor frame
basis (4 minor frames/FDSC) and the time tag-
ging of partial FDSC's (less than 4 minor frames)
was often incorrect. A decision was made at this
point in time that all SEDR's produced to date
should be reproduced after accomplishing modi-
fications to RFMT to amend its timing problems
and the development of a utility program designed
to rectify MTC and SPOP timing problems. Uti-
lizing this new utility program (STUFF) and the
new version of RFMT, all primary mission
SEDR's were produced and sent to the principal
investigators. However, toward the end of this
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production phase, it became apparent that more
serious-problems in SPOP concerning scan plat-
form pointing angles existed.
An investigation in this area.-was conducted
by the Science Data Team and-the result was that
approximately 50% of the TV and UVS SEDR's that
had been produced contained scan platform point-
ing errors. . It was apparent that to correct'these
problems, a modification to SPOP would have to
be made. Therefore, all known problems with
SPOP were tabulated and were systematically
corrected and tested with Division 91 program-
ming support. A similar approach was then taken
with the PAFUVS SEDR production portion of
RFMT. The RFMT modification was undertaken
due to the almost certainty of a Mercury III
encounter in 1975 and the fact that the RFMT time
algorithm for navigation data would not handle the
year 1975. During the modifications of SPOP
and RFMT, the utility program, STUFF, was
expanded to include a representation for each
FDSC of data. FDSC's in data gaps would be
represented by four (4) minor frames of filler
data with correct time tags, while the missing
portions of partial FDSC's would also be repre-
sented by correctly time-tagged filler data. This
would-insure that SPOP would not have to perform
any time tagging during data gaps and for partial
FDSC's.
Utilizing the new program set, the SEDR's
containing scan platform pointing errors (TV and
UVS) were reproduced and all Extended Mission
SEDR's were produced through Mercury n encoun-
ter. This same program set is expected to be
adequate to produce all the SEDR's required for
the Mercury III encounter. In all, for the
Extended Mission period from April 16, 1974
until present, the Science Data Team made the
following approximate number of runs, including
an estimate for reruns, of the SEDR production
software: 300 SPOP, 150 FIP, 200 LIBPOG and
500 RFMT.
D. Mercury II and III Predicts
These activities involved obtaining predicted
navigation data for the encounter and processing
these data to produce navigation data dumps,
SEDR's containing navigation data only and pre-
dicted fixed instrument (all but TV and UVSA)
pointing vectors in the Earth Mean Equatorial
(EME) epoch of 1950.0 coordinate system. For
Mercury n predicts 3 data dumps and 3 SEDR's
were produced. Due to a loss of expertise in the
transition from primary to extended mission, the
Science Data Team was unable to produce any
meaningful EME pointing data for this encounter.
However, due to the similarity between these data
from encounter to encounter, and the fact that
this encounter was mainly for the TV experiment,
the principal investigators were able to use the
Mercury I data for their purposes. During the
production of predicts for the Mercury III encoun-
ter, the SDT regained EME pointing vector pre-
diction capability and for this encounter the Pi's
were supplied with a full complement of predicts
data based upon the applicable predicted naviga-
tion data. These data amounted to 2 navigation
data dumps, 2 SEDR's and two EME pointing
vector listings.
E. Real-Time Support of Mission Activities
The Science Data Team provided real-time
support of the Mercury II and in encounters.
The activities in this area included checkout and
verification of data links to provide real-time
encounter data to Pi's at remote sites, the
scheduling of computer time for PI near real time
processing at JPL, the validation of quick look
EDR's received from the MTC and the generation
of quick-look magnetometer EDR's as required.
These services were also provided during other
portions of the mission as required by the Pi's.
Other real-time or near real-time activities
included the generation of daily science data logs
and command logs, maintaining a list of signifi-
cant spacecraft science events and the generation
of spacecraft clock value (FDSC) versus space-
craft event (SCE) time tables for the entire
mission.
F. Recommendations
(1) Flexibility should be built into non-
critical mission software such as the
SEDR production program set so that the
programs involved can be updated and
made available for production on a short
turn-around basis without having to go
through the bureaucracy of a mission
build concept system.
(2) The project should require maintenance
support for interdivision software (soft-
ware that is developed by one division
and used by another) so that the user
division •will have an effective means of
updating software as required during the
mission.
(3) Software users should be educated at
least to the functional level as to the
operation of his software tools and- be
able to absolutely verify the validity of
the software execution by quickly
analyzing the outputs.
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